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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks at the politics of airpower in US-China relations in 1928-1941, in 
particular the question of aviation assistance to the Nationalists. Since World War II, 
American historians have asserted that before Pearl Harbor, Americans helped the 
Chinese to improve their air force to resist Japan. The thesis finds, however, that trade 
not aid dominated the approach of the US government and private individuals towards 
China and that Chiang wanted an air force to use against his internal enemies, not Japan. 
Moreover, the Roosevelt Administration consistently treated China’s airpower needs as 
secondary to those of Britain or the US military.  
 
In the interwar years, China and the United States had less to do with each other than 
with other allies. In 1933-1935 Chiang preferred an official Italian air mission to an 
unofficial American one. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Stalin 
sent massive air assistance to China which eclipsed the influence of American aircraft 
salesmen and advisers. In 1938-1939 President Roosevelt promoted the sale of aircraft 
to Britain and France, believing that large modern air fleets would deter Germany from 
aggression against its European neighbours. China was far down his list of priorities. 
 
In 1939 the Administration adopted a policy of promoting aircraft sales to China which 
was comparable to that adopted for its European allies. By encouraging aircraft sales to 
the Nationalists, the Administration hoped to boost China’s resistance so that Japan 
would remain ‘bogged down’ in China instead of attacking the Asian colonies of 
European allies. In the winter of 1940-1941, the formation of a mercenary air force, the 
American Volunteer Group (AVG) was associated with this strategy. As this thesis 
reveals, British and Chinese officials decided to base the AVG in Burma to enhance the 
air defence of British territory in the Far East. Thus the AVG became unofficial aid 
primarily for Britain.  
 
Soon after Pearl Harbor, the American press began to treat the AVG as symbol of Sino-
American friendship. The group became known as the Flying Tigers and the original 
reasons for its formation were buried under layers of propaganda which have distorted  
the historical record ever since.     
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Introduction 
 
When the West brought its commercial enterprise and ambitions to China, ‘a modern 
fringe was stitched along the hem of an ancient garment’ as the British historian R.H. 
Tawney observed in 1932.
1
 One strand of that fringe was aviation. From 1914 onwards, 
warlords used planes for civil wars rather than civil aviation. Lacking an industrial base, 
they relied on imports for the ‘air bureaus’ attached to their armies. Overseas Chinese 
and a few foreign salesmen supplied the factions in China’s civil wars through the 
1920s. After the establishment of the Kuomintang (KMT) government at Nanking in 
1928 western aircraft brokers increasingly focused on sales to the Nationalists. As 
airpower became more important to China’s military leaders, so did their ties with 
foreign suppliers.  
 
This thesis looks at the relationship which evolved between the United States and China 
in the field of military aviation in 1928-1941, a period which ranges from the founding 
of the Nanking regime to the eve of Pearl Harbor. It calls into question the traditional 
American narrative on this topic which has emphasized unofficial air assistance 
provided by Americans to the Nationalists in the interwar years.  Since World War II, 
popular as well as academic historians have insisted that the Nationalists relied on the 
United States for equipment and expertise to improve their air force. A wide range of 
primary sources, however, suggest the reverse: Americans depended on the regime for 
sales and jobs which were better than those available at home in the United States 
during the Depression.  
 
The thesis makes an original contribution to international business history by arguing 
that in 1928-1941, trade not aid dominated American interest in China’s aviation affairs. 
Through a close examination of archival material, it traces the commercial as well as 
diplomatic motives which induced private agents as well as US government officials to 
promote aircraft sales to the Nationalists. It also reassesses the results of American 
efforts to supply and train the Chinese Air Force (CAF).  American aircraft firms such 
as Curtiss-Wright (C-W) provided the majority of planes to the CAF in 1933-1937 but  
American instructors met resistance from the Chinese when trying to impose their 
                                                     
1
 R.H.Tawney Land and Labour in China (London,1932), p.13 
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standards on the CAF. Countless military attaché reports reveal Sino-American tensions 
over discipline and training. Chiang and his military advisers commanded an air force 
which could overwhelm his internal opponents because they lacked any air resources 
but  was not fit for the purpose of fighting a war with Japan:  the CAF virtually 
collapsed in 1937 during the first four months of the Sino-Japanese war.  
 
In 1937-1939 Stalin provided a large aviation mission which effectively took charge of  
China’s Air Ministry, the Commission on Aeronautic Affairs (CoAA) and directed CAF 
operations. While  some CAF pilots participated in air combat, Russian aviators 
accounted for the lion’s share of offensives against Japanese supply lines. By 1939 
Chiang was still an airpower advocate but he had lost all confidence in the air force and 
its administration . In 1940 when Stalin started to withdraw Russian aviators from 
China, Chiang sought cooperation from both the United States and Britain to replace 
Soviet air aid: he had no further interest in trying to revive the CAF or channelling 
resources into the corrupt and ineffectual CoAA. 
 
This thesis makes an original contribution to diplomatic history by examining the 
formation of a mercenary air force, which in August 1941 became known as the 
American Volunteer Group (AVG) and after Pearl Harbor  as the Flying Tigers. 
Documents from the National Archive as well as US sources suggest a rationale for 
founding the AVG which diverges markedly from the explanations of American 
historians. Whereas they have described the AVG as the prelude to the official US 
airpower programme for China during World War II, this thesis sees a link between the 
origins of the project and Roosevelt’s foreign policy dilemmas in the winter of 1940-
1941. American historians have not recognized what a radical departure the AVG 
project was from US Far East policy in the interwar period: the decision to send a 
hundred combat planes and military personnel to the Far East was ‘not a ‘thing lightly 
arrived at’ as US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. put it. 2  Therefore the thesis 
has started from the premise that exceptional circumstances induced President 
Roosevelt to embark on an unprecedented plan to project American airpower into 
China. Therefore the reasons for his decisions must make sense within the context of 
                                                     
2
 Library of Congress (LOC), The Morgenthau Diaries Prelude to War 1940-1942 (Morgenthau), 
Reel 33, Vol.344, ‘Re: Chinese Purchasing program January 2,1941’, pp.57-59 
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US foreign relations as a whole : the Administration’s support for European allies and 
the allocation of scarce supplies of aircraft to the US military as well as foreign clients. 
Furthermore the explanation must take into full account the role of Americans who had 
been active in China’s aviation affairs during the previous decade.  
 
In order to draw a clear distinction between the arguments presented in this dissertation 
and the traditional narrative about American air aid for China, it is necessary first to 
review the key works in chronological order which have touched on the politics of 
airpower between the United States and China in the interwar period.  
 
Literature Review   
 
Scholarly works in English on China’s aviation have proved to be few and far between. 
As Frank Dikötter recently commented, ‘planes are rarely mentioned in accounts of the 
Republican period, even if China enthusiastically participated in the growth of 
aeronautics.’3 Because of its weak combat record in the Sino-Japanese war, the CAF has 
hardly earned a mention in China’s military history. For example, in A Military History 
of Modern China (1956) F. F. Liu referred to the CAF only in connection with the 
Flying Tigers, the American mercenary air force organized in the winter of 1940-1941 
which began combat missions the day after Pearl Harbor.
4
 In a more recent study, War 
and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945, (2003) Hans J. van de Ven dismissed the 
Nationalists’ air effort during the Sino-Japanese war altogether: ‘little was 
accomplished. The Nationalists were not able to produce aeroplanes domestically…The 
Japanese air force was not only far superior in numbers, the quality of its aeroplanes far 
exceeded that of the Nationalists.’5   
 
A number of American historians have felt, on the contrary, that something significant 
was accomplished in Chinese aviation thanks to support from American aircraft 
suppliers, instructors or advisers. The American aviation historian,  Ray Wagner 
commented that even if the Nationalists experienced nothing but defeat at the hands of 
                                                     
3
 Frank Dikötter, The age of openness: China before Mao (Hong Kong,2008), p.96 
4
 F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China,1924-1949 (Princeton,1956), pp.174 -176  
5
 Hans J.van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China 1925-1945 (London, 2003), p.163 
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the Japanese air force, ‘the story of their aircraft and the efforts made by Americans to 
help should be told.’6    
 
Soon after Pearl Harbor the American press began to produce reports about the combat 
record of the Flying Tigers against the Japanese which distracted the public from the 
humiliation of Pearl Harbor. For example, in February 1942, Time Magazine reported 
‘the A.V.G.'s 100-odd U.S. pilots brightened last week's dark record of war in the 
Pacific with great valour and victories.’7 The first publicists for the Flying Tigers, 
Russell Whelan and Robert Hotz idolised Claire Chennault as a maverick who almost 
singlehandedly created China’s air defences against Japan from 1937 onwards.8 As 
Whelan described, Chiang was determined to modernise China generally and the air 
force specifically. After the Shanghai War of 1932 between China and Japan, Chiang 
appealed to the British for help with training but they declined because the Japanese 
might have ‘frowned’ upon this move.9 The US government, he alleged sent an 
‘unofficial’ mission of  American instructors led by John Jouett to train the CAF ‘to the 
exacting standards of the U.S. Army, the highest in the world’.10 Thus he portrayed the 
Jouett mission as a predecessor to Chennault and the Flying Tigers, and also 
demonstrated that Americans helped the Nationalists to improve their air force long 
before Pearl Harbor.  
 
Claire Chennault’s memoirs Way of a Fighter (1949) written with Robert Hotz filled out 
the portrait of a lone crusader desperately toiling to save China through airpower.
11
 At 
the time of publication, several reviewers treated the work with scepticism because of 
its bias and factual inaccuracies. One commented that ‘as a political tract, the book is 
tendentious and often in error on events of recent years.’12 Another observed that 
Chennault’s evidence was couched in such strong terms that one ‘must in the case of 
                                                     
6
 Ray Wagner, ‘The Chinese Air Force, 1931 – 1940’ The Journal of the American Aviation 
Historical Society (JAAHS) Fall 1974, p.162  
7
 Time Magazine, ‘World: Tigers Over Burma’ Vol.ume XXXIX No.6  
8
 Russell Whelan, The Flying Tigers (New York, 1942), pp.10-15 : Robert B. Hotz With General 
Chennault: The Story of the Flying Tigers (New York, 1943), pp.14-15 
9 Whelan, Flying Tigers, p.11 
10
 Whelan, Flying Tigers, p.12 
11 Claire Lee Chennault, Way of a Fighter, The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault edited by 
Robert Hotz (New York,1949), pp.34-39 
12
 Richard E. Lauterbach, review ‘Way of a Fighter’, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 18, No. 11 (Jun. 1, 
1949), p.130 
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those whom he forthrighteously condemns wish to examine the evidence of the other 
side.’13 Annalee Jacoby, (co-author with Theodore White of Thunder out of China) 
commented on the aptness of the title because Chennault had fought with everyone: 
‘these memoirs are so interestingly schizoid that they seem to be the product of three 
different men.’14 Nevertheless American historians continue to accept Way of a Fighter 
as evidence of his central role in training the CAF, advising the Chiangs and in 1940-
1941 founding AVG.  
 
According to his memoir, in 1940 Chennault tried to persuade contacts in the United 
States that Americans should help the Chinese Air Force resist Japan just as much they 
were helping the British and French air forces resist Germany.
15
  He came up with a 
plan to ‘throw a small but well-equipped air force into China’ which called for fighters 
as well as bombers based in China to launch ‘fire-bomb attacks’ on Japan.16 
Organisation of the fighter group, however, progressed faster than expected thanks to 
support from various members of the Roosevelt Administration: in April 1941 a 
hundred Curtiss-Wright P-40s were shipped to China and pilot recruitment began; both 
planes and personnel started to arrive in Rangoon during the summer of 1941.
17
 
Others built on Chennault’s account without changing its basic structure. In Stilwell’s 
Mission to China (1952) the official Army historians, Charles Romanus and Riley 
Sunderland gave Chennault full credit as the driving force behind the AVG but alluded 
to the involvement of a few others in developing air aid for China.
18
 They referred to 
discussions in December 1940 which the directors of Intercontinent, William D Pawley 
and Captain Bruce Gardner Leighton (USN) had with the Secretary of the Navy Frank 
Knox about Chiang’s demands for massive air support.19  Romanus and Sunderland also 
noted that a Chinese plan to bomb Japan from China received ‘august support’ from 
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Because 
trained American crews were as scarce as B-17 bombers, the War Department vetoed 
this plan. Instead the Chinese received 100 P-40B's originally ordered by the British 
                                                     
      
13
 Elbridge Colby, Review ‘Way of a Fighter’ World Affairs  Vol. 112, No. 2, Summer, 1949, p.60 
14
 Annalee Jacoby, ‘ Fighting Man, Fighting Words’ The New York Times Book Review,  30 
January 1949, p.1  
15
 Chennault, Memoirs, pp.92-93 
16
 Chennault, Memoirs, pp.96-97 
17
 Chennault, Memoirs, pp.99-101 
18
 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland United States Army in World War II China-Burma-
India Theater Stillwell's Mission to China (Washington, 1953), pp.11-12 
19
 Romanus & Sunderland Stilwell’s Mission,  p.11 
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government.
20
  Nonetheless the army historians concluded that ‘at this early date, the 
[War] Department entertained the idea of containing Japan by putting airpower into 
China.’21 It was important for Romanus and Sunderland to show that Pearl Harbor was 
not the sole catalyst for delivering air support to China: American officials had been 
eager to help Chiang during 1940-1941.  
 
In the 1950s revelations about the Roosevelt Administration began to surface in 
memoirs by or about Roosevelt’s closest advisers: Robert Sherwood’s Roosevelt and 
Hopkins, an intimate history (1948) was followed by the ‘secret diary’ of Harold Ickes 
(1953-1954) and John Morton Blum’s edition of the diaries of Roosevelt’s Treasury 
Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. (1959-1967).
22
 Of these the last is the most relevant to 
this study because Morgenthau was a driving force behind the sale of airplanes to China 
in 1940-1941. 
 
In Volume II (1938-1941), Blum described some of the background to the formation of 
the Flying Tigers.  On 30 November 1940 Chiang’s personal envoy (and brother-in-law) 
T.V. Soong (Soong Tse-ven) had revealed to Morgenthau that Japan’s formal 
recognition of Wang Chingwei’s puppet government at Nanking could have dire 
consequences: the Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles warned Roosevelt of the 
‘danger of a real psychological moral lapse as a result of this recognition of the one 
regime.’23 This alleged menace induced the administration to arrange an exceptionally 
large loan of US$100 million for China. Blum quoted Roosevelt as stating that it was a 
‘matter of life and death… it may mean war in the Far East’ if the loan was not 
approved.
24
  
 
This loan was intended ‘to bolster the Generalissimo’s spirit and remind Japan of the 
long-standing American insistence on a free and independent China’.25 Nonetheless 
Chiang still pleaded for massive American air support and particularly bombers to 
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 Romanus & Sunderland Stilwell’s Mission,  p.12 
21
 Romanus & Sunderland Stilwell’s Mission,  p.13 
22
 Robert E Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History (New York,1948),: The 
Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Volumes I – III (New York, 1953-1954) ; John Morton Blum, 
From the Morgenthau Diaries Vol. I- III (Boston, 1959-1967) 
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 Blum, Morgenthau Vol. II, p.364 
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 Blum, Morgenthau Vol. II, p.364 
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12 
 
attack Japan: Morgenthau was ‘much impressed’ by Chiang’s proposition that ‘the 
experience of being bombed…might bring the Japanese people, already suffering from 
privation, to demand an end to aggression.’26 Morgenthau then discussed with 
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the idea of selling a few bombers to 
Chiang with which to bomb Tokyo from bases in China. The Morgenthau diaries 
revealed that Roosevelt was ‘simply delighted’ with the idea of bombing Japan as was 
Hull.
27
  
 
It is important to note that in 1938-1941, Morgenthau was in charge of matching the 
orders of different foreign purchasing commissions to the available supply of aircraft : 
US production lagged far behind the demands of the US military and European allies. 
Therefore supplies had to be allocated to different customers according to Roosevelt’s 
priorities.  Generally speaking, in 1940-1941 Britain was the first in line to receive 
aircraft ahead of all other countries because it was on its own in resisting Germany. 
 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson and his chief of staff, General George Marshall vetoed 
the plan to send bombers to China because these were in short supply and were 
considered to be of greater value to the British than to the Chinese.
28
 Marshall preferred 
that the Chinese receive fighter planes from the British allocation. As Morgenthau had 
obtained more planes for the Chinese ‘than the United States and England could spare... 
the Chinese were naturally grateful.’29 Blum provided no reason for this exceptional act 
of charity. His careful selection of diary extracts was calculated to reveal how much the 
Administration had wanted to help China and to bomb Japan before Pearl Harbor.  
 
The American economist, Arthur Nichols Young served as a financial adviser to the 
Nationalists’ Ministry of Finance from 1929 to 1947. He also took a direct part in 
various aviation projects in this period. In China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945 
(1963), Young went further than his predecessors to devise a conceptual framework to 
demonstrate continuity between the development of China’s aviation before and during 
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 Blum, Morgenthau Vol. II, p.365 
27
 Blum, Morgenthau Vol. II, p.367 
28
 Blum, Morgenthau Vol. II, p.368 
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 Blum, Morgenthau Vol. II, p.368 
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the Sino-Japanese war.
30
  He introduced the concept of ‘nongovernmental and 
governmental aid’ in aviation and praised the private technicians who helped the CAF 
before 1937. He regarded  Claire Chennault as ‘the dramatic figure on whom centers the 
story of China’s military aviation from 1937’: in Young’s account, Chennault provided 
the continuity between air assistance before and after Pearl Harbor.
 31
 Young was 
particularly critical of the US government for doing so little to help the Chinese before 
World War II.
32
  In his view, only Stalin made ‘a serious effort to bolster China’s air 
arm’ after the CAF lost its best aircraft and pilots in combat with the Japanese during 
the opening months of the war in 1937.
33
  
 
In discussing the formation of the AVG, Young followed Blum’s account: bombers 
were retained for Britain while 100 P-40B fighters were released to China from 
Britain’s first quarter 1941 deliveries, against the promise of 200 P-40s with more 
advanced specifications in May-July 1941. Like Blum he provided no specific 
explanation of why the P-40s were to be sent to China : they were simply described as 
‘the basis for organising the Flying Tigers.’34 Like Romanus and Sutherland, he 
mentioned the part played by William D Pawley and Bruce Leighton of Intercontinent 
who from mid-April 1941 onwards were responsible for recruiting all AVG personnel 
through their Chinese subsidiary, the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company 
(CAMCO).
35
 In terms of chronology, he implied that Intercontinent’s role in sending 
planes and men to the Far East began after the passage of Lendlease in March 1941. 
 
In The United States and China, (1971, 3
rd
 edition) John K. Fairbank offered a critique 
of American aid for China before and after World War II.  Up to 1941 there been a 
tradition of philanthropy directed to the Chinese people, which had bypassed the 
government.
36
 On the threshold of World War II, however, official assistance to the 
KMT regime began to prevail over private philanthropy. The turning point came in the 
winter of 1940-1941 when the Roosevelt administration approved a large loan for China 
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 Young, Helping Hand, pp.22-23 & p.263 
31
 Young, Helping Hand, pp.22-24 
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 Young, Helping Hand, p.263 
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 Young, Helping Hand, p.26 
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 Young, Helping Hand, pp.149 - 150 
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and the ‘clandestine development’ of the Flying Tigers.37 As Fairbank put it, these 
official forms of assistance were ‘a milestone, if not indeed a grave-marker’ in 
American relations with the Chinese people.’38 Through World War II and thereafter, 
US government support of Chiang’s regime expanded rapidly and unconditionally until 
‘trying to aid it, we became entangled in its decline and fall.’39 Thus Fairbank 
highlighted the immorality of US aid policy and traced the roots of the ‘China Lobby’ -- 
long term US support for Chiang and the Nationalists -- back to US financial and air 
assistance in the year before Pearl Harbor.  
 
It is intriguing to observe that in 1942 Fairbank worked in the White House for 
Roosevelt’s special assistant Lauchlin Currie who handled many aspects of the AVG’s 
organisation. Early in 1942 Fairbank wrote a memorandum about the airpower 
programme for China which is preserved in Currie’s China papers at the Hoover 
Institution.
40
 Although this document was never published, it began to circulate 
privately amongst historians who received copies from Currie in the 1970s.
41
 It reveals 
that early in 1942 chronological as well as factual errors enhanced the impression that 
by creating the AVG, the Administration had hoped to improve China’s air defences 
before Pearl Harbor. 
  
Fairbank dated the start of the AVG’s development to the ‘late spring of 1941’ when it 
became apparent that air-power was the most effective and tangible way to strengthen 
support for China: an air force based ‘on Chinese or even on Burmese territory’ could 
be ‘of direct value in the defence of Singapore’ or to strike at Japanese water borne 
supply lines or possibly to ‘undertake the bombing of big cities in Japan from Chinese 
bases such as Chuchow in Chekiang province, only 730 miles from Nagasaki.’ At the 
very least, the force could protect the Burma Road and other links through Burma and 
China to the outside world.
42
 Fairbank noted that plans for this air force, apart from the 
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 Fairbank, US and China, p. 261 
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 Fairbank, US and China, p. 261 
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 Hoover Institution, Stanford University (HISU), Lauchlin Bernard Currie Papers, box 5 ‘John 
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acquisition of the P-40s, only got under way in March 1941 after Currie returned from 
China thus putting Currie at the centre of project management.   
 
In describing the origins of the air programme for China, Fairbank noted that the idea of 
an ‘American Volunteer air unit had been proposed in January 1940 by Bruce G 
Leighton, vice-president of the Intercontinent Corporation.’ Leighton had put ‘strategic 
arguments for air-power in China’ before the Chief of Naval operations on 17 January 
1940: his idea was for his company to ‘handle the whole job under commercial contract 
with China’ and ‘“without any direct participation by the United States Government.”’43  
Fairbank understood that arrangements to acquire planes began in November 1940 with 
the arrival of a ‘Chinese Air Mission’ made up of Claire Chennault and CAF General 
P.T. Mow who assisted T.V.Soong to obtain support from Henry Morgenthau: General 
Marshall recommended that a hundred Curtiss P-40 planes be released from the 
British.
44
 Although the air programme was funded by Lend-lease, it ‘began before 
Lend-lease...through the initiative of Chinese agents.’45 In early 1942,  Fairbank 
provided more complete information than anyone else about the origins of the AVG. 
His purpose in writing the memorandum, however, was political, that is, to highlight the 
prescience of the President and Currie in conceiving of air aid for China before Pearl 
Harbor.  
 
In The Dragon’s Wings: the China National Aviation Corporation and the Development 
of Commercial Aviation in China (1976) Leary focused on the role of Americans in 
China’s passenger and airmail service.46 Leary described Clement Keys, the head of the 
Curtiss-Wright conglomerate as ‘the man destined to father commercial aviation in 
China’47  This was not in fact the case : the Nationalist Ministry of Communications set 
up its own service at least six months before Keys launched his own, the China National 
Aviation Corporation (CNAC). Like Young, Leary treated Keys and other western 
investors in passenger and airmail services as helping China in aviation despite their 
evident desire to make money. Through investment in China’s airlines, he stated, 
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‘western nations were prepared to lend assistance in hopes of finding profit. China and 
the West were thus tied together by bonds of mutual self-interest’.48  
 
Leary’s formula of ‘mutual self-interest’ shifted the emphasis from cause to effect and 
from motive to outcome. He implied that the means justified the ends: the Chinese 
received assistance in exchange for giving American investors a share in their state 
airline monopoly. Even though Clement Keys did not set out to help China, his quest for 
profit had a positive result: it delivered private entrepreneurial support for China’s 
modernization. Leary echoed Arthur Young in a morally uplifting conclusion that ‘those 
who extend the helping hand, for whatever reasons, are rarely loved – nor should they 
expect to be. It should be enough to derive satisfaction from being a part of one of the 
great pioneering ventures in the history of commercial aviation.’49  
 
The British historian Peter Lowe explored air aid for China from the British angle in 
Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War, A study of British Policy in East Asia 
1937-1941, (1977). He pointed out four principal forms of assistance which the British 
government provided to the Chinese starting in October of 1940: ‘the £5 mn loan made 
in Autumn 1940: the transfer of the Chinese government’s Loiwing aircraft factory to 
Bangalore in India as well as the assembly of Chinese military aircraft in Burma; the 
assembly of aircraft and transport of supplies for the International Air Force, under the 
command of the American Claire Chennault; the provision for the International Air 
force of 100 Tomahawks and 144 Vultees out of the allocation made to Britain in the 
United States.’50  Lowe’s research was of particular relevance to this dissertation 
because most of the activities which he described on closer inspection turned out to be 
initiatives which William D Pawley of Intercontinent negotiated with the British 
government in 1940-1941. 
 
In the U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (1979) Michael Schaller took an entirely new 
tack. Where Chennault, Young and Leary had vaunted the efforts of Americans to help 
the Chinese in aviation, Schaller perceived questionable motives and intrigue on the part 
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of the AVG’s founders in 1940-1941. The conspiracy of ‘private military entrepreneurs’ 
and the Roosevelt administration to create ‘a program of secret air warfare’ set ‘a major 
precedent for US military and political planning’ after World War II: several individuals 
active in the AVG went on to join Chennault in creating CAT-Air America ‘a 
paramilitary arm of the Central Intelligence Agency.’51 Like Arthur Young, Schaller 
regarded Chennault as the link between pre and post war American involvement in 
China’s military aviation. Of the AVG, he concluded that ‘a force originating in 
December 1940 as an effort to punish Japan and perhaps deter its further aggression had 
transformed itself along with the political environment of East Asia and the growth of 
American globalism.’52 
 
Schaller examined in some detail the formation of the Flying Tigers. Drawing heavily 
on the original Morgenthau diaries he also followed much of the narrative established 
by Blum’s edition:  Japan’s ‘formal recognition’ of Wang Chingwei’s puppet regime at 
Nanking provoked a crisis in China which in turn induced Roosevelt to seek a large 
morale boosting loan for Chiang.
53
 Within a week, however, the administration came to 
the view that an even stronger remedy was required: Roosevelt, Hull and Morgenthau 
for the first time considered military aid for China. In December they enthusiastically 
endorsed a proposal by Chiang and Chennault for a large air force which included 
bombers to attack Japan from facilities in China.
54
 Stimson and Marshall regarded this 
as ‘a recklessly provocative plan’ and vetoed it on the grounds that the US should retain 
scarce bombers for the British. Instead Marshall recommended that Morgenthau divert 
from the British to the Chinese a hundred fighter planes (C-W P-40s) which formed the 
nucleus of the Flying Tigers.
55
  
 
Like Blum and Young before him, Schaller did not explain the reason for diverting P-
40s to China in January 1941: in his account, the rationale only emerged in May 1941 
when the President’s special adviser, Lauchlin Currie submitted a general airpower 
programme for China. Currie’s plan provided for bomber and fighter squadrons to 
defend Singapore and the Burma Road as well as to bomb Japan from existing airfields 
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in China.
56
 He accepted Chennault’s view that the principal obstacle to establishing a 
bomber offensive in 1941 was ‘intense hostility among other factions in the War 
Department and the competing demands of the British and General MacArthur in the 
Philippines.’57 Schaller devoted the rest of his analysis about the AVG and Chennault to 
demonstrating the aggressive and secretive nature of airpower schemes which set the 
precedent for post-war CIA operations: the CIA contracted Chennault’s airline, China 
Air Transport (CAT) for many covert missions in Southeast Asia. 
 
Schaller inherited certain inconsistencies from Blum and Young to which  he added his 
own. First Japan’s formal recognition of Wang Chingwei’s government at Nanking did 
not pose an overwhelming threat to the stability of Chiang’s government at Chungking. 
Wang had already been in charge of a puppet regime since March 1940. The principal 
concern for Chiang in the autumn of 1940 as Young correctly pointed out, was the risk 
that popular support would swing towards the Communists. Chiang warned that ‘the 
Japanese and their design to smash our power we do not fear but deterioration of the 
people’s morale and the Chinese Communists are truly problems of a serious 
character’.58  
 
After the Japanese recognized Wang’s government on 29 November 1940, US 
Ambassador Nelson Johnson reported on 4 December  that the diplomatic situation had 
improved and that ‘Japanese recognition of the Wang regime had little apparent effect 
on Chungking.’ 59 Hence the threat from Wang had receded by the time the 
Administration began to develop an appetite for bombing Japan in the first part of 
December 1940.  
 
Secondly in all three accounts there is a mismatch between the American solution and 
the Chinese problem: the punishment of bombing Japan simply does not fit the 
figurative crime of an internal Chinese political crisis: challenges to Chiang’s regime 
had come and gone over the previous three years without prompting the US government 
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to abandon its policy of appeasing Japan and withholding aid for China. Blum, Young 
and Schaller failed to identify a sufficiently alarming threat which would induce the 
administration to contemplate an attack on Japan from Chinese airbases.  In Young and 
Schaller’s account, the Administration after a week of  planning an offensive on Tokyo 
suddenly dropped the plan and offered fighter planes instead to fortify Chiang’s fighting 
spirit. Yet, according to Schaller, the Administration then failed to dispatch these 
morale boosting planes for several months: he asserts that Roosevelt and his advisers 
intended delivery only after enactment of Lendlease legislation.  For that reason 
recruitment of personnel as well as the shipment of planes to Rangoon finally began in 
the late spring and early summer of 1941, just as Whelan in 1942 had described.  
 
Schaller and Young mentioned the pressure on aircraft supplies from Britain but did not 
give this factor sufficient weight in describing air aid for China. In 1940 the 
preoccupation of the Roosevelt administration was ‘all aid short of war’ for Britain. The 
P-40 was still the most advanced fighter plane in the American arsenal : it was a 
distortion on the part of Whelan to describe it as ‘obsolete’ and on the part of Chennault 
to declare that it was ‘not an ideal airplane for the purpose required’.60 By the end of 
1940, the US Army Air Corps (USAAC) felt the pinch from the diversion of so many 
aircraft to Britain. Up to November 1940, the USAAC received only 7 P-40s compared 
to 296 delivered to Britain.
 61 
 It seems odd that Marshall was willing to give up so many 
fighter planes to China when his own branch of the armed forces had received so few 
unless there was a compelling reason to do so.  
 
On 8 December 1940 Churchill wrote his famous letter to Roosevelt requesting 
immediate and unstinted financial aid which was to include the greatest number of 
planes which Roosevelt could possibly send.
62
 At this stage of the war, fighter planes 
such as the P-40 were more important to the British than bombers because of tactical 
operations in the Mediterranean planned for the spring of 1941. Yet American historians 
consistently portray the British as willing to divert P-40s to China in exchange for a 
larger supply of planes later in the year. Schaller, Blum, Young and Chennault never 
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reconciled Britain’s urgent demands for aircraft with its apparent willingness to  
sacrifice a hundred P-40s to China.  
 
In Going to War with Japan 1937-1941 (1985) Jonathan Utley made a few perceptive 
points about the story of the Flying Tigers.
63
 Utley like Schaller took the line that the 
Flying Tigers was created  for psychological reasons, to ‘keep China fighting’ and as 
part of a strategy to contain rather than confront Japan.
 64
  Utley introduced some 
primary sources which Schaller had not examined: when George Marshall vetoed the 
idea of bombing Japan, he came up with the idea of giving China enough pursuit planes 
‘to interfere with Japanese withdrawal from China. If that could be accomplished, 
Marshall argued, there would be a “big result in the vicinity of Singapore.”’ 65 Utley did 
not elaborate on what Marshall meant by a big result near Singapore but he improved on 
Young and Schaller’s account by indicating that Marshall at least had some objective in 
mind when he recommended that fighter planes be sent to China: it had something to do 
with Singapore. Utley’s main point, however, concerned the hypocrisy of US policy: the 
Flying Tigers was a way of fobbing off the Chinese :  ‘while everyone supported the 
idea of helping China no one wanted to give up anything to make that aid a reality.’66 
 
In War Wings: The United States and Chinese Military Aviation, 1929- 1949 (2001),  
Xu Guangqiu reverted to the approach which Leary and Young had adopted thirty years 
before and ignored the critical interpretations of Schaller, Utley or Fairbank. Like 
Young, Xu characterized pre-war involvement in China’s aviation affairs as private 
‘unofficial’ American air assistance.67 He praised American businessmen and advisers 
who, without strong support from the U.S. government helped the Nationalists build the 
air force during the Nanking decade (1928-1937): ‘the Chinese needed American 
assistance; American businessmen were highly attracted to business prospects in 
China,’ a paraphrase of Leary’s formula.68 On the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, thanks 
in good measure to American assistance, the CAF had become ‘a modern, well-trained 
and well-equipped air force,’ a direct quote from an article about the Jouett mission by 
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William Leary: at the time of John Jouett's departure in 1935, ‘China had the nucleus of 
a modern, well-trained, and well-equipped air force’.69   
 
Even after the start of the Sino-Japanese war, Xu asserted that with the help of 
Chennault and other instructors, ‘from July 1937 to December 1940 the American–
supervised aviation schools trained about 900 excellent Chinese cadets, who thereafter 
constituted the bulk of the flying personnel of the Chinese Air Force.’70   Xu does not 
provide a source for his estimate of 900 cadets but not a single military attaché report 
cited in his study confirms the ‘excellence’ of Chinese cadets or pilots. They were not 
excellent. In 1937-1940 Naval attachés repeatedly commented on the poor relations of 
Chinese cadets with American instructors, their resistance to discipline, inadequate 
flying hours, poor skills in hitting targets, and reckless attitude to aircraft maintenance.
71
 
By October 1940 Chennault himself had given up on the CAF. A US Naval intelligence 
officer briefed by Chennault directly reflected his views when he wrote that ‘the only 
solution currently offered for China’s present problem of “How to deal with the 
Japanese Air force” is for her to turn the whole thing over, lock, stock and barrel, to the 
nationals of some one foreign country. Col. Chennault says that if he were given 100 
bombers, 100 long-range pursuits and 100 interceptors, all of up-to-date design; with 
400 foreign pilots, he could very nicely organize a force that would protect Free China 
from Japanese raids and wreak havoc on the Japanese forces in China’.72   
 
During the Nanking decade assessments of the CAF were not much better, apart from 
one reference by the US consul at Shanghai who spoke of ‘some four hundred 
admittedly excellent Chinese pilots.’ 73 The US military attaché Walter Drysdale tended 
to praise the work of the Jouett Mission but was hardly an impartial observer: he had 
                                                     
69
 Xu, War Wings, p.92; William M Leary Jr. ‘ Wings for China: The Jouett Mission, 1932-1935’ 
Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Nov.,1969), p.461 
70
 Xu, War Wings, p.138 
71
 The key file which contains naval intelligence reports for 1937-1940  is National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA,), RG 38 E-98 Box 136, File A-1-u Register no. 7348-A, Folder, 
Aeronautic Personnel, Schools, Training,etc._ China 1936-44 
72
 NARA, RG38 E-98 Box 96, File A-1-Q Register no. 12592-E  Folder Aeronautics in China 
1939-40 ‘Personal Observation  &Conversations’ by Captain H.J McQuillen USMC, October 
8,1940, p.3 
73
 For comments by the Shanghai consul, Edwin Cunningham see NARA, RG38 Box 136 File 
A-1-u Register no. 7348  ‘Central Aviation Academy, Hangchow, China’ May 18, 1935; for naval 
intelligence reports in 1932-1935 see NARA, RG 38 E-98 Box 136, File A-1-u Register no. 
7348-A Folder Aeronautic personnel, schools, training etc. China 1916-1935 
22 
 
been directly involved in promoting this group of American air instructors to T.V. 
Soong in 1932.  Through the entire interwar period, US military attachés were 
occasionally complimentary about their compatriots’ efforts to train CAF pilots but 
always recognised that CAF training was inferior to that of the USAAC. In 1937-1940, 
the CAF stagnated and Americans could do nothing to reverse years of mismanagement 
by the Chinese military. 
 
Like Young, Xu condemned the US government for its policies during the first years of 
the Sino-Japanese war when it appeased Japan and ‘weakened China’s war effort and 
the air force’.74 In 1938-1940, he asserts that the CAF was forced to rely on the Soviet 
Union because the U.S. government refused to provide air aid.
75
 Chiang, however, did 
not turn to Stalin because Roosevelt refused assistance: the barter agreement between 
Chiang and Stalin to bring Russian planes and pilots to China was signed on 21 August 
1937 while Chiang still believed that he had the upper hand over the Japanese at 
Shanghai.
76
  Russian pilots and planes began to arrive in November 1937.  Finally from 
August 1937 onwards neither the US nor any other western government was willing to 
provide aviation personnel to China for a variety of reasons. One of the most significant 
was the horrific collateral damage inflicted by the CAF on Shanghai during the August 
offensive and ‘friendly fire’ directed at American warships and refugee boats such as 
the USS Hoover. Western governments did not want their citizens or air forces to be 
involved with an air force as dangerous as the CAF in August-September 1937. 
 
Xu accepted Chennault and Young’s version of the formation of the AVG, omitting all 
references to plans for bombing Japan in December 1940. As he relates ‘with the 
acquiescence of some policy makers,’ on 2 January 1941 Chennault submitted a plan to 
use 100 fighter planes and 150 technicians: William D Pawley recruited pilots and crew 
all over the United States as well as the Philippines, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, ‘where,’ 
Xu alleges, ‘there were many pilots with P-40 experience.’77 This last point is entirely at 
odds with archival material from the papers of Lauchlin Currie at the Hoover 
Institution. One of Chennault’s principal complaints about CAMCO was that its 
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recruiters had not hired enough pilots with the right qualifications to fly a P-40.
78
 Since 
the US Army Air Corps had barely acquired enough P-40s to form a single squadron by 
the end of 1940, it is unlikely that they had trained enough P-40 crews to have a surplus 
by the autumn of 1941. 
 
Nonetheless Xu’s account of  Chennault ‘excellent’ training results has left its mark. An 
American scholar, Edna Tow recently echoed his characterisation of American 
influence over the CAF in her article ‘The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-
Japanese War, 1937-1945,’ in The Battle for China (2011) edited by the eminent 
American and British historians Mark Peattie, Edward Drea and Hans van de Ven.
79
  
Tow referred to Chennault as an example of how ‘individual and private-sector 
initiatives’ aided China to improve its air defence capacity despite a US embargo on 
munitions and armaments.
80
 She stated, ‘tasked with reorganizing China’s air force, 
Chennault overhauled pilot training programs, updated Chinese aerial tactics, and 
coordinated air strategy. Under his supervision, aviation schools were reorganized to 
provide detailed instruction in specific aerial skills: pursuit, bombardment, and 
reconnaissance. Cadets logged valuable flight hours by participating in simulated 
combat drills and tactical manoeuvres. In the period from July 1937 to December 1940 
these programs trained approximately 900 students.’81 Tow based her assertions on 
Xu’s War Wings and Chennault’s memoirs.82 As a result, she replicated the legend that 
Chennault and a handful of American instructors transformed Chinese military aviation 
in the years before Pearl Harbor. 
 
As this survey suggests, for sixty years, American historians have been at pains to 
describe American aviation activities in China as private air assistance which yielded 
significant improvements in the CAF. Furthermore several have gone far to demonstrate 
continuity between unofficial pre-war help and large official US air support during and 
after the Pacific war. All, with the exception of Michael Schaller and Jonathan Utley, 
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have presumed that Americans either wanted to help China or that, regardless of their 
motives, they improved Chinese military aviation in the interwar period. Young, Leary 
and Xu identified examples of pre-war ‘nongovernment’ air aid:  the formation of 
China’s national airline, CNAC in 1928-1931; CAF training provided by the Jouett air 
mission (1932-1935); the establishment of China’s first modern air assembly plant, 
CAMCO ( a subsidiary of the Intercontinent Aviation) and the influence of Claire 
Chennault as an air adviser and instructor in 1937-1941. In the case of the Flying 
Tigers, Fairbank, Schaller, Xu and Young regarded the group as the US government’s 
first significant step towards official military support for the Nationalists – a turn for the 
worse according to Fairbank and Schaller, for the better in the view of Xu and Young.  
Several of these works have provided a starting point for exploring the key themes of 
this thesis but primary sources have tended to contradict the fundamental premise that 
Americans extended a helping hand to the Chinese which the Chinese gratefully 
grasped. The argument of this thesis points to a different conclusion which is presented 
in detail in Chapter V but summarised below. 
 
The Argument 
 
The Roosevelt administration initially did not conceive of the AVG as air aid for China 
to protect the Burma Road. In December 1940-January 1941 the President and his 
advisers acted on a threat perception: their sources ranging from Chiang Kai-shek to 
diplomats based in Thailand warned them of an imminent Japanese attack on Singapore. 
The timing of this alleged attack was extremely awkward because Roosevelt was in the 
course of introducing Lendlease legislation. The US Congress still had strong 
isolationist factions: any incident which threatened to draw the United States into war 
on behalf of its allies would jeopardise the passage of Lendlease. At the root of 
presidential anxiety was a secret commitment to Churchill that the United States would 
help the British to defend Singapore if it were attacked by Japan. Roosevelt wanted at 
all costs to avoid fulfilling that pledge to Churchill which would require him to order 
some portion of the US Fleet to the Far East.  
 
Although they had never planned a military operation before, the President and his 
advisers wanted to create a manoeuvre so powerful that it would derail Japan from its 
alleged advance through Thailand and onto Malaysia. At first they considered using 
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China as a base from which to launch a bombing offensive against Japan. When 
Secretary of Defence Henry Stimson and the Army head of Staff George Marshall 
pointed out the folly of this plan, Marshall suggested an alternative: provide the Chinese 
with some fighter planes and pilots to create  a ‘distraction’ over the Burma Road which 
would divert Japan from the attack on Singapore. These squadrons in principle were to 
both provoke a Japanese attack on the Burma Road and defend it at the same time. The 
President and members of his cabinet saw this diversion over the Burma Road as the 
only solution to the multiple diplomatic and political problems which they suddenly 
confronted in December 1940 to January 1941. 
 
In late December 1940, Morgenthau was in charge of coordinating aircraft sales for 
Britain and other allies such as Greece. The President asked him to arrange the 
immediate release of a hundred P-40s from the British allocation for sale to the 
Nationalists: Morgenthau promised to compensate the British government with twice as 
many planes in the summer of 1941. Most American historians who have described the 
British government’s reaction to this plan have stated that its purchasing agents went 
along with the decision because they were promised a larger allocation at a later date. 
British archives, however, reveal an entirely different response.  
 
The British government deeply resented interference in the delivery schedule of P-40s 
required for spring campaigns in the Eastern Mediterranean. They were furious that 
planes would be given to the Chinese who very likely would waste or wreck them when 
they felt that every plane was required for the war effort. In January 1941 Foreign 
Secretary Antony Eden  wanted Lord Halifax the new British ambassador in 
Washington to make representations to Roosevelt about the disruption of the P-40 
supply line.   
 
American historians have never referred to this controversy or the diplomatic 
developments which emerged from it. In February 1941, T.V. Soong met with Air 
Commodore John Slessor, one of the chief British representatives who had been sent to 
Washington for secret discussions about the possible entry of the United States into the 
war. Soong and Slessor agreed that the squadrons which were to be formed from the P-
40s shipped to Rangoon would remain in Burma rather than be dispatched to Yunnan: 
the AVG was to be discreetly incorporated into Imperial Air Defence plans with an 
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understanding that they would fight alongside the RAF in the event of a war with Japan. 
Thus the British who had reluctantly given up a hundred P-40s regained access to them 
to protect their Far East colonies.  
 
Where recruitment was concerned, in mid-January 1941 Secretary of the Navy Frank 
Knox contacted Bruce Leighton the vice president of the Intercontinent Corporation :  
Intercontinent had been the exclusive aircraft broker for Curtiss-Wright sales to China 
in 1933-1940: as Fairbank noted in his memorandum, Leighton had submitted his own 
plans to the Navy about a guerrilla air corps for China in January-May 1940. On 16 
January 1941,  Knox asked Leighton to start the process of hiring aviators and 
mechanics for the mission as soon as possible. For C-W sales to China, Intercontinent 
also was due a commission on the resale of the British P-40s to China. Furthermore 
once the planes reached the port of Rangoon, Intercontinent would be responsible for 
assembling and maintaining them. Indeed, Intercontinent with its relatively long history 
of aviation sales and services in China was the only organisation in existence at that 
time which could manage the logistics of delivering planes and personnel to the Far 
East on behalf of the project organisers.  
 
In February 1941 shipment of planes began: Pawley, Leighton and Chennault liaised 
with US military authorities to seek permission to hire personnel directly from US 
bases. In the same month, however, Roosevelt lost interest in the project when the 
Japanese appeared to back down from any threat to Singapore thanks to a warning 
delivered by the US counselor in Tokyo, Eugene Dooman.
83
 Thereafter Roosevelt 
delegated the entire programme to his special adviser Lauchlin Currie who managed the 
AVG project and explored other possibilities for air assistance to China. The president 
indicated to Currie, however, that he was not particularly in favour of further airpower 
proposals for China if they interfered with the needs of the US military or Britain which 
they almost certainly would because of the shortfall in aircraft production.  
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There were never any formal consultations about the airpower programme which 
evolved into the AVG. Almost by default, Intercontinent’s president Bill Pawley 
became the liaison with the various participants who had an interest in the AVG: British 
authorities in the Far East, Claire Chennault, the Chinese purchasing agents and 
Lauchlin Currie. Roosevelt kept his distance from the AVG because its existence, if 
known, might have given Japan a pretext to break off negotiations or to attack US 
territory in the Pacific. Therefore, the Administration tried in vain to keep the AVG a 
secret but by the summer of 1941, the Japanese and the American press were aware that 
planes and pilots were heading for Burma. Thus the AVG began as a scheme to keep 
Japan bogged down in China and evolved into air aid which benefitted Britain more 
than China. 
 
Methodology 
 
This thesis is based on a broad examination of documents from archives in the People’s 
Republic of China, Italy, the United States and the United Kingdom. Many of these 
primary sources have been available for years but apparently they have not been 
regarded as material to an investigation about American aviation interests in China or 
the AVG. This is particularly the case for the extensive material in the National Archive 
about the International Air Force (IAF), the name given by British officials to the AVG. 
Although these files have been open since the early 1970s, American historians have 
not cited them in describing the formation of the Flying Tigers in 1940-1941. 
 
 The thesis also introduces new material which sheds light on how the Nationalists dealt 
with their foreign partners in aviation, particularly the Intercontinent Corporation. Of 
primary importance is the correspondence of Captain Bruce Leighton (USN), who 
served as Intercontinent’s principal vice president from 1937 to 1942. These are in my 
possession for the duration of my research but I intend to donate them to the Library of 
Congress. Until those arrangements are made, I will make the documents available to 
scholars.  
 
Leighton had a distinguished career in naval aviation before joining Wright 
Aeronautical in 1928 : after the merger with Curtiss, Leighton was a leading salesman 
of C-W military aircraft in the Balkans and the Soviet Union. He went to work for 
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William D Pawley, the president of Intercontinent in May 1937. In 1942 he left 
Intercontinent to return to active service in the US Navy Bureau of Aeronautics.
84
    
The Leighton papers contain extensive company correspondence about the firm’s 
involvement in Chinese military aviation from September 1936 to September 1944. The 
collection contains letters and memoranda which describe the challenges of maintaining 
operations in China during the Sino-Japanese war. They are of special relevance to 
discussion of  the Soviet Air Mission and the Flying Tigers  covered in Chapters IV    
and V. 
 
The official US Army historians Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland consulted the 
a range of company documents in Bill Pawley’s office at Intercontinent’s New York 
headquarters while preparing Stilwell’s Mission in China in the early 1950s.85 In the 
1960s, Pawley’s AVG files went missing when he arranged for them to be collected by 
the embassy of the Republic of China for shipment to Taiwan.
86
 Leighton’s 
correspondence contains duplicates of the documents which Romanus and Sunderland 
cited in their account of the AVG but other relevant documents which they very likely 
viewed but which appear to have contradicted their version of events.  
 
Supplementing the Leighton papers are personal letters of Bill Pawley to his first wife, 
which his biographer Anthony Carrozza kindly provided before publication of his 
biography of Pawley.
87
 These reveal Pawley’s extreme anxiety about securing sales to 
China in 1933-1936. As interesting are letters written by Intercontinent’s secretary, 
Mamie Porritt which one of her descendants, Tracy Minter transcribed and sent to me in 
2009.  Some of these are now available on http://www.warbirdforum.com/porritt1.htm, 
the website of Dan Ford, author of the Flying Tigers.
88
 Mrs Porritt’s correspondence 
described life at the CAMCO factory in Loiwing 1939-1942. Her testimony has helped 
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to establish the chronology of operations in Burma and India as well as details about 
Intercontinent’s business and the Japanese bombing of Loiwing in October 1940.  
Equally interesting is the diary of Edward W. Wingerter about his work at the Hankow 
airfield in the winter of 1937-1938.
89
 I received a copy of this unusual document from 
his son, Captain Edward Wingerter (USN). Wingerter’s eyewitness account sheds new 
light on Chinese air operations, the Russian mission and the involvement of Claire 
Chennault in the International Volunteer Squadron discussed in Chapter IV. His 
admiration of the Russians belies criticism of their performance by the Chiangs and 
their close adviser William H. Donald who had their own political reasons for trying to 
downplay the contribution of the Soviet mission to the Chinese war effort. 
 
 No historians to my knowledge have consulted the archives of the Italian Foreign 
Ministry about Sino-Italian relations in aviation. This is not surprising as the Ministry 
restricts access to its historical records: special permission is required and the archives 
are only open four mornings a week. In September 2010 I had just enough time to 
photograph most of the cables between Rome and Shanghai for 1932-1934 which 
clarified misconceptions about the formation of an Italian air mission to China.  
Whereas many Americans presumed that Chiang’s brother-in-law Dr. H.H. Kung 
(K'ung Hsiang-hsi) arranged this mission, Italian records disclose that Soong and Ciano 
were entirely responsible for it. The archives also describe the exceptional rapport 
which the Chiangs developed with the mission’s first head il Colonnello Roberto Lordi 
and the attraction which Chiang had for the ideals of Italian fascism: given the size and 
chaos of China, Chiang could never exert the control over his own country which 
Mussolini exercised over Italy but in 1934-1935 il Duce was an inspiration for the 
Generalissimo if Italian dispatches are to be believed. 
 
The National Archives (TNA) contains a vast range of material about Sino-American 
relations in aviation in Foreign Office, Air Ministry and Cabinet Office files. These 
proved to be invaluable for assessing British involvement in the formation of the AVG 
as well as the competition between British and American aviation interests during the 
Nanking decade.  The US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and 
the Library of Congress (LOC) were consulted on four separate research trips to 
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Washington DC. Whereas the LOC is one of the best organized archives in the United 
States, the NARA is one of the most difficult to use: its paper index and reference 
folders tend to hide more than they reveal to even the most assiduous researcher.  
 
The National Air and Space Museum Archives (NASM) at the Garber Facility in 
Suitland Maryland contain some company records of Curtiss-Wright and Clement M 
Keys, the first president of Intercontinent Aviation. The curators are helpful but lack 
resources to improve the facility. Other American archives provided excellent service, 
especially, Cornell University for the papers of Captain James M McHugh who served 
as a US Naval Attaché to China in 1937-1942 and the University of Virginia for the 
papers of George Conrad Westervelt, the second president of Intercontinent. I also 
visited the George C Marshall Foundation in Lexington Virginia to consult a few 
documents by William D Pawley which are held there.  
 
The Hoover Institution at Stanford University contains the most important group of 
papers relevant to this study but imposes relatively short hours and restrictions on 
reproducing materials. Consequently research takes longer and is more costly than in 
other US archives. I consulted the papers of Lauchlin Currie, Minard Hamilton, George 
Sokolsky and Arthur Young which have been examined by other historians. 
Nonetheless evidence from these papers in light of new archival material made sense of 
anomalies in previous accounts about China’s military aviation and the Flying Tigers. 
 
The dissertation makes use of a few works in Mandarin. Research, however, in Chinese 
archives was limited by the cost of travel and translation. The Second Historical 
Archives (SHAC) in Nanjing are the most important repository of primary sources on 
relations between the Nationalists and American aviation interests in the period covered. 
Professor Robert Bickers kindly provided a letter of introduction to the chief archivist. 
However, the SHAC posed formidable obstacles to foreign researchers in at the time of 
my visit in September 2008. Closing hours varied from posted schedules: documents 
listed in indexes had gone missing (the Flying Tigers file could not be found); no 
photography was allowed and photocopying quality depended on the state of the 
cartridge. There were no English finding aids or English speaking curators. Staff was 
capricious in dealing with requests although few researchers were in the reading room. 
The archivists withheld files until the last minute of the day. Consequently there was 
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only about a quarter of an hour allowed to browse through documents. There was no 
apparent respect for the fragility of documents, many of which had suffered the 
exigencies of time: they were crushed into Xerox machines and hastily bundled back 
into flaking folders. After three days’ effort, a random selection of documents covering 
payroll for the CAMCO factory in Hangchow (1936) and at Loiwing (1941) were 
provided and photocopied. 
 
The Hoover Institution has the only reproduction of the handwritten diary of Chiang 
Kai-shek outside of Taiwan. I consulted it in the autumn of 2010 with the help of 
several Chinese students as translators. Because of restrictions imposed by Chiang’s 
descendants, the diary is not easy to examine: researchers are only allowed to use paper 
and pencil while consulting the document and no electronic equipment (computer, 
camera, and mobile phone) is allowed on the table. There are further conditions for 
citing the diary: the Hoover reserves the right to screen any quotations or translations of 
extracts used for publication. Nonetheless just as an ‘off the record’ briefing can steer a 
reporter in the right direction; the diary is valuable for leading the researcher to other 
material that can be readily used for publication. The Hoover also holds the papers of T. 
V. Soong and of Dr. H. H. Kung: Chinese translators considered Soong’s handwriting 
and spelling difficult to decipher; because of inadequate Chinese, limits on time and 
translation, I did not have the opportunity to explore the Kung and Soong papers. 
 
The other Chinese work of particular relevance to this study is the memoir of Chien 
Chang-tsu (C.T. Chien) 'Fo sheng bai ji' [One hundred life memories] (Taiwan, 1975) 
Chien was head of the CoAA’s technical division had a long association with 
Intercontinent which included correspondence with Bruce Leighton. A translator 
provided an English version of relevant sections to do with the Loiwing CAMCO 
factory and his relations with Leighton. These extracts provided insight into the Chinese 
attitude towards Intercontinent’s directors and other American associates as well as the 
difference between the Anglo-Saxon and Chinese approach to autobiography.  
Finally I have used two important recent secondary sources about aircraft in the CAF 
fleet which hold a wealth of archival material but unfortunately lack adequate footnotes: 
A History of Chinese Aviation by Lennart Andersson and Curtiss Fighter Aircraft by 
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Francis H. Dean and Dan Hagedorn.
90
 Hagedorn, is a former NASM curator and 
meticulous historian who completed this work after the death of his co-author who had 
amassed most of the material. Andersson is a dedicated amateur in the best sense of the 
word. I have corresponded with both authors to verify sources and although they have 
been unable to track down the source for some statements, I have cited them when no 
other references are available about the composition of the CAF fleet. Indeed, whenever 
I wanted further information related to a published work, most authors were extremely 
helpful in providing clarification. This correspondence in itself  became a rich resource.   
 
Access to Western and China’s archives is constantly changing and unpublished 
documents from the interwar period frequently resurface. There is enormous scope for 
further research about the history of Chinese aviation: Chinese scholars could bring to 
light material from archives in Taiwan as well as mainland China which western 
historians have not consulted. A greater range of Chinese sources than have been used 
in this study would test the validity of its analysis and also counter the comments of 
numerous observers whose reports are housed in western archives. As new documents 
become available, the conclusions of this study no doubt will be critiqued and revised.  
This dissertation is just the start of further investigation into the history of Chinese 
aviation and the role of foreign participants in its development. 
 
Chapter summaries 
 
Chapter I, American Loans, American Planes introduces Intercontinent Aviation, the 
private aviation firm which managed participation of Clement Keys in CNAC and 
which, apart from CNAC, had the longest involvement in Chinese aviation during the 
Republican period.   It examines the problems which its first Chairman, Clement Keys 
encountered over his investment in CNAC. After the sale of CNAC to Pan Am, 
Intercontinent’s third president, William D Pawley stayed on in China to specialise in 
military aviation sales. In 1928-1931 many traits which shaped the politics of airpower 
in US-China relations through to 1941 became evident:  the dominance of the Chinese 
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military; the ambivalence of US government policy towards arms and aircraft trade; the 
profit motive of American businessmen; the misconception of China as a potential 
market for aviation; the Nanking regime’s chronic shortage of funds to pay for imported 
equipment.  
 
Chapter II ‘National Salvation through Aviation’ explores the role of military aviation 
in the years between the Shanghai War and the Sino-Japanese War(1932-1937). It 
describes competition between American and Italian aviation interests and Chiang’s 
conversion to airpower during the small but significant Fukien rebellion in December 
1933. Thereafter Chiang used airpower in line with his political priorities, ‘first 
pacification then external resistance’. In the autumn of 1936, the Chiangs organized 
fund-raising campaigns around the theme of ‘National Salvation through Aviation’ in 
association with the Generalissimo’s fiftieth birthday celebrations which raised popular 
expectations about air force resistance to Japan By the start of 1937, however, the 
Chiangs recognized the mediocrity of the CAF which created a political and strategic 
quandary as they faced the prospect of war with Japan.  
 
Chapter III ‘Bloody Saturday’ covers the Chinese Air Force during the opening phase of 
the Sino-Japanese War. The Chiangs and Chennault were well aware that the air force 
was inadequately trained for precision bombing but during the Shanghai offensive of 
August1937, they ordered squadrons to attack Japanese military targets dangerously 
close to the civilian population. In this regard Chennault’s advise on tactics badly 
misfired: he was complicit with the Chiangs in the death of thousands of Chinese 
through collateral damage. The editor of the North China Herald described CAF’s 
actions on and after ‘Bloody Saturday’ 14 August 1937 as a ‘crime against 
civilisation.’91 Instead of rallying Western allies to China’s cause, the CAF’s abysmal 
performance hardened their resistance to providing any military or financial aid to 
China in 1937-1938. 
 
Chapter IV ‘American Volunteers, Russian Volunteers’ assesses the influence of the 
Soviet air mission on American aviation interests and Chiang’s family circle in 1937-
1939.  In November 1937, Soviet personnel and planes began to arrive in China and the 
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Russians assumed control over Chinese air operations against the Japanese. The Soviet 
mission effectively removed the Chiangs from control of the CoAA in 1937-1939. It 
also eclipsed  the influence of American advisers such as Claire Chennault and 
businessmen such as Bill Pawley who stayed on in China in the hope of restoring their 
position if and when the Russians departed. 
 
The final chapter, the Flying Tigers (1940-1941) examines the participation of 
Intercontinent and the Chinese, US and British governments in forming the AVG. The 
research programme for this chapter was extensive. It used as a point of departure the 
analysis of Michael Schaller, Jonathan Utley and Peter Lowe who pointed to the British 
role in air aid for China. It revises the received narrative about the rationale for the 
AVG and its development in 1941. It provides a rationale for the establishment of the 
AVG in the winter of 1940-1941 which is consistent with the political priorities and 
procurement problems which the Roosevelt Administration faced at that time. 
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Chapter I    American Loans, American Planes 
 
From 1914 onwards, while the Western powers were caught up with their own war, Sun 
Yat Sen led the KMT in a revolution against the Imperialist regime of Peking: Chinese-
American volunteers brought the first airplanes to South China in 1914 and started to 
raise funds using the slogan National Salvation through Aviation.
92
 After the armistice, 
however, the Western powers were determined to promote peace worldwide. They took 
the view that trade with China in aircraft as well as arms needed to be restricted in order 
to discourage its ongoing civil war.  In 1919 the diplomatic corps in Peking entered into 
a voluntary arms embargo on China, the repeal of which depended on an end to the civil 
war and the establishment of a national government recognised by the country’s various 
factions. In 1928 after the KMT established its regime at Nanking, the western powers 
lifted the embargo. American entrepreneurs immediately began to sell planes to China’s 
regional interests initially with the support of local US diplomats who were determined 
to see off competition from other foreign suppliers. 
 
This chapter explores the interplay between US government policy and American 
business which affected US aviation interests in China in 1928-1931. It looks especially 
at the activities of an American financier, Clement M Keys who became the first 
American investor in China’s commercial aviation, founding with the Nanking regime, 
the China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC). The joint venture between the Keys-
Curtiss interests and the Nationalists revealed fundamental tensions in the politics of 
airpower between the US and China which endured up to World War II. American 
entrepreneurs suffered from misplaced confidence in the potential of the China market, 
and in the patronage of the single English speaking politician with whom they had 
contact. On the Chinese side, regional militarists used aviation to sustain independence 
from the central government. Central and regional authorities resisted the imposition of 
western business standards. In dealing with their American aviation partners,  the 
Nationalists rarely maintained their end of the bargain, refusing to provide their agreed 
share of investment or to respect contractual obligations. 
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The China Arms Embargo 
 
On 5 May, 1919, the British ambassador Sir John Jordan (dean of the diplomatic corps) 
communicated to the Chinese Foreign Ministry the decision of nine countries to place a 
voluntary embargo on arms and aircraft sales to China.
93
 Of the nine signatories, five 
had aircraft industries: the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Russia. They 
agreed to maintain the moral embargo ‘until the establishment of a government whose 
authority is recognised throughout the whole country’.94  
 
As these sanctions were not binding, several countries quickly abused the embargo. The 
British government, unlike the other signatories decided in November 1919 that the 
agreement did not cover airplanes.
95
  Vickers was willing to lend the money to the 
Peking government to buy a hundred ‘commercial’ Vimy planes which were clearly for 
military use.
96
 As Noel Pugach has pointed out, the Vickers deal undermined the 
credibility of the British government where other aspects of its China policy were 
concerned. In 1929 the British ambassador Sir Miles Lampson wrote that British 
aviation firms could not complain about ‘lack of official support’: they could rely on the 
Legation and consular officers for all the support which could be properly given for any 
specific case.’97 
 
The US government was determined to uphold the embargo and reinforced its 
commitment with a Presidential proclamation on 4 March 1922 which deemed unlawful 
the exportation of arms or munitions of war to China: the two measures of 1919 and 
1922 were interpreted as applying to aircraft because planes were adaptable to ‘warlike 
uses’: if, however, the planes were clearly of a commercial type, the State Department 
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granted an export license immediately.
98
 Through the 1920s the State Department used 
its power over export licenses to scrutinise contracts and limit the size of aircraft exports 
to small orders.
99
 
 
In June 1928 Chiang Kai-shek’s forces entered Peking, declared the end to the Northern 
Expedition and announced the political unification of China under the KMT. As one 
country after the other renewed customs treaties with the central government, the 
signatories to the 1919 arms embargo considered cancelling the agreement: in their 
view, China finally had a government which was recognised across the country.
100
  The 
process of unification, however, was far from complete.  
 
Chiang and his brother-in-law, T.V. Soong, the KMT Finance Minister put pressure on 
regional warlords to demobilise their armies, to submit to Nanking’s authority and start 
to turn over a significant share of customs and tax revenue to the central government.
101
 
In South China, the military leaders in Kwangtung and Kwangsi – the ‘Kwangsi 
Clique’—resisted. As the historian Diana Lary has observed, for the Clique, 
‘autonomous military control meant autonomous financial control’: they were 
determined to retain both.
102
 If they were to be forced into disbandment, they would 
need new sources of revenue. In their air bureaus they saw the possibility of using their 
air fleets for airmail and passenger services which might generate income.
103
 Thus 
aviation became an extension of Southern resistance to political and economic 
domination by the KMT faction at Nanking.  
 
In the summer of 1928, the Canton Air Bureau (CAB) took the lead in developing 
airmail projects. The CAB was the oldest and the most advanced air force in China. 
Founded in 1922 by Sun Yat Sen, it attracted funding, volunteer pilots and planes from 
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the Chinese diaspora. By 1928 the CAB had 30-40 aircraft and ambitions for further 
expansion.
104
  
 
The CAB’s director at this time was Colonel Chang Wai-jung who allegedly had trained 
as a pilot in the United States.
105
 Chang’s patron was Li Chih-Shen (Li Chai-Sum) the 
commander of Kwangtung’s 4th Route Army which comprised 350,000 troops in 1928: 
Li Chih-Shen was so closely associated with the Kwangsi Clique that he was considered 
its fifth man.
106
 In June 1928 Chang Wai-jung approached the US consul in Canton, 
Douglas Jenkins about the Bureau’s plans for air routes across South China.107  Jenkins 
was persuaded that the ‘Canton administration seems to be in earnest respecting 
establishment of commercial aircraft routes.’108  Whether or not he believed in the 
sincerity of the military’s intentions, Jenkins did not want to see American aircraft 
salesmen lose out to French or British competitors in selling planes to militarists in 
South China.
109
 
 
On 20 June 1928 a few days after the KMT’s announcement of China’s reunification, 
John van Antwerp MacMurray, the Minister in Peking wrote to Secretary of State Frank 
Kellogg for guidance about Jenkins’s request. He emphasised that  
aviation has been advanced to such a point that the distinction between military and 
commercial aircraft is very marked and as commercial planes now have no combat 
value it means that they should no more be banned as arms or munitions of war than 
commercial ships or motor trucks. Airplanes furthermore have become a commercial 
commodity in which a fair field of competition should be open in China.
110
 
 
MacMurray’s suggestion that ‘commercial planes now have no combat value’ was ill 
founded: the air bureaus could easily adapt any biplane for basic military purposes. Nor 
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did the Chinese regard the airplane as a commercial commodity. Planes were symbols 
of prestige which reflected the standing of the leaders who owned them: the slogan  
‘National Salvation through Aviation,’ eventually adopted as the motto of the 
Nationalist Air Force, was just one expression of the higher political and spiritual status 
of the airplane in the eyes of the Chinese in this period. Furthermore, it  was unrealistic 
to believe that a market for aircraft would emerge in China comparable to that in the 
west. The conditions which MacMurray treated as a justification for the promotion of 
aircraft sales to China never developed in China under the Nationalists and hardly exist 
today: according to one estimate there are only 150 private jets in the People’s Republic 
of China compared to 200,000 in the United States.
111
 
 
To protect American aircraft interests against British competition, MacMurray 
persuaded the Department to allow the sale of ‘nonmilitary’ aircraft to to the military. 
On June 23, 1928, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg responded to MacMurray with one 
line: ‘the Department will grant permits to export commercial airplanes to China:’ this 
was confirmation of an existing policy since, under the China Arms embargo, the 
Department already allowed the sale of commercial planes.
112
 MacMurray in Peking 
and Jenkins in Canton interpreted Kellogg’s guidelines as permission for US diplomats 
to help local American aircraft salesmen in the so-called ‘China Market.’ The British 
ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson later described this as ‘undefined but strong consular 
support.’113  
 
With the help of Douglas Jenkins, Chang Wai-jung ordered two Ryan Mahoney planes. 
In December1928 he and a colleague set off from Canton for a tour of Chinese cities 
ending at Shanghai. Chang christened his plane, the Spirit of Canton thereby 
commemorating Lindbergh’s transatlantic flight in the Spirit of St Louis, a similar Ryan 
plane.
114
 Chang was dubbed ‘the Chinese Lindbergh’ and made political capital out of 
the publicity stunt for himself and the Canton faction. At the same time the Kwangtung 
Eighth Route Army based in Canton purchased American airplanes allegedly to develop 
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airmail services between the main cities of South China.
115
  For these civil aviation 
projects the US government offered its blessing at least for the time being: officials took 
at face value the diversification of regional militarists into civil aviation because they 
saw an opportunity to sell American aircraft.  
 
Sun Fo and Clement Keys 
 
There was considerable difference between the sale of a few American planes and the 
investment strategy of Clement Keys. The contact between the Keys-Curtiss interests 
and the Nationalist regime was a manifestation of the Wall Street boom and the 
speculative activities of Keys who eventually bankrupted himself because of them. In 
1928, however, he was still a respectable aviation financier with directorships on the 
boards of a dozen major aviation firms of which the most important was the Curtiss 
Aeroplane and Motor Company (Curtiss Aero).
116
  
 
Keys became president of Curtiss Aero in 1920 when he rescued the firm founded by 
Glen Curtiss from bankruptcy.
117
 By the spring of 1929 the Curtiss group comprised 
some twenty subsidiary or affiliated companies. Nonetheless as the business historians 
Louis Eltscher and Edward M. Young noted,   ‘the Curtiss group, as it came to be 
called, was in fact a rather loosely organized structure of separate operations.’ 118  At the 
end of 1928 Keys formed a new aviation holding company North American Aviation.
119
  
He also had his own company Clement Keys & Co. and a close association with the 
investment bank Dillon Read. 
 
In 1928 the KMT leadership sent unofficial ambassadors abroad in search of foreign 
loans. At the end of 1927 Sun Fo, the son of Sun Yat Sen lost out to T.V. Soong (his 
uncle by marriage) as finance minister in Chiang’s new government.  To preserve 
harmony in the KMT as well as in the extended Soong family, Chiang who had married 
Soong Meiling in December 1927 dispatched Sun Fo on a worldwide mission: Sun Fo 
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set off on New Year’s day 1928. After a tour of European capitals, Sun arrived in New 
York on 1 August to obtain foreign backing for China’s reconstruction along the lines 
laid down by Sun Yat Sen in The Economic Development of China: he was greeted as 
‘Minister for Reconstruction of the Republic of China.’120 His visit to the United States 
was the springboard for transforming US-China relations in aviation from the odd 
transaction to capital investment. 
 
During the late summer of 1928, Sun Fo played up the need for American finance and 
expertise to develop China, avoiding those aspects of his father’s ideology at odds with 
American capitalism. ‘Only with American business methods,’ he stated, ‘and 
American financial resources can we hope to hasten the process of our national 
reconstruction.’121 He echoed the words of his father: ‘in this national undertaking, 
foreign capital have to be invited, foreign experts and organisers have to be enlisted, and 
gigantic methods have to be adopted.’122 Sun Fo hoped that the United States would 
‘assume the leadership in international cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual 
interest.’  By early September Sun appeared to have achieved his goal: there were 
rumours in Shanghai that he was ‘arranging for a loan of $700,000,000 (£140,000,000) 
in New York and that when the negotiations…are complete, he will return to China as 
Minister of Finance, which he deserves to be.’ 123  
 
During the US stock market boom, even though financiers were intrigued by foreign 
expansion, few heeded Sun Fo’s call to invest in China. The US share of capital 
commitments to China always remained relatively small: after the onset of the 
Depression, the United States accounted for 6.3% of foreign direct investment in China 
compared to 38.9% for Great Britain and 36.9% for Japan in 1931.
124
 In 1936, the US 
proportion of total investment in Chinese manufacturing was only 2.9 % compared to 
54.1% for Great Britain and 40.3% for Japan.
125
 There were no private bank loans or 
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bonds floated for China in the interwar period although pro-Chinese financiers tried to 
persuade Wall Street to offer them.  
 
In the second half of 1928, American bankers seemed ready to negotiate a large loan 
with the Nationalists. Thomas Lamont of J P Morgan intended to lead a goodwill 
mission to China but others in his firm developed cold feet about venturing any further 
into financial relations with debt-ridden China and vetoed his trip.
126
 At this point, 
Dillon Read, which did not belong to J.P. Morgan’s Chinese Consortium attempted to 
negotiate separately a bond issue with Sun Fo. Mixed up in these secret discussions was 
a plan devised by Clement Keys and his associate Clarence Dillon to use some portion 
of the credit obtained through the bond to establish an air mail and passenger service in 
China.  
 
Leary noted in his history of CNAC that at the very end of 1928, Robert Otis Hayward 
of Dillon Read travelled to China for discussions with Sun Fo, the Minister of 
Railways.
127
 Leary presumed that the primary purpose of Hayward’s trip concerned an 
airline proposal.
128
 There were, however several odd aspects to Hayward’s mission. 
First, he was a specialist in international bonds and sovereign debt, not aviation: Wall 
Street abounded with experts about the aircraft industry who might have gone in his 
place.
129
 Secondly he spent only ten days in China, an unusually short span of time 
given the weeks on board ship to travel there and back.
130
 Such a brief visit conducted 
over the Christmas and New Year period suggested urgent short term business rather 
than a long term venture such as an airline. Thirdly, Sun Fo was minister of Railways 
and had nothing to do with aviation over which there was already increasing 
competition between different Chinese interests. The Communications minister, Wang 
Po-chun was in charge of developing an airmail service for the Nanking government 
and wresting control of China’s air routes from regional military air bureaus.131 
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Nonetheless as Railways minister, Sun Fo had budgetary autonomy and could possibly 
divert some funds to other projects without interference from the Finance Ministry.
132
 
American industrialists had been angling for some time to have a ‘slice’ of China’s 
railway construction which was dominated by British interests.
133
  
 
Correspondence between the American journalists George Sokolsky and George 
Bronson Rea, two ‘Old China Hands’ provides insight into the competition between 
Dillon Read and the Chinese Consortium for the international bond market, rivalry 
which was matched by that between Sun Fo and T.V. Soong to obtain foreign loans.  In 
July 1929 Rea wrote to Sokolsky that ‘Sun Fo is in constant communication with 
Hayward, who is stringing him along in the hope of tying him up when the time is 
opportune.’134 Rea was concerned that Sun would alienate the China Consortium 
because when and if the time came for a bond issue, the more powerful American 
banking group led by Morgan would dominate the market.
135
 Sokolsky agreed that TV 
Soong would only deal with the large American banking group led by J P Morgan. Sun 
Fo, he added, was ‘not a very reliable person... He is more tolerated for his father’s 
reputation than his ability is respected.’136  
 
In 1928-1929 China’s economic conditions did not improve the outlook for a large bond 
issue. In September 1929 Rea wrote to Sokolsky, ‘the world is fed up with Chinese 
promises and talk. The American people are not particularly interested in her vast 
schemes for development, calling for hundreds of millions of dollars, at a time when her 
finances are bankrupt and she shows no intention of discharging her old obligations. 
You can’t interest investors in Chinese schemes while practically all our large bankers 
and manufacturers are creditors of the Chinese government, without hope of immediate 
payment of their claims’.137 
 
Sokolsky and Rea reflected the widespread perception of the American business and 
financial community that there was no reward for pouring capital into impoverished 
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China. Circumstantial evidence, however, suggests that Dillon Read cultivated Sun Fo 
in the hope that the firm might secure eventually a bond issue for China’s railways 
which would also allow the diversion of  funds into an aviation venture. When the 
prospects for floating the bond disappeared, Keys decided to proceed anyway in China: 
he was no longer the cautious banker who had rescued Curtiss Aero through prudent 
management but a risk-taker on a grand scale. While Hayward pursued Sun Fo for a 
monopoly on railway bonds, Keys tried to interest Clarence Dillon in obtaining a 
monopoly in overseas aviation markets. 
 
The Foreign Policy of Clement Keys 
 
Towards the end of 1928 Keys became interested in ‘foreign things’ because he could 
not ‘think of anything local at the moment that is worth doing.’138 In November he 
wrote to a potential investor in Latin America that he had ‘several million dollars to be 
used in the acquisition of air transport lines, airplane and motor manufacturing plants, et 
cetera, in any of the countries of South America and in parts of Asia and Africa.’139 He 
sketched out for Clarence Dillon the equity structure for two interlinked companies: a 
small ‘exploration’ company as well as a large holding company that would provide the 
capital for aviation ventures across South America and the Far East.
140
 Keys hoped to 
have as capital subscribers, Dillon, Curtiss Aeroplane and Automotive Company 
(Curtiss Aero) and Charles Lindbergh.  Although he claimed not to be in a hurry he 
noted that ‘competition was very keen now in the North-western corner of South 
America and in China.’141 Keys went on to comment, that there were ‘a tremendous 
number of small local very profitable projects that are likely to be available in South 
America and in Asia.’142 His plans ‘entailed the immediate dispatch of two expeditions, 
one to South America and the other to Asia.’143 
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In letters to prospective South American investors, Keys described his quest for equal 
partnership with local entrepreneurs or government agencies to create a few small but 
profitable airlines. In a letter to a Colombian banker, Antonio Borda, Keys stated that 
his object was ‘not to control aviation anywhere in the world but to participate with the 
nationals of other countries in pushing forward the development of aviation.’144 Keys 
stressed the importance of using local talent in building up a new business:  
 
Our general policy, in foreign countries will be to use and to build up the local resources of 
those countries. This applies particularly to pilots. Other things being equal, we should prefer to 
use pilots and mechanics and all personnel of the nationality of the country in which we are at 
work, rather than to import our own men.
145
   
 
Keys had ideas for developing joint ventures in emerging markets based mainly on his 
experience in Latin America: he already had sent successful missions to Argentina, 
Chile, Peru and Bolivia led by ex-Army Air Corps Colonel ‘Jimmy’ Doolittle.146  By 
contrast China was unknown territory. Sun Fo was the only Chinese politician of the 
new KMT regime known to most American bankers in 1928. Keys based his plan on 
nothing more than his own confidence and propaganda from the pro-China business 
lobby.
147
 Even if the bond business did not materialise, he considered the gamble on 
aviation worth taking because it might deliver a monopoly on future aircraft sales for 
Curtiss and firms in his other holding company North American Aviation. 
 
In January 1929 as Robert Hayward sailed home from Shanghai, Keys sounded out the 
State Department about his proposed investment in a Chinese airline and flying school – 
further indication of how little he knew about China. On January 8, 1929 Keys wrote to 
Secretary of State Kellogg, that he was not seeking ‘a monopoly on all aviation in 
China, but in order to justify any considerable investment, it will be necessary to require 
that certain of the mail and other contracts will be exclusive to the company… for a 
period of years.’148 Keys also wanted to use American military fliers in his China 
venture just as he had often employed Colonel Jimmy Doolittle in South America. 
Stanley Hornbeck, head of East Asia desk in the State Department advised that, ‘if 
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Army and Navy officers appear among the employees of the company, unfortunate 
impression will be created in the Far East; it will be assumed that the American 
Government is actively behind the enterprise.’149 Nelson T. Johnson, who was about to 
be appointed as Ambassador to China, advised the Secretary of State to disapprove of 
the venture and requested that the Navy Department with whom Keys also consulted 
should ‘discourage this contemplated action.’150 The State Department informed Keys 
that it would only offer ‘the same type of support it gives any other American enterprise 
legitimately entered into and carried on abroad.’151  
 
Aviation Exploration Inc. 
 
Undaunted, Keys asked his lawyer Roland Riggs and Major William B. Robertson to 
lead a delegation to Shanghai: Robertson had backed Lindbergh’s transatlantic flight 
and recently sold his aircraft company to the Curtiss group.  In a letter to Robertson of 
18 January 1929 Keys outlined the joint venture, in virtually the same terms as he had to 
other associates and the State Department.
152
 He warned Robertson to focus on only one 
or two air routes ‘involving a capital expenditure that might not in the first instance be 
over $500,000 and which should be started quickly.’ Keys imagined that the ‘stops on 
such a route or routes would all be places where oil and gasoline can be obtained and 
which are established centers of trade population. We could throw such a line into 
operation within a comparatively short time.’ It would be important to use Chinese 
personnel or have ‘a definite policy that we will use Chinese personnel just as soon as 
such personnel is available…There is no limit to what we shall do in China if the 
Chinese really wants us to co-operate and the Chinese commercial interests welcome us 
into China.’153 
 
On 19 January 1929 Keys arranged the incorporation of Aviation Exploration in the 
state of Delaware. ‘AviExplor’ was the small holding company which he had mentioned 
to Clarence Dillon although there is no evidence that the latter ever became a 
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subscriber. Keys was president and drew directors from close associates including 
Robertson and Riggs. The terms of incorporation, typical of the era, allowed the 
directors full discretion to conduct any sort of transaction and maintain total secrecy 
over the accounts; Keys had exclusive control over the company’s activities and 
finances.
154
 Indeed AviExplor became a purely personal investment vehicle of Clement 
Keys. The press continued to treat AviExplor as a subsidiary of the Curtiss companies 
but it really was solely ‘his organisation.’155  
 
The Robertson party left New York on 26 January 1929 and arrived in Shanghai in the 
middle of February.  Following instructions, Robertson and Riggs proposed a company 
entirely in the Wall Street mould: a public corporation capitalised at $10 mn with the 
Americans taking up to 60 % of the shares and private Chinese investors the rest. Sun 
Fo ‘expressed doubt that either private investors or the government would be able to 
raise $4 mn.’156 Instead Sun suggested that the Chinese government subsidize the 
venture through government bonds at interest – a vestige of the original bond idea 
proposed by Hayward.
157
 When this response was transmitted to New York in late 
March, Hayward objected that the Chinese only had to ‘pledge their credit’ whereas the 
Keys interests would assume the financial burden for equipment and operations.’158   
 
Robertson and Riggs consulted with George Sokolsky who advised them against doing 
business in China. He noted that they had failed to make any contact with either the 
Ministry of War or the Ministry of Communications which controlled aviation.
159
 Since 
aviation was outside the sphere of Sun Fo, any contract which he attempted to conclude 
was likely to run into difficulties. Riggs assured Sokolsky that he was being too 
pessimistic: ‘everything would turn out alright because Sun Fo told him so.’ 160  
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As Robertson and Riggs pursued talks with Sun Fo, the conflict which had simmered 
for months between the Kwangsi generals and Chiang came to a head. Chiang Kai-shek 
announced that there was no place for the Kwangsi faction under the KMT government 
and he prepared to settle his differences with the Clique by force of arms.
161
 The 
generals had withheld all revenue and ‘did not even pretend to carry out Nanking’s 
mandates.’162 By the middle of March 1929 Chiang had assembled 150,000 men ready 
to descend on Wuhan where, by contrast, the Clique had only about 30,000 troops. Li 
Chi-shen, the Chairman of the Political Council in Kwangtung and patron of the Canton 
Aviation Bureau went to Nanking to sue for peace but was placed under house arrest. 
Further complications arose when the Third KMT Congress expelled Li and the other 
‘clique’ Generals, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Jung-hsi from the party for life on March 26th: 
Sun Fo rushed to show his support for Li Chi-shen, thus signalling his political 
independence from Chiang.
163
 Li’s subordinates, General Ch’en Chi-t’ang and Ch’en 
Ming-shu (commanders of the Canton based Fourth Route Army) broke with their 
patron and pledged their loyalty to Nanking at least for the time being.
164
 
 
At the end of March Colonel Chang Ching-yu, assistant head of the Aviation Bureau in 
the Ministry of War at Nanking approached Sun Fo about buying the four Curtiss 
demonstrators which Robertson had imported to China:  Chang claimed that these were 
required urgently for the coming attack on the Clique at Wuhan.  Since the Department 
of State had permitted export of the planes as demonstrators only, Robertson was 
reluctant to release them but he postponed any decision until he had received word from 
Keys in New York. Keys awaited advice from MacMurray in Peking. On April 1 
MacMurray, unaware of the real situation said that he had no objection to a sale to Sun 
Fo. Robertson, however, held back, still waiting for Keys to reply.  
 
On 2 April, T.V.Soong invited Robertson to his house to explain that Chiang Kai-shek 
was now involved and wanted the planes for the upcoming campaign at Wuhan. To stay 
in the good graces of the government, Robertson decided to lend two planes to the 
Ministry of War. Meanwhile Keys had contacted Secretary of State, Henry Stimson 
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who on 6 April replied to Keys through a cable sent to MacMurray: the Department 
could ‘give no approval and cannot allow itself to be associated with this particular 
proposed transaction.’165  By this time, however, the Falcon and the Robin Challenger 
had left Shanghai with Colonel Chang Ching-yu on board.  
 
The planes never reached the front. Chiang Kai-shek declared war on the rebels, 
advanced on Wuhan and easily forced the Kwangsi forces to retreat from the tri-city 
area on 4 April.
166
  Chiang’s victory, however, failed to settle scores with the Clique. In 
early May an ally of the Kwangsi generals, General Huang Shao-hsiung launched a 
counter attack against Canton.  Cantonese Naval officers with gunboats anchored along 
the Canton Bund threatened to defect to Huang Shao-hsiung, a move which would have 
allowed his forces to recapture the city. 
 
During this battle, the Cantonese armies and the Canton Air Bureau, both loyal to 
Nanking at this stage, went into action against General Huang.  US Consul Douglas 
Jenkins stated that, ‘an outstanding feature of the conflict was the effectiveness of the 
Cantonese airplanes’ which bombed the rebel fleet and forced it to surrender.167 By the 
end of the month Nanking’s troops, which had moved from Wuhan to Canton had 
delivered a blow to the Kwangsi Clique. In early June Huang Shao-hsiung and Pai 
Ch’ung-hsi fled to Hong Kong. For the time being, Chiang had overwhelmed his 
principal regional opponents, and brought all of the provinces previously governed by 
the Clique under his control.  
 
Although there are contradictory accounts of what happened on 9 May 1929, the use of 
bombers may have turned the tide in Nanking’s favour. This was considered to be the 
first Chinese military campaign in which bombers had a decisive impact on the course 
of the conflict.
168
 It also demonstrated that Canton was ahead of Nanking in military 
aviation. General Chang Wai-jung, head of the CAB took part in the bombing and not 
long thereafter, under the patronage of Sun Fo he was appointed to the Ministry of 
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War’s aviation department: in August 1929 he became its director and responsible for 
aircraft procurement.
169
  
 
The China National Aviation Corporation 
 
During the campaign against Wuhan, Robertson and the Nationalist government came 
to an agreement about commercial aviation. On 5 April the State Council organized ‘the 
China National Aviation Corporation with an authorized capital of ten million dollars, 
Chinese currency, entirely owned by the National Government …at the suggestion of 
and under the presidency of Mr. Sun Fo, Minister of Railways.’ 170  The Minister of 
Communications, Wang Po-Chun was to serve as Vice President with five directors 
from other government ministries. The Keys-Curtiss interests contracted to provide 
pilots, aircraft and capital to start the services in six months time.
171
  
 
The contract signed on 17 April called for three initial routes –the same ones which the 
military air bureaus acting through the National Aviation Association (NAA) had 
thought would be reserved for them: Canton to Hankow, Hankow to Shanghai via 
Nanking and Nanking to Peiping.
172
 A second contract covered future projects offered 
by Aviation Exploration: an aircraft assembly plant, flying school and other air routes: 
the new enterprise was ‘to be a Chinese service under the control of the National 
Government but under American management and operation.’ 173  George Sokolsky 
pointed out to George Rea that Sun Fo had borrowed US$ 1 million to start an airline 
but this new debt would do more damage than good : ‘China cannot afford to borrow 
anything less than $100,000,000 without appearing to be so poor as to be unworthy of 
credit.’174 
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To Edwin Cunningham US consul in Nanking, the scheme seemed ‘Utopian’: the 
American investors were “taking a pretty long chance of collecting their money.’175 
British observers took some delight in the gloomy prognosis: ‘the mentality of the 
Chinese officials may be difficult to understand, but it is pretty patent to us here that 
they are not particularly interested in having any foreign interests in their schemes, and 
apart from the purchasing of material they prefer to run their own shows…’ noted a 
commentator in The Aeroplane.
176
  Keys was nonchalant about the whole affair. He 
recognised the risks and stated that ‘we enter upon them as more or less of a business 
adventure with full intention of financing them ourselves and meeting the gains and 
losses incident to them from our own resources.’177  
 
On 27 April 1929 the State Council appointed a Board of Directors for the new aviation 
corporation. It included Hsiung Piu and Chang Ching-yu the Director and Assistant 
Director of the Aviation Department in the Ministry of War as well as the Vice-Minister 
of Communications Li Jung-kung.
178
  When Robertson gave in to Colonel Chang 
Ching-yu’s demands for the four demonstrators, he did not strengthen the position of 
the Keys-Curtiss interests nor of the new corporation. The regional military aviators led 
by Colonel Chang Ching-yu objected to the Keys contract just as they had to the 
Ministry of Communication’s plans for an air route. On 29 April two days after being 
appointed as a director of the corporation, Colonel Chang Ching-yu met with the NAA 
which issued a warning that it would seek cancellation of the new corporation and the 
contract with the Americans.  
 
Colonel Chang then called on recently named directors to refuse their appointments, 
labelling the new joint venture as ‘an encroachment on China’s sovereignty.’179 At stake 
was the monopoly on airmail tariffs which the regional militarists had anticipated would 
generate revenue for themselves in South China, not for the Nanking regime. 
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Several of the NAA projects contemplated in 1928 were said to be under way by late 
April 1929: routes between Kwangtung and Kwangsi were ‘nearing completion’ with 
Canton as the hub; CH$300,000 had been collected of the estimated CH$1,000,000 
needed for the Association’s planned Hankow-Shanghai route. The aerodrome at 
Hankow (one of the three cities in the Wuhan area of Hupei) had been completed in 
February 1929.
180
 The Wuhan Aviation Association was already selling first and second 
class tickets at CH$18 and $10 to fly between Hankow and Changsha: other regional 
branches of the Association pursued airmail projects in central and North China. 
181
  
 
As Sokolsky pointed out to George Rea, the American contract ‘went the way of all 
flesh’ because Keys had not made his representatives stay on and see the contract 
through.
182
 As for the four demonstrators, the Curtiss Robin Challenger and the Falcon 
were cracked up by inexperienced Chinese pilots while on loan to the Ministry of War; 
the Robin OX remained with its wings off at Hungjao field and the Ireland Flying Boat 
was stored at the Navy air hangar on the Whangpoa.
 183
 In the absence of Keys-Curtiss 
representatives, the US district attorney in the International Settlement of Shanghai, Dr. 
George Sellett started to look after their  interests.
184
  
 
Once the Robertson party left Shanghai, Sun Fo did little to defend the new corporation. 
As Minister of Railways Sun had responsibilities that were far more demanding than the 
fledgling airline project: those challenges increased during the summer of 1929 with a 
Sino-Russian confrontation over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. The 
Nanking regime looked to Wang Po-Chun, not Sun Fo to exercise authority over its 
commercial aviation and overrule the troublesome regional bureaus.  In mid-June the 
KMT Central Executive Committee decided to place all radio and commercial aviation 
projects under the Minister of Communications, who had laid claim to both areas as far 
back as July 1928. The Committee put out a statement that this decision ‘regarding civil 
aviation has no bearing on the Curtiss contracts which have been approved by the State 
Council. The contracts stand.’185   
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A special report to The New York Times on 11 June stated that ‘at the [Communication] 
Ministry’s instigation’ Chinese aviators had risen up against the Americans: ‘they assert 
they fought a revolution to regain China’s railways, customs, post offices, &c., from 
foreign control and that now the first thing the Nationalist government does is to hand 
the newly organized airways over to foreigners.’186  The newspaper misconstrued the 
alliance between the military aviators and the Minister of Communications: Wang Po-
chun opposed the regional militarists; he had also employed foreign planes and pilots in 
the Ministry’s new air service.  The rivalry in fact was trilateral between the Keys-
Curtiss interests aligned with Sun Fo, the central government represented by the 
Minister of Communications and the military air bureaus supported by Colonel Chang 
Ching-yu in the Ministry of War. 
 
To counter charges that the project was in disarray, Keys wrote to the New York Times 
on June 24. He reassured the paper that ‘Aviation Exploration Inc. which is my 
organization working with the Chinese Government has a definite contract with that 
government.’187 Furthermore, he claimed, equipment and personnel were on their way 
to China. In June 1929, however, Keys had little time to feel anxious about his small 
investment in China. He was entirely focussed on the merger which he had brought 
about between the Curtiss group of companies and Wright Aeronautical: the 
establishment of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation was announced on 27 June. The 
combined group had assets of over $75 mn. With this coup, Keys became ‘the Harriman 
of aviation.’188   
 
In June 1929 Keys also started to assemble pilots, mechanics and seaplanes for the 
China venture.
 189
 Ernest B Price, the former US consul in Nanking, became president 
of a new enterprise, China Airways to operate the airmail service on behalf of the new 
Sino-American corporation. He was well known in diplomatic circles: he had done two 
tours of duty in Peking and reopened the consulate in Nanking early in 1929. Keys and 
Robertson chose Price largely on the basis of his close relationship to Sun Fo on whom 
they continued to rely to protect their interests.
190
 Price advised his new employers that 
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‘the Chinese corporation and the enterprise of Aviation Exploration Incorporated will 
stand or fall, succeed or fail, largely as Sun Fo stands or falls, succeeds or fails, as a 
factor in the Chinese government.’191  
 
Meanwhile, on 9 July, Minister of Communications Wang launched an airmail service 
between Shanghai and Nanking: Captains W.R. Henderson and J.R. Machle flew one of 
the new Stinson-Detroiters from Hungjao aerodrome to Nanking, landing at the 
National Aviation field at the Hsi Hwa Men gate.
192
 On 26 August, the new service 
began to carry a few passengers on the same line.
193
 Thereafter despite weather and 
maintenance problems, the Ministry ran a fairly regular mail and passenger service 
between Nanking and Shanghai: in the first three months of service, it missed only 6 
scheduled flights.
194
 Wang Po-chun overtook both Clement Keys and the regional air 
bureaus to become the father of China’s civil aviation. 
 
Intercontinent Aviation 
 
On 1 August 1929 Keys established the second of the two corporations which he had 
described to Clarence Dillon the year before. Intercontinent Aviation Inc was limited to 
an issue of one million shares without par value and commenced business with 
$1000.
195
 In every other respect, the terms of incorporation for Intercontinent were the 
same as for Aviation Exploration. Keys appointed many of the same associates to the 
Board of Intercontinent who served as directors for Curtiss-Wright and North American 
Aviation.
196
 
 
On 26 August China Airways was registered under the China Trade Act of 1922 and  
Ernest Price was named as its president in the first week of September 1929. It was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Intercontinent Aviation and served as the operator for 
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China National Aviation Corporation. 
197
 China Airways also replaced Aviation 
Exploration Inc as the public face of the Keys-Curtiss interests in Shanghai.  
 
In mid-September Jack Allard, the President of Curtiss Aero Export Corporation  
briefed the press on the scope of the China project.  The company was shipping to 
Shanghai four Fledgling training planes in addition to the five Loenings: the Fledglings 
would be used to train Chinese pilots some of whom would also be taught in the United 
States. Allard suggested that China Airways would eventually have a fleet of 35-40 
planes to cover some 3000 miles per day. The company would also construct four radio 
stations just for the Shanghai to Hankow line. 
198
  
 
In Shanghai, the outlook for China Airways bore no resemblance to the enterprise 
described by Jack Allard. The company hardly had the facilities to shelter one airplane, 
no less a fleet of 35-40 planes. A bamboo hangar which protected the Curtiss Robin OX 
at Hungjao field had blown apart in a high wind. As one of the new managers, Minard 
Hamilton noted in his diary, there was ‘no field that we can use. The Army field at 
Hungjao would be suitable but although we have temporary permission to use it, we 
will have to make other arrangements when we start operating.’199 At the end of August, 
Hamilton still had not obtained permission to land planes at any of the military airfields: 
he hoped to secure temporary space for the Loening seaplanes (when they arrived) at 
Lunghwa, the airfield for Army seaplanes.
200
 Delivery of the Loenings was delayed 
until late September – early October. As Hamilton remarked, ‘this makes it an awfully 
tight squeeze to get the first route in operation by October I7th, which is what the 
contract calls for. Also it rather upsets our program which had been predicated on the 
arrival of the planes during the month of September. However we will have to get along 
as best we can.’201   
 
On 12 and 13 October 1929 China Airways organized a small party including journalist 
Edgar Snow to make the first trial flight by seaplane between Shanghai, Nanking and 
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Hankow. Snow was ecstatic in his report on ‘the Middle Kingdom’ from the air.202 
Nonetheless, there were still legal and financial obstacles to overcome for China 
Airways to meet its 17 October deadline. As Wang Po-chun was in charge of the postal 
service, he continued to channel all airmail between Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow 
onto his Stinson-Detroiters in breach of the Keys-Sun Fo contract. Sun Fo urged Price 
to turn a blind eye but Price insisted that until the Ministry of Communications 
respected the new corporation, China Airways would refuse to fly. Sun Fo finally took 
the issue to the State Council. On October 18 it issued orders to the Ministry of 
Communications to respect the contract, an action which saved appearances and 
allowed the flight to go ahead.
203
 On 21 October China Airways finally inaugurated the 
airmail passenger service: a Loening seaplane carried Sun-Fo and other dignitaries from 
Shanghai along the Yangtze River to Hankow.  
 
In New York, however, there was no cause for celebration.  On 19 October the New 
York Stock Exchange revealed that through the course of September aggregate market 
values had declined by 2.3%: for the aviation sector the drop was 10 times greater, from 
$732.6 mn to $563.9 mn or 23%. 
204
 Curtiss-Wright common stock went from $31 to $9 
within days.
205
 North American Aviation slumped from its peak in 1929 of $19.25 to 
$4, further deflating the cushion of capital on which Keys had relied.
206
  
 
The wave of bad news hit China Airways almost immediately. On October 29  when 
Price cabled Keys about extending routes, the response from New York was categorical: 
‘directors unwilling to proceed with additional large capital investment without definite 
information on revenue and operating condition present line and further assurance of 
government support. Advise urging slowness starting additional routes.’ 207  
 
China Airways carried on with the Shanghai-Hankow route despite the precarious state 
of finances. In mid-November Price attempted to recover the airmail earnings and 
promissory notes: US$15,480 was owed to the company under the terms of the contract. 
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Sun Fo asked for a month’s reprieve to arrange for the Ministry of Communications to 
turn over the receipts. When Keys in New York heard that the Corporation and China 
Airways faced a stalemate over contract revisions, he suggested that it be ‘indefinitely 
suspended or cancelled if Chinese Government wishes.’208  
 
As the deadline of 15 December 1929 approached, Wang Po-chun continued to block 
the release of the airmail receipts to China Airways. Sun  asked the State Council to 
intervene and force Wang to hand over the airmail receipts. Otherwise they would have 
to accept Sun’s resignation as President of the corporation. The Council pleaded 
impotence, accepted Sun’s resignation and promptly replaced him with Wang as the 
president of China National Aviation Corporation.  
 
In New York, the share prices for Curtiss-Wright and North American Aviation hit a 
low in the middle of December and stayed there through January of the New Year. In a 
cable to Price, Keys insisted, ‘we will not consider any further capital expenditure or 
even continue operations…unless contract revision definitely settled.’ Price was advised 
to negotiate for a revised formula of compensation based on cash payments from the 
Chinese government operations at either the rate of $1.25 per mile (the estimated 
operating cost) or $0.80 per pound of first class mail with a minimum obligation of 
1,800 pounds a day carried. ‘If neither basis possible’ ended the cable from New York, 
‘endeavour to negotiate sale entire investment.’209  
 
In January 1930 Wang sought cancellation of the agreement with China Airways from 
the State Council which on January 31, decided in his favour. Although the Council did 
not publicise its action, Wang circulated the news, oblivious to the consequences. 
Senior government officials and the press recognised that foreign investors would take 
fright if they could not count on the Chinese government to honour its agreement with a 
foreign enterprise. Arthur Nichols Young, one of the senior foreign financial advisers in 
the Chinese Government warned that cancellation ‘would be injurious to the credit and 
prestige of the government, and would tend to discourage further investment of capital 
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in the country.’210 After a week of controversy, the State Council announced on 7 
February 1930 that it would not cancel the contract and would start fresh talks with 
China Airways; it was a victory for Ernest Price but a dangerous loss of face for 
Minister Wang. 
 
Wang remained in charge of the airmail service and demanded the dismissal of Ernest 
Price as a condition for renegotiating the contract. The Keys organisation quickly 
realised that to curry favour with the government, it would have to let Price go: he 
learned by cable that his services were no longer warranted as ‘stockholders feel that 
expenses must be curtailed to the extent of possible.’211 It was a low blow for Price who 
had sacrificed his diplomatic career and his reputation in China for the airline. On June 
22, 1930 he and his family left Shanghai never to return.  
 
The 1930 Wall Street rally    
   
Keys might have let the China venture lapse but through the course of February and 
March 1930 a market rally restored the value of Curtiss Wright and North American 
Aviation to the level of the previous November – still only about a third of their value at 
the peak of trading in May 1929. R.R. Doane the assiduous observer of aviation finance 
commented in early April ‘the present confidence is proving more than satisfactory.’212 
Furthermore Intercontinent’s new foreign venture in Cuba was steadily moving ahead.  
 
In September 1929 just before the crash, Keys announced the formation of Compañía 
Nacional Cubana de Aviación Curtiss.  The new company, would establish sales 
agencies for American aviation products, airmail and passenger airways, cross-country 
and air taxi service, a complete system of flying schools and the installation of an aerial 
photographic unit for agricultural use.
213
  Cubana provided a model for developing 
aviation services in less developed countries .  In January 1930 the airline’s president 
William D. Pawley sold three Curtiss Hawk P-6 warplanes to the Cuban Government. 
As the Miami Herald reported, ‘costing more than $20,000 each, the planes featured 
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two fixed mounts for guns, Wasp engines, and Nelson synchronizer gears.’214 On 24 
February 1930 Pawley opened the new Curtiss airport near Havana with the blessing of 
Cuba’s President Machado and the Curtiss flying school at the airport on March 7. In 
addition to the in-country flights, Cubana also planned a Miami-Havana route. 
215
 
 
The New China National Aviation Corporation - CNAC 
 
Having overcome the impasse with Wang Po-chun, Keys required a new representative 
to negotiate the revised contract with the government. One of his associates, Cyril 
McNear suggested an old friend Max Polin who allegedly knew China well: he arrived 
in Shanghai sometime in March 1930.
216
  At the end of June as Ernest Price sailed 
home, Polin worked out a new agreement with the Chinese government. On 8 July 1930 
Polin and Wang consolidated the operations of China Airways and the Ministry of 
Communication’s air routes. The new enterprise retained the name China National 
Aviation Corporation and became known as CNAC.  
 
The Chinese government had the majority share – 55% - and China Airways held the 
remaining 45%.
217
  CNAC had capital of $1.3mn: the Chinese government provided 
$715,000 while $585,000 came from China Airways. The minority share was treated as 
a credit for the investment already made by the Keys group but in addition, the 
Americans were obliged to invest another $558,000 over the first 18 months of 
operations. The Chinese were credited with $240,000 for the investment in Wang’s 
Shanghai-Hankow-Chengtu line and the original corporation; the government was 
committed to paying the rest of their share -- $675,000 – by December 1, 1931.218 The 
Shanghai based English language weekly China Weekly Review (CWR) which was a 
staunch but critical supporter of Chiang’s regime, applauded an agreement with a 
foreign partner which, for the first time ‘is really compatible with Chinese 
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sovereignty.’219 CNAC’s first president was the Communications Minister Wang Po-
chun.  
 
The battle over CNAC dispelled once and for all the challenge by regional military air 
bureaus for control of China’s air routes. Nonetheless senior officers from the 
Nationalist Ministry of War found their way on to the board. In 1930-1931, General Ho 
Chi-wu, the brother of Chiang’s long standing Minister of War Ho Ying-chin was 
managing of CNAC.
220
 Moreover the Nationalist Government used the new 
arrangement with the Curtiss-Keys group as a model for further partnerships in aviation, 
notably with the German national airline, Lufthansa to establish Eurasia for flights 
between Shanghai and Berlin. From 1927 onwards, German military advisers had 
exerted considerable influence over Chiang in reorganising the army and providing 
campaign strategy; Lufthansa had worked towards such a deal since December 1928.
221
  
 
CNAC now faced the task of extending its existing route between Shanghai, Hankow 
and Nanking while opening new ones. The military controlled the country’s airfields 
and airports and were still suspicious of sharing facilities with commercial operators. 
Many cities that CNAC hoped to connect to its Shanghai ‘hub’ were in areas controlled 
by warlords: Chengdu for example was in Szechwan province controlled by Marshal 
Liu Hsiang, and Canton was now under the control of Li Tsung-jen. From May to 
September 1930, Chiang was once again embroiled in civil war with the Kwangsi clique 
around Hankow which interfered with the operation of commercial air service.  
 
The difficulties which China Airways and CNAC faced in 1930-1931 were 
compounded by those of Clement Keys who in 1931 began to lose control of his 
empire. Over the years Keys had established cross-holdings between the different 
companies in the group which were linked together by share ownership rather than 
management: Curtiss-Wright, North American Aviation and Sperry Gyroscope were the 
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largest, Intercontinent the smallest of which North American held 56 % of the stock.
222
  
He manipulated transactions and channelled company revenue through his personal 
bank C.M. Keys & Co. to subsidise stock market speculation. In 1931 an audit 
uncovered the extent of the damage; he owed North American Aviation US$ 766,000 
but had assets of only US$100,000 to cover the debt.
223
 Although Keys retained the 
chairmanship of several committees, the boards of his companies removed him from all 
positions of authority. In 1931 Thomas A Morgan the head of Sperry Gyroscope 
became president of North American Aviation and Curtiss-Wright.
224
  On 6 January 
1932, Keys tendered his resignation to North American and withdrew entirely from 
public life.
225
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The followers of Sun Yat Sen coined the phrase National Salvation through Aviation 
but after the establishment of the KMT regime at Nanking, aviation became a battle 
ground between the centre and the regions.   The founding of CNAC revealed two 
fundamental preoccupations of the new KMT regime: political unification and national 
sovereignty. On behalf of the central government the Minister of Communications 
wrested control over airline routes from regional militarists. The ‘public-private’ 
partnership which the Nationalists finally formed with foreign investors ensured that 
sovereignty was respected: the central government had the majority of shares and voting 
rights on the board of CNAC and Eurasia. In setting up the first airlines, the Chinese 
were content to delegate operations to foreigners while retaining senior management 
positions for both civilian and military leaders. Nonetheless, Americans remained 
largely in charge as chief pilots and operational managers until the company was 
dissolved on 31 December 1949:  over the course of twenty years, Chinese accounted 
for only 15 % of the total number of pilots with the rank of captain.
226
   It can be 
inferred that Wang preferred foreign to Chinese personnel not only because of their 
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competence but because they had no affiliation with any military factions in the 
National or regional air bureaus from which most pilots came.  
 
The Nationalists had not invited Clement Keys to help them develop aviation nor did 
Keys set out to assist China by launching his China venture. He and his associates at 
Dillon Read imposed themselves upon Sun Fo in search of a monopoly on a bond issue, 
on an airline and on aircraft sales. Keys was a case study in ‘irrational exuberance.’227 
He believed in a perennial stock market boom which would cancel out any losses 
experienced at home or abroad. Such was his overconfidence, that before plunging into 
China, he hardly took any soundings about its internal politics. He was not alone, 
however, in his fascination with the China market which continued to tantalise 
experienced China observers in the interwar period. In 1936 the British leader of an 
economic mission to China Sir Frederick Leith-Ross described China as ‘perhaps the 
most important market in the world for highly manufactured goods.’228  
 
In creating CNAC, the Keys-Curtiss group and the Nationalist government forged an 
agreement which not only conformed to American legal and commercial practice but 
satisfied China’s quest for sovereignty. The Sino-American partnership in aviation was 
fundamentally different from the bilateral agreements which the Nationalist regime 
formed with two other foreign aviation interests, Fascist Italy and the Soviet Union 
because it was a venture with a private American firm which had no other support than 
US government laws to guarantee the contract. By contrast, the Nationalists negotiated 
agreements to secure Italian and Soviet assistance which had no reference to 
international law or the law of either country: politics rather than law determined 
whether or not their terms would be fulfilled and their longevity. 
 
Two enduring traits became evident in this early period : the tendency of Americans to 
embark on aviation projects with little or no reference to intelligence about Chinese 
politics or the conditions which would affect operations. This included blind faith in 
their Chinese patron, Sun Fo, the only Chinese politician whom the Americans knew 
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and with whom they could speak English. Secondly Americans consistently 
underestimated how long it would take to organise an aviation project. Keys had 
believed that he could throw together an airline ‘within a comparatively short time.’ 
Because planes were faster than trains, businessmen and politicians alike believed that 
air operations could be established far more quickly than building railways. Although 
there was some truth in that presumption, through the entire interwar period, aviation 
proved to more time consuming and costly than anticipated. By the time planes arrived, 
many were obsolete, by the time a project was realised, it was overtaken by events or 
had ceased to be relevant. Through the interwar period, these misconceptions about the 
speed with which airplanes could be delivered and deployed compounded the 
misunderstandings which Chiang’s regime and American aviation interests faced as 
they tried to manage joint ventures.  
\ 
From a financial and economic point of view, the strategy which Keys implemented in 
China was doomed to failure. He had invested in ventures without understanding the 
technical as well as political difficulties in China, particularly the resistance posed by 
the military. His speculative streak created Intercontinent Aviation and CNAC but could 
not sustain them. It was up to Juan Trippe of Pan American to fulfil Keys vision of a 
global network of airlines and William D Pawley to realise Keys’s ambition to develop 
aircraft factories and military aircraft sales in China. 
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Chapter II  National Salvation through Aviation  
 
In March 1935, Wing Commander Robin Willock, the British air attaché summed up 
the state of the Chinese Air Force:  ‘although vast sums of money have been spent on 
military aircraft, there appears to be no definite policy with regard to their employment 
except as accessories to Marshall Chiang Kai-shek’s proclaimed political and ambitious 
aim for the unification and pacification of China’.229 The result, he observed was ‘a 
lamentable lack of any air strategy vis-à-vis China’s potential enemy, Japan and the 
National Air force is concentrated in the two Provinces of Kiangsi and Chekiang, being 
utilised in attempts to suppress communism in adjoining provinces and for the purpose 
of consolidating and improving the position of the Generalissimo.’  
 
This chapter looks at the effort of the Nationalists to transform its Nanking air bureau 
into an air force in 1932-1937. It charts a series of initiatives which the regime adopted 
following the ‘brief but bloody encounter’ with Japan at Shanghai in January-March 
1932.
230
 In the aftermath of the war, the Finance Minister, T.V. Soong tried to establish 
an air force devoted to national defence under the supervision of an unofficial American 
air mission. This was doomed to failure owing to resistance by the Chinese military 
including Chiang Kai-shek whose policy of ‘first pacification, then external resistance’ 
reversed the priorities which Soong and his American friends set for airpower.  
Although Chiang deployed the air force for limited tactical operations against his 
internal enemies, he counted on airpower mostly for psychological and propaganda 
impact. He also regarded the possession of long range bombers as a  deterrent to Japan: 
he wanted to  impress upon Japan that he had the means to bomb Taiwan and other 
Japanese territory if it dared to interfere in South China while he was in the process of 
eliminating Communists enclaves there. Eventually he hoped to develop a genuine 
‘bomber command’ which if necessary could carry out offensives against Japan itself 
but in the short term Chiang’s bombers were to serve as a ‘scarecrow’. 
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The political setting  
 
In the spring and summer of 1931, the KMT was in crisis: Chiang and his wing of the 
party at Nanking had been on the verge of civil war with the Canton faction from 
February 1931 onwards after putting the veteran KMT leader Hu Han-min under house 
arrest.
231
 One of the dramatic manifestations of the breakdown in relations was the 
defection of Colonel Chang Wai-jung, head of the Nanking Air Bureau in the War 
Ministry. On 20 April 1931 Colonel Chang chaired a National Aviation Conference 
which the Generalissimo addressed, emphasising the role of aviation in communications 
and political unification.
232
 On 28 April 1931 Cantonese pilots attending the conference 
joined with aviators from the Air Bureau to fly five of its planes to Canton: four were 
highly prized Chance Vought Corsairs. Not long thereafter Chang Wai-jung also fled to 
Canton where he resumed his old post as head of the Canton Air Bureau. 
233
 T.V. Soong 
told Intercontinent’s second president George Westervelt that ‘Chang Wai-jung had 
double crossed them’ by ordering planes which were subsequently sent to Canton.234  
 
Chiang Kai-shek drew lessons from this misadventure with ‘the Chinese Lindbergh’: 
loyalty became more important than skill or experience in aviation. Leadership of the 
Nanking Air Bureau passed to General Whang Ping-heng, who returned from an 
extensive tour of US aircraft manufacturers to become its director.
 235
 From 1931 
onwards, a clique of Army officers rotated through the air administration. Chiang also 
removed aircraft procurement from the Bureau and placed it in the hands of T.V. Soong. 
Officers involved in administration were allowed to participate in tours of foreign 
manufacturers and to recommend aircraft models but were barred from participating 
directly in aircraft orders until 1939.  
 
In September 1931 the Japanese seized Manchuria  with hardly a shot fired. The 
invasion triggered violent anti-Japanese boycotts in the treaty ports which carried on 
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into the New Year and escalated into a series of armed confrontations at Shanghai. In 
late January 1932, after months of infighting, Chiang returned to government and 
worked out a power-sharing arrangement with the veterans of the KMT ‘left’ Wang 
Ching-wei and Hu Han-min. They were still assembling a new cabinet when skirmishes 
erupted at Shanghai on the night of 28 January. The following night, Chiang and Wang 
devised their ‘two pronged’ policy towards Japan: ‘on the one hand resist, on the other 
hand negotiate’: Chiang hoped to stage a decent fight at Shanghai and seek peace as 
quickly as possible.
236
  
 
Until 28 January 1932 the Sino-Japanese conflict had unfolded far afield in Manchuria 
and the border areas north of Peking, largely unseen and unreported by the Western 
press. From the first day of the conflict, however, Japanese aviators wreaked havoc on 
Shanghai which turned  the city’s foreign residents and their newspapers at home 
against Japan. ‘The savage bombing operations…’ wrote the Times on 2 February 1932  
‘have greatly estranged foreign sentiment which was at first inclined to sympathize with 
the Japanese government’ when the Chinese government had failed to crack down on 
the anti-Japanese boycotts across the country.
237
   
 
Over the course of six weeks the Japanese brought reinforcements to the city and by 27 
February had amassed two hundred airplanes at Shanghai, which represented half of 
their total air fleet at that time.
238
 They outnumbered the Nanking Air Bureau by about 
three to one. The newly appointed Mayor of Shanghai Wu Te-chen ( allied to the 
Canton faction) assured foreign residents that Chinese air units would neither carry 
bombs nor attack any bomb-laden Japanese planes over the city: they would, however, 
be armed with machine guns to chase enemy bombers away.
239
 Chinese aviators also 
scattered leaflets from their planes which supplemented the Mayor’s assurances.240   
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Air combat proved to be limited. On 5 February Chinese pilots brought down three 
Japanese aircraft but became inactive thereafter.
241
 The western press might have paid 
little attention to the Nanking air force altogether had it not been for the death of an 
American pilot, Robert Short who had volunteered as a Lieutenant in the Chinese Army. 
On 22 February he allegedly brought down a Japanese plane in a dogfight over 
Soochow Creek and the next day died when attacked by a group of Japanese fighters.
242
  
 
CWR quickly made political capital out of his death: Short, it claimed, was ‘one of 
many scores of American and Canadian fliers who have offered their services in the 
present struggle: his death had ‘an electrical effect on American and Canadian aircraft 
circles and ‘sensational developments’ could be expected shortly.’243 In its coverage of 
Short’s death and memorial service, the Chinese press also hailed him as ‘a great friend 
of China seeking to assist her against [the] Japanese aggressor’: on behalf of the 
government T.V. Soong cabled condolences to his mother.
244
  American diplomats, 
however, immediately distanced themselves from China’s new hero.  Edwin 
Cunningham, the US Consul at Shanghai reacted to Short’s death by informing the 
Japanese Consulate that Short and any other Americans who fought for a foreign army 
could be prosecuted under Section 4090 of the US Revised Statutes.
245
  This was the 
first of several occasions when, to avoid provocation of Japan, the State Department 
protested that Americans who worked for the Chinese military had a status might be 
treated as traitors to their own country.
246
  
 
While the war was on, foreign observers criticized the performance of Japanese 
aviators. The US assistant Naval attaché, Parker Tenney commented on the weakness of 
the Japanese military particularly noting that ‘airplanes have been used ineffectively and 
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have given the impression of obsolescence.’247 Nor did Japanese airpower undermine 
the resolve of the Chinese soldier: ‘the attempt has been made to blast the Chinaman 
from his trenches, to bury him with metal, and to wreck his morale. A soldiery equipped 
in most instances with antiquated weapons but armed with an unexpected courage has 
over a favourable terrain made Japan pay for each inch of advance.’248  
 
As Tenney’s remark suggests, the lack of a Chinese air force did not pose a 
disadvantage because the Japanese air force proved to be less competent than expected; 
although airpower caused destruction, it did not force surrender. If the Nanking Air 
Bureau had allowed squadrons to carry bombs and attack the Japanese navy, collateral 
damage to the city would have been far greater than it was.  
 
After the cease-fire was signed on 3 March the Chinese counted the dead and damage to 
the city. An estimated forty thousand Chinese troops were sent to Shanghai: army 
casualties came to 11,698 of which 4000 died.
249
  The Japanese were reported to have 
dropped 394 large bombs and 1,070 smaller ones from 7 February to 3 March.
250
  The 
League of Nations put civilian casualties at 13,000.
251
 In the war zone, close to 80 % of 
all housing and 70 % of commercial as well as industrial buildings were damaged.
252
 
Major institutions were destroyed such as the Commercial Press and the National 
Oriental Library both founded by T.V. Soong’s father, Charlie Soong: the press had 
expanded into a plant valued at US$50,000,000 employing some 14,000 Chinese 
workers and the library contained the country’s major collection of Oriental 
manuscripts.
253
 The principal targets of Japanese bombardment were textile mills which 
competed directly with those in ‘Little Tokyo,’ the Japanese area in the North sector of 
the International Settlement. By the end of the war, 80 % of urban workers had lost their 
jobs; 50 % of all factories in Chapei were destroyed largely from aerial bombardment 
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and an estimated 1.2 million Chinese had become refugees.
254
 The Japanese air force 
had proved itself to be a formidable weapon of economic warfare regardless of what 
western observers felt about its tactical merits.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, Chiang’s opponents criticized his management 
of the campaign.
255
 The Canton faction argued that casualties would have been far less 
had he been willing to send more troops to Shanghai earlier – there were, at that time, 
two million troops in various armies across China. There was also controversy as Parks 
Coble has observed, over the role (or non-role) of the Chinese navy.
256
 Cantonese 
writers suggested that the head of the Chinese fleet colluded with Japanese naval 
commanders: if the Chinese Navy had blockaded the Yangtze, it might have prevented 
the Japanese landing in the early stages of the war.
257
  
 
The Nanking Air Bureau fared no better. In early February Parker Tenney commented 
that General Whang Ping-heng, commandant of the Nanking Air Bureau was subjected 
to the ‘most insulting criticism’ for failing to engage the enemy in the second half of 
February.
258
 In Tenney’s view the fault was not with the Air Bureau but politicians who 
could not ‘drop their differences and resist the common enemy with a united front’.259 
After the ceasefire, on 14 April 1932, General Whang offered his resignation. 
260
 
Nevertheless he was retained as head of the Nanking air bureau because he had the 
confidence of Chiang and the Minister of War Ho Ying-chin.
261
  
 
Those with a vested interest in aviation used the Shanghai war as proof that air bureaus 
needed to be ‘strengthened’. At the end of March 1932 General Chang Wai-jung, 
asserted that strengthening the country’s military aviation was ‘a means of saving the 
country from aggression:’ he pointed to the Japanese bombing of unarmed civilians at 
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Shanghai and alleged that with more planes, Chinese ‘aviators with their superior skill 
can easily avenge the Shanghai victories.’262 Chang’s hyperbole was not very different 
from the rhetoric which American businessmen and diplomats employed to persuade 
T.V. Soong that the central government could ‘easily’ build an air force to wreak 
vengeance on the Japanese.  One of the most articulate airpower advocates was George 
Westervelt of Intercontinent Aviation. 
 
George Westervelt and Chinese aviation 
 
In early December 1930 Captain George Conrad Westervelt (USN) took over from 
Clement Keys as President of Intercontinent and also became a director of North 
American Aviation which at that time had the controlling interest in Intercontinent.
263
 
On 26 December 1930  he arrived in Shanghai to deal with the losses incurred by China 
Airways, the operator for CNAC. Towards the end of 1931, operations had revenues 
improved but the cash assets of the airline were nearly depleted: the Chinese had not 
provided their share of funding.
264
 As the CNAC agreement of July 1930 was due to 
expire on 1 December 1931, Westervelt had to negotiate a new one to keep the company 
afloat.  
 
Westervelt like other Americans was impressed by T.V. Soong whom he described as 
‘the ablest man I have met in China.’265 Educated at Harvard and speaking perfect 
English, Soong appeared to be the most westernised of the Nationalist politicians. 
Westervelt wrote to his directors in New York that Soong was ‘an enthusiastic advocate 
of aeronautical developments. If he knew where to get the money he would put large 
sums into aviation. He is in favour of both air transport and a factory development’266  
 
Through the course of the Shanghai War, Westervelt daily recorded his impressions in 
letters to his wife and colleagues at Intercontinent in New York. Horrified by Japanese 
brutality, he was in two minds about the impact of the Japanese air force.
267
  Like 
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Parker Tenney, he felt that the Japanese aviators had not produced the anticipated 
military effect on Chinese ground troops: ‘the Chinese even stood up under bombing 
from airplanes and refused to be driven from certain stands until the fires set by the 
bombs drove them out’.268 After the war, however, Westervelt put aside any doubts 
which he had about the impact of the Japanese bombers during the war. He wrote a 
series of letters to T.V. Soong which advocated a complete restructuring of China’s 
military aviation to take on the Japanese. 
 
In the first letter dated 10 March 1932, Westervelt wrote that ‘the events of the last few 
weeks have sufficiently demonstrated the significance of airpower as differentiated from 
a lack of airpower. ’269 He suggested to Soong that if the Chinese had possessed an air 
force ‘one half as great in striking power’ as Japan had wielded at Shanghai, the 
Chinese could have stopped the landing forces and inflicted huge damage on Japanese 
shipping. With relative ease an offensive against the Japanese could be launched: 
‘without any undue risks on the part of Chinese aviation personnel’ the air force could 
have carried out night bombing or taken advantage of low cloud cover to attack 
Japanese ships.’270  Five years later the Chinese Air Force attempted precisely these 
tactics against Japanese gunboats at Shanghai: they missed their target each time, 
destroyed major buildings in the city centre and killed or injured thousands of Chinese 
civilians.  
 
He asserted that of all the weapons wielded against ‘the entrenched Chinese army’, the 
most powerful, ‘in the effect on resistance morale have been the machine gun fire and 
the bombing from airplanes.’271 By contrast, in his war time observations, Westervelt 
like Parker Tenney had remarked on the failure of Japanese bombers to undermine the 
morale of the Chinese army.
272
 Then Westervelt proceeded to think the unthinkable: he 
proposed to Soong that a competent Chinese air force could fire bomb Japan, 
emphasising how easily a bomber command could be organized to attack Japanese 
cities.  
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Even today planes are easily obtainable which could take off from Chinese soil, drop 
bombs on Japanese cities as far away as Tokyo, and return to their take-off place. Due 
to the peculiarly inflammable nature of Japanese cities, such planes could easily carry 
sufficient inflammable bombs of small weight to burn down the major portion of most 
Japanese cities, and to cause enormous economic losses which would have direct 
repercussion on the military efforts of that country.
273
 
 
Targeting industrial facilities in order to cripple military capability was a standard 
feature of strategic air doctrine at this time. Westervelt, however, suggested fire-
bombing Japanese cities which implicitly meant killing civilians as well as destroying 
industry. It seems likely that he was familiar with the views of Colonel Billy Mitchell 
who after his court-martial in 1924 openly aired his views that the United States would 
one day go to war with Japan and could burn its cities to the ground with incendiary 
projectiles.
274
 
 
After planting this lethal idea, Westervelt insisted that the United States was ‘the proper 
aviation contact, and source of supply for China, until China is able to supply its own 
requirements.’275 Westervelt capped his strategic arguments by introducing the theme of 
political unification through aviation: ‘in a greater degree than attaches to any other 
military arm, aviation has a direct bearing on the unification of China, and on a building 
up of its resources through such unification.’ If China could achieve political unity and 
implement his ideas, aviation would make China ‘impregnable.’276 He concluded with 
an airpower ratio: ‘there can be no sustained invasion of China if China is protected by 
an air force of one-half the striking power and of equal efficiency, to that of the enemy 
attempting the invasion.’277   
 
The close association which Westervelt drew between aviation, national defence and 
political unity resonated with patriotic ideas captured by the slogan National Salvation 
through Aviation: he explored these themes in a separate memorandum on fundraising: 
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Westervelt suggested that an ‘All-China National Aviation Legion’ could  administer a 
lottery devoted to purchase of aircraft: ‘no other agency tending to the development of 
National spirit, unification and defence could, at anything approximating the outlay, be 
employed which would compare to aviation. 
278
  
 
Although there is no record of Soong’s reply to Westervelt, within weeks he had asked 
his financial adviser Arthur Young to contact US government representatives based in 
China: the military attaché Walter Drysdale and Edward Paxson Howard, the 
aeronautics commissioner representing the US Department of Commerce in Shanghai. 
Soong wanted these American officials to arrange the recruitment of a chief military air 
adviser and instructors to come to China.  
 
In cables to the War Department, Drysdale made no reference to the national defence 
aspects of the project. He was only concerned with trade: ‘a nonofficial aviation mission 
in China will be invaluable in increasing the use here of American planes and 
equipment. I consider its importance commercially warrants the careful selection of a 
nonofficial group of qualified American aviators by some suitable and interested 
American interests...I request reply at earliest convenience. The American Minister 
[Nelson T Johnson] concurs’.279  Julean Arnold, the longstanding head of the US 
Commerce Department’s Shanghai office gave his ‘full endorsement as distinctly 
helpful to American Aviation development China.’280 For Arnold as for Drysdale, the 
commercial element was far more important than any strategic considerations. On 29 
March, Acting Secretary of State William Castle eventually replied to Drysdale: the 
War Department refused to send an air mission to China. Furthermore, Castle thought it 
inadvisable for the US government to even consider such an undertaking as there was 
no end in sight to the Far East crisis. Nonetheless, he was willing to pass the request to 
Commerce solely for the purpose of recruiting civil aviation experts.  
 
                                                     
278
 HISU, ANY, Box 36 Mil/Av, ‘Provision of funds for development of National Chinese Aviation 
from Captain Westervelt’ 11 August1932  
279
 FRUS, 1932 Vol. III ‘the Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, Shanghai  14 
March 1932, pp.582-583  
280
 NARA, RG 151 Box No. 2503, Folder Aviation China 1932, ‘Cable 458 March 14, 1932 
Shanghai signed Arnold’ 
74 
 
Young learned of Castle’s response on 1 April: he understood that ‘no military mission 
[was] possible’.281  Nonetheless he took the message to mean that the US government 
only opposed the recruitment of enlisted men even though Castle had been explicit 
about restricting the search to civil aviation experts for China. Young, Howard and 
Leighton Rogers, head of the aeronautics trade division in the Department of Commerce 
ignored the State Department:  they began to look for instructors on the reserve instead 
of the active list of US military aviators. According to a note by Arthur Young, on 4 
May 1932  Chiang gave Soong full authority to pursue the project with the 
Americans.
282
 
 
By 11 May John Jouett a retired USAAC officer employed by Standard Oil of 
Louisiana emerged as the front runner: Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have approved 
his appointment on 18 May.
 283
  After he arrived in China some two months later, Jouett 
styled himself as ‘Aviation Adviser, National Government of the Republic of China’ but 
he never received a second contract signed by the Generalissimo which officially 
confirmed his title, duties and powers: Jouett’s position in China depended on a 
‘gentleman’s agreement.’284  
 
Paying for planes 
 
For Soong the first task was funding aircraft procurement. In the middle of the Shanghai 
War, he had explored debt relief with Western governments and on 9 February appealed 
to the United States, Britain and Italy to allow China to defer payment of the Boxer 
indemnity for the period 1 April 1 1932 to 31
 
March 1933.
285
 Customs receipts for the 
fiscal year 1931-1932 had declined by a third: just over 70 % of the reduction resulted 
from the Shanghai war and the rest very likely from the loss of Manchurian 1931.
286
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In mid-February British and American representatives agreed in principle to reschedule 
the payments while the Italian government allegedly did not ‘view with favour’ Soong’s 
request.
287
 On March 9, 1932 US Ambassador Nelson Johnson reported that the Italian 
Chargé d’Affaires (Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law) had been instructed 
to ‘consent to the deposit of a year’s payments with the Italian bank on condition that 
said deposit will be used for purchase of supplies in Italy.’288 On 25 April 1932 Ciano 
and Soong secretly signed an agreement covering the Boxer Indemnity obligations for 
the period February 1, 1932 to January 31, 1933.
289
 The monthly payments of US (gold) 
$126,078 were not to accrue on account at the Italian Bank for China but would be 
earmarked for acquisitions of Italian military aircraft in contravention of the 1925 Boxer 
agreement. On 12 June 1932 Soong and George H. Lautenberg, the FIAT 
representative, signed the first aircraft contract for 6 FIAT BR3 bombers: the terms 
stipulated ‘time and method of payment - to be made on the funds of the Boxer 
indemnity devoted to this particular purpose as per agreement 25
th
 April 1932’; the 
contract included a pilot and chief engineer at no extra cost; the total price came to 
2.988 million lira - 498,000 lira (US $ 25,741) for each plane.
 290
  First in line to provide 
credit, the Italians slipped ahead of American aviation interests to sell planes for the 
new air force. 
 
Before agreeing to defer Boxer indemnity payments, the Department of State wanted 
some assurance that the cultural and educational activities to which funds were legally 
committed would not suffer.
291
  On 2 July 1932 Nelson Johnson received Soong’s 
confirmation and both the British and US governments agreed to a deferral.
292
 The 
British and American payments for 1932-1933 came to US gold $5 million.
293
 Soong 
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later claimed that Anglo-American debt relief in relation to the Boxer Indemnity 
allowed him to balance the budget for 1932-1933.
294
   
 
In China’s Nation-Building Effort, Arthur Young offered an official explanation of how 
China could afford to buy aircraft after the Shanghai War: ‘a number of planes were 
bought from funds subscribed all over the country’ when Soong ‘with Generalissimo 
Chiang’s approval, sought expert American help’.295 There was another possible source 
of funds for the new air force as CWR reported in June 1932: the diversion of CH$11 
million (equal to US$2.3 million) from the Navy to the air force after which the naval 
budget was reduced to a ‘paltry’ CH$310,000.296 Chiang had given up all hope of ever 
building a Navy on a par with that of Japan or western powers: aircraft would have to 
do the work of gunboats if the Japanese arrived by sea as well as by land.  
 
The Nanking regime embarked on a vast fundraising campaign for aircraft. From April 
1932 to December 1933, CWR carried at least forty articles about Chinese contributions 
at home and abroad for planes.
297
 Most of these initiatives were organized around the 
theme of National Salvation through Aviation: typical was the announcement by the 
Federation of National Salvation Associations about funds for a bomber which would 
be christened ‘the Spirit of Shanghai’.298 One polemicist commented that of the 
estimated CH$20-30 million worth of donations, the Chinese could account for only 
CH$1.7 million.
299
 As Walter Drysdale commented in April 1933 most of the 
associations never purchased a single airplane: ‘enough hot air has been developed in 
meetings and drives to float a fleet of lighter-than-air aircraft but to date the Japanese 
planes have undisputed air supremacy in North China.’300  
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In 1933 total aircraft imports to China came to CH$7.9 million (approximately US$2.14 
million) of which 70 % were from the United States.
301
 It is improbable that the 
National Salvation through Aviation campaigns covered the full costs of American 
planes and personnel. The most likely explanation is that Soong used the public 
subscription denominated in Chinese dollars to replenish the national budget and used 
hard currency derived from deferred Boxer Indemnity fund payments to purchase 
American as well as Italian planes. Therefore Soong could claim that Anglo-American 
debt relief helped to balance the national budget in 1932-1933. 
 
Transforming the Nanking Air Bureau 
 
Having secured the means to fund procurement, Soong delegated to others the 
reorganisation of the Nanking Air Bureau. This institution was not so much an air force 
as an army bureaucracy with a few pilots and planes attached: it had many of the same 
problems as the Army. According to data submitted to the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference of the League of Nations in June 1932, air force personnel consisted of 
some 300 pilots and 700 other officers: there were a further 2,258 officers or workers in 
air force administration, thus yielding a grand total of 3270 employees, a ratio of 10:1 
where pilots were concerned.
 302
  All of these figures very likely were inflated but none 
more so than the number of aviators. Just before the Shanghai war, a US military 
intelligence report estimated that there were only 156 qualified military aviators in the 
entire country including Canton and other air bureaus.
303
 This too was an exaggeration. 
When John Jouett launched his training course in September 1932, he gave a refresher 
course to only 50 air officers and washed out half of them a month later.
 304
   
 
In an article for Foreign Affairs published in April 1931 John Magruder, who had 
served as a military attaché in Peking, described the Chinese as ‘practical pacifists.’ 305 
Despite long spells of civil war in recent years, historically they had avoided any form 
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of armed conflict apart from defence against invasion. Unlike Japan which has a deep 
reverence for the fighting man, the Chinese had no martial spirit: the Chinese soldier 
was held in contempt; the sons of educated families if they went into the army 
gravitated to ‘the administrative milieu in which they are really at home’.306 In the face 
of war, the key difference between the Chinese and westerners was the Chinese faith in 
surviving attack or invasion through passive resistance sustained by patience, 
persistence and single-mindedness.
307
 
 
Magruder noted that with the exception of an increased use of machine guns, the 
Chinese had hardly modernised the armed forces. Military aviation was in a ‘period of 
transition from military stage property to a moral auxiliary’: the Chinese army did not 
regard aviation as ‘a necessary arm’ and owing to the inferior performance of army air 
bureaus, regarded it as ‘an overrated scarecrow’.308  
 
In August 1932 a US Naval intelligence officer made similar comments about the 
Chinese use of military aviation: the spirit of combat was lacking, they failed to deploy 
planes against foreign enemies, for example the Soviet forces who invaded north-
western Manchuria in 1929.’ 309 Instead, it was ‘against their own people that the 
Chinese are developing experience in military aviation’: ‘the offensive is attempted 
against towns, or troops without aerial defence; rival air forces avoid each other in the 
air.’ Their preferred manoeuvre was high level bombardment employed for physical and 
moral effects; ‘no successful tactical or strategical destructive missions have been 
reported.’310 
 
These observations provide rare insight into Chinese ideas about airpower which had 
influenced the performance of the air force in the Shanghai War. To use Magruder’s 
words, the air bureau was not much more than ‘stage property’ and had a modest moral 
auxiliary function: pilots scattered leaflets over the city to assure people that they would 
not bomb the city. Chinese generals were not interested in producing heroes by sending 
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pilots against a superior force. Not knowing what to do against the enemy or for its own 
troops on the ground, the air bureau did nothing.  
 
The Chinese attitude to military aviation appears to have had some roots in traditional 
ideas about strategy.  Several historians have commented on the influence of Sun Tzu’s 
the Art of War on both Mao Tse Tung and Chiang Kai-shek: Jay Taylor pointed out in 
his biography of Chiang that in taking decisions during the Northern Expedition, he 
contemplated what neo-Confucian models and Sun Tzu might do.
311
 Chiang’s diary 
reveals that in October 1937 after the failure of the Shanghai offensive, he read the Art 
of War over the course of ten days, especially the 8
th
 chapter [‘Variation in Tactics’], the 
section which discusses the qualities which the military leader must show in trying to 
seize the advantage back from the enemy.
312
  
 
In his Military History of Modern China F.F. Liu highlighted the key principles of Sun 
Tzu which resonated with Chinese commanders: ‘war is deception;’ ‘when the enemy is 
strong, avoid it; when the enemy is angry, stir it.’313 Sun Tzu also stressed that the 
Chinese general must discover the enemy’s weakness and outwit him by doing the 
opposite of what he expects: ‘attack him where he is unprepared, appear where are you 
not expected’.314  At various points during the Nanking decade and the Sino-Japanese 
war, these tenets can be detected in the use of airpower: in applying these principles, the 
Chinese did not distinguish between internal and external enemies, between armed or 
unarmed opponents. When enemy forces were perceived to be superior, the Chinese 
avoided a fight. When the enemy was weak, the Chinese attacked with full force. The 
ideal was to deploy the air force when it had an overwhelming advantage or when then 
enemy was at a temporary disadvantage. The unopposed high level bombing was the 
preferred operation, a display of overwhelming force against the enemy: using a stone to 
crush an egg, to quote Sun Tzu.
315
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T.V Soong and his American advisers hoped to transform this swollen air bureaucracy 
into an air force in the mould of the USAAC. In laying his plans Soong tended to ignore 
the existing leadership of the Air Bureau. American diplomats soon became involved in 
the tensions which developed between Soong and the Air Bureau’s commandant 
General Whang Ping-heng.
316
  
 
On 2 June 1932  one of the US diplomats in Shanghai, Lincoln ‘Tom’ Reynolds 
reported a conversation with General Whang to the Department. Whang complained 
that he had lost face because he was in the dark about Soong’s programme: only 
‘through the intercession of Chiang Kai-shek had an open break been prevented.’317 
Reynolds explained to him that Ed Howard had promised Soong strict confidentiality 
about aviation planning and therefore he could not keep ‘his personal friend’ informed 
about it. The consul at Shanghai, Willys Peck noted that ‘the rift between General 
Whang and T.V. Soong is important to American interests…’ because Whang enjoyed 
the confidence of Chiang even if Soong held him in low esteem.
318
  Officers in the US 
legation at Nanking started to suspect that if Soong’s project might have consequences 
for American relations with the Generalissimo. For the time being, however, they had 
faith in Soong’s patronage. 
 
In July 1932 Lt-Col John Hamilton Jouett (AR) and thirteen USAAC reserve officers 
(all 2
nd
 Lieutenants) came to China. In the first year their salaries amounted to 
US$97,000 – Jouett received US$21,000 whereas an instructor received US$5,000 - 
6,000.
319
 These wages were handsome not only by Chinese standards but those of the 
US military: according to his memoirs, in 1940 Claire Chennault drew a basic salary of 
US$15,000 a year from the Chinese government compared to the average salary for a 
USAAC Captain of US$4,300.
320
   Chinese salaries were a fraction of this. In 1939, a  
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British air attaché reported that a trained aviation mechanic received a monthly wage of 
CH$30, an electrician CH$70 and an engineer CH$90.
321
 
 
As the government’s self-styled aviation adviser, Jouett began to dispense advise to 
T.V. Soong: he found that China was not prepared for conflict with any nation ‘using 
the air as a medium of warfare’; he recommended that the government immediately 
establish an independent air ministry equal to that of the Navy and the Ministry of War; 
this new ministry would need ‘a strong man who can, by training and ability, ...assume 
control of all military aviation...without interference from other governmental 
agencies.’322 Jouett offered as a model Mussolini who had assumed the position of 
Minister of Air in addition to other ministries which he controlled. Consequently ‘the 
efficiency of the Italian Aviation improved by leaps and bounds almost overnight. The 
same drastic action is necessary in China.’323 
 
There was only one strong man in the country, Chiang Kai-shek. In due course Jouett’s 
suggestion was adopted. As Walter Drysdale reported a few months later, the War 
Ministry resented the idea of having the Air Bureau removed from its control.
324
 A 
compromise was reached whereby it was placed under the direct control of the 
Generalissimo, head of the Military Council.
325
  
 
John Jouett and aircraft procurement 
 
In the autumn of 1932, Soong approved John Jouett’s five year procurement programme 
for national air defence to counter future Japanese aggression.
 
Jouett made no secret of 
favouring American equipment although he later claimed that he had not chosen 
‘airplanes by name, nationality or anything else.’326  American aircraft manufacturers 
were quick to take advantage of this new opportunity in China. In the first quarter of 
1933, the export arms of the two largest American aircraft corporations, United Aircraft 
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Exports (UAE) and Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation (CWEC) organized missions to 
China to demonstrate planes to John Jouett and the Chinese government. Thomas A. 
Morgan, president of Curtiss-Wright decided to send William D. Pawley to settle the 
fate of China Airways and start the marketing of Curtiss-Wright and Douglas aircraft.  
UAE sent one of its principal foreign agents Francis Love. Pawley left the United States 
on 10 January 1933 and arrived in Shanghai about a month later.
327
  From the start, he 
realised that Intercontinent’s days in civil aviation were numbered. As Julean Arnold 
later commented, ‘Mr Pawley came to China for military business.’328 Pan Am’s 
representatives followed hard on Pawley’s heels and acquired all of Intercontinent’s 
shares in China Airways on 31 March 1933, thus becoming the principal American 
shareholder in CNAC.
329
  
 
The Chinese observed the competition between Love and Pawley with some 
bemusement. Kung’s secretary Jabin Hsu contended that their price-cutting would 
undermine the chances of either making a profit and that the winner would probably 
obtain the contract at a loss.
330
 Pawley negotiated solidly for three weeks and on 15 
May 1933 concluded an agreement for 18 Hawks at US$22,227 each: he felt certain of 
selling another ten at US$22,270. With spare parts worth US$150,000, the estimated 
total contract came to US$772,784.
331
 This was the largest single order that the Chinese 
had ever placed for aircraft.  Pawley wrote to his wife, ‘if ever in my life I have had a 
hard job it was this one...the English, French, Italians and United Aircraft were all after 
the business. Love of United almost took it away from me 4 or 5 times.’332  
 
The first 18 Hawks were delivered from the factory in Buffalo, New York to CWEC 
between 18 June and 17 July 1933. At least five were shipped and assembled at 
Hangchow by mid-August.
333
 To demonstrate that funds raised by National Salvation 
through Aviation campaigns had been put to good use, these five planes were christened 
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in a public ceremony at Shanghai on 9 September with names ‘to indicate the sources of 
the funds to pay for them’: Shanghai Merchants, Shanghai Laborers, Shanghai Boy 
Scouts, Shanghai Students and Shanghai Ningponese.
334
 A Chinese aviator performed 
stunts in Shanghai No.1, the Hawk demonstrator originally flown by Jimmy Doolittle 
the previous spring at Shanghai. By December 1933 all thirty-two had been imported 
and were based at the American aviation school in Hangchow.
335
  
 
In 1933 US military attachés began to report that the Hawks were being mishandled. In 
Canton, on 1 July 1933 an American instructor Ed Deedes crashed and died while 
piloting one of the recently delivered ‘Canton’ Hawks.336 Not long thereafter another 
three Hawks were cracked up beyond repair: the Cantonese authority tried to cover up 
these accidents which reflected poorly on the ability of their pilots.
337
 By year-end, only 
nine Cantonese pilots out of a total of 160 were certified to fly a Hawk.
338
 As for the 
Hawks at Hangchow, the authorities dared not turn them over directly to Chinese 
pilots.
339
 At least five of the Hangchow Hawks were ‘cracked up’ in the autumn of 1933 
and several turned out to have faults which damaged the reputation of Curtiss Wright.
340
 
The Chinese were being forced to fly before they were ready – they needed years rather 
than months of training to become competent on these relatively high powered planes. 
Nonetheless in 1932-1935 American military attachés generated optimistic reports 
about Jouett’s training programme. In July 1933 an officer from the US Asiatic Fleet 
noted that ‘contrary to popular belief, the Chinese make good aviators.’341 Day and 
night formation work was excellent and at least 15 students could compete in an 
aviation meet anywhere in the world. By contrast 35 out of 40 older air officers had 
been disqualified during a refresher course. 
342
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Nonetheless as Walter Drysdale pointed out in October 1932,  the success of Jouett’s 
mission and the gradual reform of the Nationalist air bureau mission depended entirely 
on ‘the continued interest of Chiang Kai-shek and T.V. Soong (more particularly the 
latter) and there is a certain amount of hazard in having everything subject to the whims 
of one or two individuals.’343 In emphasising Soong’s patronage, Drysdale revealed an 
error of judgment which also afflicted John Jouett and other Americans: they presumed 
that Soong’s influence outweighed that of the Generalissimo and that Soong would have 
an ongoing interest in the project.  The new American aviation fraternity was no more 
adept at reading Chinese politics than the Keys-Robertson group had been in 1929-1931 
when they relied on Sun Fo to see through the contract.  The one man in China whose 
heart and mind Jouett needed to capture was Chiang Kai-shek. The place which he 
should have secured was taken by the Italian aviation adviser il Colonello Roberto 
Lordi. 
 
The Italian Mission 
 
During the spring of 1933, the prospects for bringing a large group of Italian airmen to 
China had not been promising: the Americans had arrived and started training at 
Hangchow; Kung had put out feelers to other potential partners on his trip abroad and 
followed up these leads on his return to China. In Ciano’s view, ‘the projects under 
discussion, at least for the moment, will be difficult to realize given the financial 
difficulties of the Chinese government.’344  The only way forward in Sino-Italian 
relations was to renew the Boxer Indemnity accord for another year or come to a 
general agreement about its remission. A settlement was eventually reached on 1 July 
1933  by Soong, Ciano and the Italian Finance minister in London between sessions of 
the World Economic Conference.
 345
 
 
On 10 April 1933 just before his departure for Italy, Ciano received a letter from Kung 
who, with Soong’s agreement, requested the dispatch of an Italian air mission to be 
funded from the remainder of the 1932-33 Boxer funds under the April 1932 
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agreement.
346
 With Soong’s departure for England, it was up to Kung to finalise 
arrangements with Filippo Anfuso, Ciano’s successor, about the Italian 
instructors/aviators. As Anfuso noted in a cable to Rome, even though Kung had agreed 
to an exchange of letters about the Mission’s eventual departure for China, he  
demonstrated ‘by his resistance and reservations’, that he wanted to postpone its arrival 
at least until there was ‘an opportunity to renew – or not – the contract with the 
American aeronautical mission’.347 
 
Cables in the Italian Foreign Ministry Archives reveal that Chiang and Kung were in a 
quandary about the Italian mission which Soong and Ciano had imposed upon them: 
there was no desire to manage two foreign air missions simultaneously. Kung dragged 
his feet and suggested that the Chinese needed more time to establish a programme for 
its work in China. He also wanted its arrival to coincide with Soong’s return from the 
United States to China in late summer 1933.
348
  Anfuso detected that ‘a current of 
jealousy runs through Kung and the circle close to Chiang Kai-shek over the prominent 
part taken by T.V. Soong in foreign negotiations on behalf of Chinese government.’349 
More importantly, Anfuso discovered from an independent source that Chiang had 
advised Kung that as long as the American mission was in China there was little point 
in bringing over an Italian mission.
350
  
 
As they could not find a way out of this imbroglio, Chiang and Kung drew a veil of 
silence over it. Consequently in early September 1933 when John Jouett found out 
about the imminent arrival of Italian pilots, he was deeply offended that as the 
government’s chief aviation adviser, he had not been included in consultations about the 
Italians. In mid-September he wrote to Arthur Young that he did not want to see his 
own efforts undone and that there was no way for his group to work with the Italians: 
‘oil and water cannot mix and it cannot be expected that Italians and Americans with 
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totally different racial characteristics, ideas, methods of training, etc. could work 
harmoniously together.’351  
 
Jouett had heard that Dr. Kung was responsible for arranging the project during his stay 
in Italy in earlier in 1933.
352
 He and other Americans were incapable of suspecting that 
their patron, T.V. Soong was behind a project which sabotaged their interests. 
Documents in the Italian Foreign Ministry, however, confirm that Kung was the very 
last link in a chain which went back to Soong and Ciano’s Boxer Indemnity scheme. 
 
In the summer of 1933 Chiang was more focussed on the next drive against the 
Communists than problems to do with aviation.  In his diary for June 1933 Chiang 
wrote of his determination to ‘exterminate the Red Bandits.’353 In late August 1933 
soon after Soong returned to China, Chiang demanded CH$20 million from his Finance 
minister: Soong refused because the government’s deficit was already running at 
CH$10 million a month.
354
 Julean Arnold, the US Commerce commissioner in Shanghai 
confirmed the nature of their disagreement in his diary on 30 October:  
Chiang needed more and more money for the campaign against Communists in Kiangsi, 
a war being waged in earnest at present…Soong violently opposed Chiang’s 
tendency…towards compromise with Japan... Soong made further financing of 
Chiang’s campaign contingent upon Chiang swinging over to Soong’s policy of further 
courting western support against Japan.
355
  
 
Through October 1933 Chiang wrote in his diary that Soong was ‘very stubborn and 
obstructive’.356 On 31 October after weeks of crisis, Soong tendered his resignation: 
Kung replaced him as Finance Minister the following day and remained in that post 
until 1944. 
 
                                                     
351
 HISU, ANY, Box 36 Mil/Av, ‘John Jouett to Arthur Young, September 18
th
 1933’ 
352
 HISU, ANY, Box 36 Mil/Av, Jouett to Young 18/9/33 
353
 HISU, Chiang Diaries, Box 36, Folder 18, 1 June 1933 
354
 FRUS, 1933 Vol.III, ‘The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State’ 31 October 
1933, pp.444-445 
355
 HISU, Arnold Papers Box 1, File Office Activities, ‘Weekly Report October 30,1933’ 
356
 HISU, Chiang Diaries, Box 36, Folder 22 entry for 21 October 1933 there are twenty 
references to Soong in the month of October 1933, five refer to his stubborn attitude : 2, 8, 
15,18 & 21 October. 
87 
 
The Fifth Encirclement Campaign began in October 1933. It was considered the most 
successful of those which Chiang mounted against the Communists in 1931-1933. To 
support operations Chiang deployed one light bomber squadron made up of six Fiats 
and six Vought Corsairs. This represented overwhelming force as the Communists had 
neither planes nor anti-aircraft artillery with which to resist bombardment.
357
  
 
At the same time a political conspiracy was developing in Fukien province which 
threatened the Fifth Campaign. At the end of 1932, Chiang had sent the 19
th
 Route 
Army – the heroes of the Shanghai War - to Fukien to participate in the failed Fourth 
Encirclement Campaign. Demoralised by their defeat at the hands of the Red Army and 
mindful of their former glory at Shanghai, the 19
th
 Route Army, rank and file, resented 
Chiang’s insistence on pursuing the Communists instead of resisting Japan.358  By mid-
October 1933 if not earlier, Ch’en Ming-shu, commander of the 19th Route Army put 
out feelers towards the leftist leaders of the Fukien provincial government and of the 
Kiangsi Soviet.
359
   
 
The Communists were in two minds about forming a pact with the 19
th
 Route Army and 
other forces in Fukien: Chou En-Lai was enthusiastic but Mao Tse-tung wanted little to 
do with them.
360
 On 26 October 1933 representatives of the 19
th
 Route Army, the 
Fukien secessionists and Communist delegates from Kiangsi signed an ‘Anti-Japanese, 
Anti-Chiang Preliminary Agreement.’ Through this accord the Fukien rebels hoped to 
gain Communist support for a full scale revolt against Chiang Kai-shek while the 
Communists counted on the Fukien rebels to help break the trade blockade and restore 
supply lines into the Kiangsi Soviet.
 361
 For these reasons the Fukien rebels posed a 
significant threat to Chiang’s pacification programme in South China. 
 
On 25 November 1933 the new Italian Minister in China, Raffaele Boscarelli reported 
to the Foreign Ministry in Rome that Lordi had received a request from the 
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Generalissimo through his air staff to ‘organize a bombing mission into Fukien, using 
Italian aircraft and eventually taking part in the action himself.’ 362  Boscarelli was of 
the view that ‘such an operation would be most effective for enhancing the value of our 
aviation in China and for the execution of our entire aviation programme in this 
country.’363 He sought Mussolini’s opinion about Lordi’s personal participation in the 
campaign. Soong informed Boscarelli that the Chinese planned to reject the idea of 
Lordi’s direct participation on the grounds that he should not engage in any action 
against other Chinese. Mussolini, however, authorised Lordi to take part in air 
operations.
364
 
 
At the end of December 1933 Lordi informed the Italian Legation that ‘the aerial 
bombardment recently organized by the Nanking Government’s airplanes in Fukien had 
been conducted by Chinese pilots flying Italian aircraft.’ 365 Lordi had put the Chinese 
pilots through a brief course of training. He observed that ‘the mission had been a 
success, especially taking into account the inexperience of the pilots.’ 366 According to 
Walter Drysdale, ‘bombs were loaded on Fiat bombers in Nanchang the morning of 
December 1
st
 for the avowed purpose of bombing Fukien... a mass meeting in a public 
park at Chuanchow was bombed by three planes. Four of the six bombs dropped 
exploded, killing seventeen and wounding thirty people.’367  This was precisely the kind 
of air mission which the Chinese military tended to regard as unqualified success – an 
overwhelming display of force against an enemy unable to retaliate.  
 
On the 7 January 1934 Walter Drysdale reported on another major offensive against 
Fukien. There were ten Corsairs and Douglas observation planes which  
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Made direct hits on the wall [of Yenping] with 120-lb bombs dropped from about 1500 
feet. The effect of these bombs was to wipe off the upper part of the wall and to spread 
demoralization to the fortification’s defenders. Six Fiats followed up on this attack and  
dropped their 250-lb. bombs, all around this same point. The city was captured in one 
day due almost entirely to the co-operation of the Air Force. As A result Chiang Kai-
shek gave all participating pilots and observers a cash bonus.
368
 
 
The next target was Kutien where ‘all available Air Force was to be used.’ On 18 
January a mission was flown against the enemy between Shuikow and Foochow. ‘six 
Fiat bombers and twelve observation planes, Douglases and Vought Corsairs assisted 
the Nanking Army in the attack. The Fiats were loaded with six 500-lb bombs and 
eighteen 250-lb. bombs...the bombers had to stay around 1500 feet.’369 During this 
decisive battle, there were an estimated 2000 enemy casualties, 4000 surrendered, 4000 
escaped to the South and some 2000 evaporated into the neighbouring hills. Drysdale 
commented that even though ‘the air force had assisted materially in the success of the 
operations,’ ‘air corps officers no doubt wish to avoid any publicity regarding that phase 
of the operations which were subject to considerable political disapproval.’370 
 
By January 1934 Chiang had put down the Fukien revolt. Although something of a side-
show, the episode had a lasting impact on him. For the first time, commented John 
Jouett, he started to show ‘an active and personal interest in Military Aviation.’371  
Walter Drysdale also noted that after the suppression of the Fukien rebellion in January 
1934, the Central government established its first real field air force and that ‘this was 
no doubt induced by the success of the Air Corps during that rebellion.’372  A US Naval 
Intelligence officer reported: ‘the recent Fukien revolt, in which aviation played an 
important part, made it imperative for the central government to devote more time and 
money for the development of this branch of service’.373 A.W.G. Randall of the Foreign 
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Office later noted that ‘the Chinese Govt…owe it to Colonel Lordi that they were able 
to overcome so easily the last Communist attack on Fukien.’374   
 
The Fukien Rebellion marked the ascendancy of Roberto Lordi in Chiang’s estimation 
and the demise of John Jouett.  In March 1934 Chiang moved the National Air Bureau 
from Hangchow to his military headquarters at Nanchang where it was renamed the 
Commission on Aeronautic Affairs (CoAA).
375
 Jouett complained that even though he 
was the ‘official Air Adviser, he had neither been consulted nor informed officially 
about the move.’376 Jouett told the British Air attaché, Robin Willock that he would stay 
at Hangchow until his contract expired in 1935 but ‘he was heartily tired of continual 
conflicts with the Chinese’.377  
 
At the same time, Colonel Lordi and his small Italian mission were transferred from 
Hangchow to Chiang’s military headquarters in Nanchang.378 Jouett surmised that the 
Italians not only would take over bombing instruction but procurement policy to the 
advantage of Italian manufacturers.
379
  Soon thereafter, in early April 1934 George 
Lautenberg circulated the good news that he had sold 38 aircraft of different models to 
the central government.
380
  On 7 May 1934 Colonel Lordi officially replaced Jouett as 
the CoAA’s chief aviation adviser.381  
 
To keep an eye on the Americans at Hangchow, Chiang appointed one of his loyal army 
officers Chou Chih-jou as Commandant of the school in June 1934 despite his lack of 
aviation experience: Jouett initially got along on well with him.
382
 Chiang also 
appointed his wife Soong Meiling to become his representative for all matters to do 
                                                     
374
 TNA, FO/371/18124 F6461/218/10 ‘Sales of Italian Aircraft in China’ handwritten minute by 
A.W.G. Randall 31 Oct 1934, p.200 
375
 TNA, FO/371/18124 F3223/218/10 31 May 1934  ‘Move of Chinese National Government 
Bureau of Aeronautics from Hangchow to Nanchang – Report of, Office of H.B.M air attaché 9
th
 
April 1934’, p.69 
376
 TNA, FO/371/18124 F3223/218/10, p.69 
377
 TNA, FO/371/18124 F3223/218/10, p.69 
378
 ASMAE, Anno 1934 Telegrammi di Arrivo Cina ‘Situazione in Cina – Missione aeronautica 
italiana’ n. 492  R. Shanghai 2 February 1934 
379
 TNA, FO/371/18124 F3223/218/10, p.69 
380
 TNA, FO/371/18124 F3517/298/10 ‘Italian Aviation in China’ : ‘Sale of Italian Aircraft, 17 April 
1934’, p.102 
381
 ASMAE , Anno 1934 Telegrammi di Arrivo Cina “Forniture materiali aeronautici: Colonnello 
Lordi” n. 4556 P.R. Shanghai 7 May 1934 
382
 RG 165 File 2078-125 Report no. 8858  ‘Central Aviation School, Hangchow, China’ 28 June 
1934’ p.4: Chou is also referred to as General Chow or Chao in diplomatic reports. 
91 
 
with the American air mission, its administration and policies.
383
 Western diplomats 
were as taken with her as they had been with her brother T.V.: Walter Drysdale 
described her as ‘not only a charming lady but an intelligent, capable and interested 
one.’384 From this point onwards Madame took an increasing interest in aviation but 
Roberto Lordi rather than John Jouett served as tutor to her and the Generalissimo.  
 
American Bombers for the Air Force  
 
There was another aspect of the Fukien Revolt which disturbed Chiang more than the 
political challenge posed by the rebels. According to entries in his diary (24 and 26 
October 1933), Chiang was convinced that Japanese officers in Taiwan were preparing 
to invade South China via Fukien, a threat to which Cantonese army officers based there 
were oblivious.
385
 Since taking over Taiwan in 1895, Japan had treated Fukien as a 
region of special interest and actively interfered in its internal affairs.
386
 When the 
Fukien rebels declared independence on 20 November 1933, Joseph Grew, the US 
Ambassador in Tokyo immediately reported to the State Department the concern of the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry: ‘if any indication of anti-Japanese activities appears, Japan 
will be forced to act. Due to the proximity of Fukien Province to Formosa Japan feels a 
special interest in the situation.’387  
 
In this period the Japanese began to disseminate propaganda about the air threat from 
South China which mirrored Chiang’s own fear of Japanese  incursion  into Fukien 
from Taiwan:  in November 1933 CWR reproduced extracts of articles published in the 
Tokyo press during the previous month.
388
 These raised the spectre of a Chinese 
invasion of Taiwan, or aerial attacks on Japanese islands in the South China Sea with 
the help of the United States. The most detailed of these articles was ‘The US-Chinese 
Menace from the Air’ in which the author, Shinnaka Hirata raised the spectre of air-
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raids on Japan from the Philippines or China. Although he regarded China’s existing air 
force as ‘no more of a menace than a flight of crows’ he was a scaremonger about 
Chiang’s plans ‘to attack Japan from the air by acquiring the command of the air of the 
Yellow Sea and South China Sea.’389 Heavy bombers from Haichow could attack North 
Kyushu, only 900 kilometres away while bombers based at Chenhai and Hangchow 
would menace South Kyushu and the Liuchiu Islands (the chain of islands between 
Taiwan and Japan which includes Nagasaki); air attacks launched from Chuanchow and 
Swatow would ‘strangle Formosa and undermine our strategic base in the south.’390  He 
concluded that ‘the US-Chinese approach in the military field makes me picture in mind 
the advent of a giant scale crisis in three to four years.’391  
 
The Japanese may have based their threat assessment in part on inflated estimates of 
Chinese air strength. In October 1933 CWR ran a long article entitled, ‘China Rapidly 
Becoming an Air-power – Soon will Rank Sixth Among Nations’ which claimed that 
the Chinese Air Force had ‘well over three hundred planes.’ Yet the number of planes 
on active duty in Nanchang for the Fifth anti-Bandit Campaign comprised only 21 
aircraft.
392
 In December 1933 CWR reported that, according to General Chen Chih 
Tang, the Kwangtung air force had some 180 aircraft.
393
 At that time, however, 
American military observers counted only 63 aircraft in Canton’s fleet of which 47 were 
just about airworthy.
394
 CWR also wrote that the 19
th
 Route Army had 50-60 airplanes in 
Fukien paid for by the Overseas Chinese and that the People’s Government of Fukien 
had taken over the only airplane factory in China, the naval air station at Amoy.
395
  US 
intelligence in the autumn of 1933 found that the 19
th
 Route Army had four airworthy 
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planes.
396
  As for the naval factory at Amoy, it had produced only 2 airplanes in 1933 
owing to a shortage of funds.
397
  
 
In late December 1933 Chiang wrote in his diary that he must secretly acquire long 
range bombers and made many notes about developing air facilities across Fukien 
province. 
398
 According to Julean Arnold, Dr. Kung was interested in acquiring 18 
heavy long distance Boeing planes (possibly the Boeing B-9) which cost US$150,000 
each.
399
  In choosing the Boeing, he wanted the biggest and best but the local Boeing 
representative, Leslie Lewis discouraged him from buying them ‘as they are too large, 
they can only be landed on the Hangchow field’: since the airfields in Kiangsi or Fukien 
could not accommodate heavy long range bombers, it was pointless to acquire the 
planes which Chiang demanded.
400
  
 
Lewis recommended to Kung that he opt instead for Northrop bombers which Bill 
Pawley could sell for about US$45,000 each.
401
 On 16 December Kung ordered 14 
Northrop bombers from Pawley as well as the necessary munitions to go with them, at 
an estimated cost of US$630,000.
402
 On hearing of the Northrop contract, Arnold noted 
in his diary that ‘the demands arising out of the Fukien separatist movement are forcing 
the Central government to expend large sums on military preparations…thus the 
financial outlook is becoming a matter of increasing concern.’403   
 
In addition to selling Northrop bombers, on 8 December 1933 Bill Pawley signed a 
contract with Dr. Kung to set up a new corporation, the Central Aircraft Manufacturing 
Company Federal Inc. U.S.A. (CAMCO).
404
 A further agreement between Curtiss-
Wright, Intercontinent and Douglas set out the terms for participation by the three 
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CAMCO shareholders.
405
  The key clauses in this contract benefitted both parties: 
Intercontinent and its partners received a minimum guaranteed order of 60 planes a year 
while and the Ministry of Finance and Intercontinent divided the savings from local 
assembly evenly. Exactly how these savings were accounted for and distributed remains 
something of a mystery: it was reported that in 1934-1936 total estimated savings for 
assembling 127 planes came to $600,210.
406
  
 
In December 1933, a few days after Pawley had signed the factory contract with Dr. 
Kung, he sent a version of the same plan to Colonel K.Y. ‘Freddy’ Wong, head of the 
Kwangtung Air Force (KAF) which came under the jurisdiction of the Kwangtung First 
Army Corps.
407
 When Chen Chih-tang heard that Nanking was planning to construct an 
American airplane factory, he wanted to rival it with a modern plant for planes of 
‘Chinese design,’ according to the aeronautical engineer Constantine L. 
Zakhartchenko.
408
   
 
The Amau Statement  
 
The evidence has suggested that China’s foreign partnerships in aviation genuinely 
perturbed the Japanese, especially the initiatives in Fukien province and Kwangtung 
which were within flying range of Taiwan. In April 1934 the British Commercial 
consular in Shanghai, Louis Beale received documents about the Curtiss-Wright factory 
at Canton from a Japanese diplomat.
409
 A.W.G. Randall of the Foreign Office 
subsequently minuted, ‘Mr. Suma evidently wanted to ‘rub it in’ about U.S.A. military 
backing of China, which Japan resents and will probably try to prevent.’410  In May 
1934 the American military attaché Walter Drysdale also made the connection between 
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the proposed Canton factory and Japanese paranoia about American military support for 
China: ‘this important advance probably was one of the immediate and direct causes of 
the recent Japanese reaction,’ he noted referring to the Amau Statement.411  By the time 
Drysdale made this comment, most of the western powers had spent weeks pondering 
the appropriate response to ‘off the record’ remarks of the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
spokesman, Eiji Amau at a press conference on 17 April 1934. This clear expression of 
a Japanese Monroe Doctrine created a diplomatic incident which heavily penalised 
China and increased US government appeasement of Japan. 
 
In mid-January 1934, Eiji Amau, a spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Ministry read 
out a telegram at Ministry press conference alleging that ‘Chiang Kai-shek was engaged 
in the construction of elaborate aerodromes on the Fukien coast at Amoy and Foochow 
which airdromes were being financed from proceeds of the[US] Cotton and Wheat 
loan.’412 Amau repeated assertions made the previous year that Chiang received covert 
American assistance for the air force in Fukien which, he claimed violated Sino-
Japanese treaties forbidding foreign powers from establishing military or commercial 
facilities in the province.
413
  
 
Some months later, in April 1934 Amau, once again appeared before the press and took 
questions about foreign assistance to China. He pulled from his files a document 
purporting to be instructions sent to the Japanese Minister in China to use in talks with 
the Chinese government: he translated this document into English on the spot.
 414
 How 
recently it had been written or exactly why was unclear: it could have been transmitted a 
few days or even a few months before, as the Old China Hand George Sokolsky 
observed in the New York Times. 
415
  
 
The Japanese Foreign Ministry subsequently confirmed that the views expressed by 
Amau on the basis of this memorandum should be considered official.
416
 
 
The Statement 
disclosed that Japan would ‘oppose any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of 
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the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan. Any joint operations 
undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial 
assistance…acquire political significance.’417 Significantly, the Statement emphasised 
the threat posed by China’s military aviation and foreign assistance to the air force in 
terms which echoed Mr. Amau’s declaration to the press in January 1934: 
Supplying China with war planes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military 
instructors or military advisers to China or contracting a loan to provide funds for 
political uses, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and 
China and other countries and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose 
such projects. 
418
  
 
The Japanese ambassador to the United States clarified that ‘Japan’s restatement of 
policy with regard to China resulted from the American wheat and cotton credit and 
from sale of American airplanes to China.’419 On 25 April 1934 the Japanese foreign 
minister repeated the warning that Japan opposed any cooperation –financial, technical 
or otherwise -- between foreign powers and China, in particular ‘the supply of military 
aeroplanes, the establishment of aerodromes, the supply of military advisers or political 
loans’ that would ‘prejudice peace and order in the Far East.’420  
 
In an article for The New York Times George Sokolsky also emphasised the air threat to 
Japan:  a photo of airplanes flying in formation bore the caption, ‘air armadas, Japan’s 
Greatest Fear’ while a map of China and Taiwan had another caption concerning 
Foochow ‘where Japan fears an Anti-Japanese Air Base’. Sokolsky pointed out that 
Japan even felt threatened by civil aviation developments in China: as Pan Am’s 
proposed air route between Shanghai and Manila would fly along the Fukien coast, ‘the 
Japanese immediately became concerned over the future of Formosa, which could easily 
be bombarded by planes from Fukien just across the channel.’421   
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In the spring of 1934 Frank Hawks demonstrated the huge Curtiss Condor 
transport/bomber to crowds in Shanghai and Nanchang.
422
 Furthermore a few Northrop 
bombers had been shipped to China. The Northrop bomber out-performed all other 
planes in the Chinese fleet and many other models worldwide, having set records in the 
United States as the fastest long distance aircraft yet tested:  it had a cruising speed of 
200 mph and a range of 1700 miles.
423
 The Chinese were unique among foreign 
customers in procuring these long range planes for their air force.  
 
That Japan took the air threat from China seriously is further revealed by the staging of 
air manoeuvres and civil defence exercises on Taiwan in June 1934. Alexander Ovens, 
the British consul at Tamsui, (formerly known as Fort Santo Domingo) reported to the 
Foreign office about extensive preparations for air raid practice in the northern part of 
the island:  
 
Gas mask practices have been organized. Routine business of government offices 
throughout the two provinces has been largely held up for at least two weeks by daily 
visitation from the military charged with the supervision of local measures of self-
protection...In all the above there is probably nothing new, save perhaps the degree of 
thoroughness with which preliminary training is being conducted.
424
 
 
In his annual report for 1934 Ovens noted that in an otherwise uneventful year, the only 
disturbing factor was the enforcement of preparations in the cause of ‘national defence’: 
the military governor, General Iwane Matsui – later the notorious leader of the Shanghai 
expeditionary force - was ‘an enthusiastic advocate of air-preparedness and aviation 
communications.’425 Chiang’s ‘scarecrows’ had the desired effect. By acquiring long 
range bombers he impressed upon the Japanese in Tokyo and in Taiwan that if they 
meddled in South China, he could retaliate with force. Airpower became one more 
instrument for ‘buying time’ as he pressed on with pacification before facing external 
resistance.  
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In The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1933-1938 Dorothy Borg treated the 
Amau Statement primarily as an expression of ‘Japanese opposition to foreign aid to 
China,’ particularly economic and technical assistance.426  The evidence of diplomatic 
and press reports suggests that the  Amau Statement was triggered by Chiang’s 
development of airpower in South China and specifically the acquisition of long 
distance bombers from the United States which made Taiwan and possibly other 
Japanese territory vulnerable to air attack from China.   
 
The American response to the Amau Statement 
 
The Amau Statement induced the US State Department to reinforce its policy of 
appeasement towards Japan by taking further steps to distance itself from China, 
particularly in the field of  military aviation. From the start, the State Department had 
been against the US$50 million Cotton and Wheat credit which T.V. Soong negotiated 
with Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. in May1933: in the summer of 1933 
Stanley Hornbeck wrote numerous memoranda warning President Roosevelt of the 
difficulties which the loan had created for US foreign policy.
427
 In an aide-memoire and 
other memoranda, the State Department confirmed its ‘policy of the good neighbour’ 
and its desire to settle any differences with Japan in a ‘spirit of better understanding and 
harmony.’428 It reviewed China policies to ascertain if they should be changed to avoid 
friction with Japan and quickly came to the conclusion that steps were needed to ‘avert 
any future controversy between America and Japan over the issue of military aid to 
China:’429 Hornbeck also argued that the US government should refrain from supporting 
any  further loans to China on the grounds that China had a long history of defaulting on 
its loans and the recent US$50 million loan to China had broken with the spirit if not the 
letter of a longstanding agreement established by a Consortium on international banks 
about arranging credit for China.
430
  
 
                                                     
426
 Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass., 
1965), p.75 
427
 Borg, Far Eastern Crisis, p.68 
428
 Borg, Far Eastern Crisis, p.80 
429
 Borg, Far Eastern Crisis, p.81 
430
 Borg, Far Eastern Crisis, p.81 
99 
 
The first victim of the new policy was John Jouett. Stanley Hornbeck issued instructions 
for Foreign Service officers to take every opportunity to clarify that John Jouett’s air 
mission in China received no government backing.
431
 In April 1934 Jouett had already 
told Robin Willock of his desire to leave China. Nevertheless in the summer of 1934, he 
made a final effort to save his mission in China. In a letter to President Roosevelt Jouett 
him to intercede with Chiang for renewal of his group’s three year contract.432   The 
State Department prepared a memorandum for the White House stating that since it was 
not the government’s policy to encourage trade in munitions of war to China, neither the 
President nor the Department should become involved in Jouett’s problem. ‘A 
noncommittal acknowledgement of Jouett’s letter’ was sent to him by Roosevelt’s 
secretary.’433   
 
By this time, Jouett and his diplomatic supporters were already resigned to his defeat at 
the hands of the Italians and the Generalissimo. According to Walter Drysdale, Chiang 
had become convinced ‘that Colonel Jouett and his American group were primarily 
interested in the sale of American planes and not in building up an efficient Chinese air 
force.’434 In one of the last dispatches about Jouett’s tenure at the Hangchow aviation 
school, Ed Cunningham observed that whatever may have accounted for the disruption 
of the Mission’s work at Hangchow, the fact remained that the mission had trained 
‘some four hundred admittedly excellent Chinese pilots’ and that its work  was ‘shortly 
to be greatly curtailed and possibly eclipsed.’ 435   The principal reason for the mission’s 
demise was that ‘the American Adviser (Colonel Jouett) had not attached himself 
closely to General Chiang Kai-shek while the Italian Adviser definitely had.’ 
 
In late January 1935, Clarence Gauss, the chargé at Peiping reported that ‘the Legation 
has reason to believe that an effort may be made through Jouett or others to invite some 
fairly high ranking officer of the United States Army Air Force now on the active list to 
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retire and accept appointment as Jouett’s successor.’436 Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
immediately advised diplomats in China to convey to Chiang Kai-shek that any effort to 
replace Jouett by recruiting an officer from the USAAC active list would be ‘regarded 
with displeasure by this government.’437  
 
Above all, in American official circles, it is felt that action on the part of the Chinese or of the 
American or of both Governments tending to give the impression that the American 
Government is inciting the Chinese Government to military preparedness or is assisting that 
Government in its own program of preparedness or is attempting to create special bonds 
between the military forces of the two countries would have a net effect disadvantageous to 
each and to both countries.
438
 
 
With this communication, the State Department made clear that the US government 
would avoid any appearance of assisting China militarily and would discourage its 
citizens from taking part in it either by threatening prosecution under various statutes or 
withholding passports.  
 
 Chiang and the Italian mission 
 
In 1934 Roberto Lordi became not only the top air adviser to the CoAA but a friend and 
confidante to the Chiangs.  Using English as their common language, with Madame 
acting as interpreter,  Lordi and the Chiangs discussed international affairs, Mussolini’s 
foreign policy and Italian fascism.
 439
  Lordi reported that ‘Chiang followed with lively 
interest developments in the European situation and took notice of the profound and 
decisive influence that the personality of our President exerts on it’...440  
 
The Italian minister in China, Raffaele Boscarelli took every opportunity to convey to 
the Foreign Ministry in Rome Chiang’s admiration for Mussolini and Italian fascism. 
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‘In all the conversation that I have had with Ciang Kai Schek, he has always spoken to 
me at length and above all of fascism.’441  
 
Chiang’s admiration for Italian fascism became a recurring theme in Boscarelli’s reports 
to the Foreign Ministry from May 1934 onwards. At Nanchang, ceremonies involving 
the Italian air mission or conversations with Lordi were punctuated by Chiang’s praises 
for Mussolini. The British air attaché on a visit to Nanchang noticed ‘even the Chinese 
pupils giving the fascist salute.’442At a banquet for the air mission in September 1934 
Chiang ‘thanked members of the mission for effectively developed work in aeronautic 
training, expressing admiration for their discipline, spirit of sacrifice and expressing on 
behalf of Chinese officials the greatest appreciation for the work of il Duce and 
Fascism.’443 Lordi reported to Boscarelli that Chiang ‘did not limit himself to admiring 
Mussolini but desired as much as possible and as the special conditions of his country 
would allow ,to shape his work along the general political lines laid down by il 
Duce.’444 Chiang’s followers had already started to address him as the supreme leader of 
his country. During the Shanghai war  Whampoa cadets established the tradition of 
calling Chiang ‘leader’ (lingxiu), the equivalent of Führer, a practice which apparently 
endured for the rest of his career.
445
 
 
Furthermore Lordi felt that the Italians were rising steadily in the esteem of the 
Generalissimo even to the detriment of the German military advisers.
446
 Boscarelli 
hinted that Chiang might reconsider the status of the German advisers in light of 
Mussolini’s attitude towards Nazi Germany: ‘as regards the presence of German 
military advisers and the eventual continuation of their mission, Chiang Kai Schek has 
asked Lordi to come and ask me personally to find out from Your Excellency most 
confidentially ‘What the attitude is of the Government towards Hitler’s regime.’447  
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It is difficult to distinguish between flattery and fact in Boscarelli’s reports as he had 
every reason to present Chiang as pro-Italy, pro-Fascist. Nonetheless it is evident that in 
1934-1935, Chiang was satisfied with the Italian aviation mission at Nanchang, that 
Lordi was close to the Chiangs and through frequent contact with Lordi, Chiang 
developed an admiration for Italian fascism which translated into a desire to replicate in 
China, il Duce’s achievements in Italy.  
 
Nanking and Canton 
 
In 1935-1936 an equally important factor in Chinese military aviation was tension 
between Canton and Nanking. This reached a climax in the summer of 1936 when the 
semi-independent regime of Marshal Chen Chih-tang in Kwangtung collapsed. The 
defection of the Kwangtung Air Force to Nanking during a coup against Marshal Chen 
was seen as ‘an important step towards unification’ in China by the British Air 
attaché.
448
 The underlining rationale for the merger of the KAF and the CAF was the 
growing anxiety of Canton and Nanking about the Japanese threat to South China. 
 
In July 1935 Chiang transferred his military base from Nanchang to Szechuan province 
to continue the campaign against the Communists in the west and north.
 449
  British 
Army intelligence surmised that this westward shift of Chiang’s best troops would leave 
Kwangtung ‘to shoulder the responsibility of holding the right flank to the sea’ in the 
event of war with Japan.
450
 The British particularly kept an eye on developments in 
Taiwan because of the risk which Japanese forces posed to Hong Kong. In 1935 the 
local consul C.H. Archer in Taiwan noted that the civil administration of the island had 
a policy of ‘economic penetration by peaceful means in South China and the ‘South 
Seas.’ Only time can show whether the militarists will be content to leave well 
alone.’451 Archer also commented on ‘spy fever’ and the considerable increase in air 
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force facilities.
452
  In 1936 when G.W. Harrison of the British Embassy in Tokyo visited 
Taiwan, he noted far more aerodromes and squadrons, indications that the Japanese 
military regarded Taiwan as a ‘jumping off ground’ for aggression against either Hong 
Kong or South China.’453  
 
Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated further in the autumn of 1935 when, after months 
of negotiation, Foreign Minister Hirota reduced his country’s demands to three main 
points:  recognition of Manchukuo; cooperation with Japan to eliminate Communism; 
submission to Japan in foreign policy.
454
 In subsequent discussions, Japan also insisted 
on the suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda across China.
455
 As Hirota’s three point 
programme became known in China, students reacted with nationwide protests and the 
Southwest leaders with more anti-Chiang, anti-Japan rhetoric.
456
  
 
While tension mounted between Nanking and Canton at the political level, their two air 
forces were beginning to collaborate. In the autumn of 1935 Bill Pawley brought a 
Vultee V-11 attack bomber to China which he demonstrated at Shanghai, Hangchow 
and possibly Canton.
457
 Art Lim of the Kwangtung Air Force proclaimed that ‘the day 
of pursuit aviation was absolutely done, and that the fast attack bomber must be the 
backbone of their Air Force,’ hence the interest in Vultee planes.458 In February 1936 
the military authority in Canton received import licenses from the central government to 
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purchase 29 Curtiss Hawk III and 29 Vultee V-11 attack bombers.
459
 At the end of 
February 1936  the US Consul General in Canton reported that local military authorities 
had paid Intercontinent US$850,000 as one third down payment for 60 aircraft which 
had recently received huchaos (permits) from the central government.
460
  
 
It is unlikely that the central government would have allowed the Canton air force to 
import planes which might be used against Nanking in a civil war. In early July 1936 
US naval intelligence officer Thomas Shock commented that Nanking had no longer 
held up Canton’s huchaos because ‘the Central Government feels ( and may be knows) 
that the Cantonese air force will take off for and side with Nanking immediately trouble 
breaks between the Central Government and South China.’461   
 
On 12 May 1936 the death of the veteran KMT statesman Hu Han-min created a 
political vacuum which both sides rushed to fill.
462
 Anticipating military action by the 
Southwest generals, Chiang massed troops in Hunan on the Kwangsi/Kwangtung 
border.
463
 On 6 June Chen, Li and officers of the First and Fourth Group Armies 
renamed their armies the Chinese Revolutionary Anti-Japan National Salvation Army 
and prepared to launch a northern expedition against the Japanese designed to embarrass 
Chiang into further concessions and subsidies for the Southwest militarists.
464
 To do so, 
however, their army as it cross through Hunan on the way north had to confront close to 
350,000 Nationalist troops.
465
  
 
In the end, Chen ~Chih-tang’s right hand man Yu Han-mou dealt the final blow to 
Southern independence. As a ‘pacification commissioner’ in Kiangsi since 1935, Yu 
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had come into close contact with Chiang’s headquarters in Nanchang.466  On arriving at 
Nanking to attend a plenary session, he announced that from thenceforth Kwangtung 
‘would adhere to the policy of the Central government in all matters affecting the 
state.’467 On 13 July Yu was appointed Southwest Pacification Commissioner and led 
the Kwangtung 1
st
 Army Corps back to its home province. Within days, Marshal Chen’s 
troops began to desert en masse, soon followed by the Kwangtung Air Force under 
General K.Y. ‘Freddy’ Wong.468 Chen Chih-tang tendered his resignation on 18 July 
and fled to Hong Kong.
469
 The Japanese threat to South China persuaded Yu, and the 
KAF to abandon Canton’s traditional opposition to Chiang and join forces with 
Nanking as the best possible course for resisting Japan. 
 
Chiang’s 50th Birthday Airplanes 
 
1936 marked another turning point in China’s military aviation when the Nanking 
regime prepared to celebrate the Generalissimo’s Fiftieth Birthday on 31 October. The 
slogan National Salvation through Aviation was revived as was the emphasis on 
national defence which had been current in the aftermath of the Shanghai War.  Both 
themes were used for the Birthday Celebration fundraising drive to buy 70-100 planes 
for Chiang which CWR expected to be ‘probably the most extensive ever staged in the 
land, even surpassing the campaign which followed the Japanese intervention and 
bombing of Shanghai in 1932.’470 The regime also reinforced ‘air mindedness’ by 
staging night-time air defence manoeuvres in major cities.
471
  
 
There were key differences, however, between the 1933 and 1936 fundraising 
campaigns. In 1933 public subscription for planes covered up the diversion of Boxer 
Indemnity funds for aircraft procurement. The 1936 campaign was directly linked to a 
personality cult centred on the Generalissimo. In the run up to the Birthday celebrations, 
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the air force became a symbol of national mobilisation under Chiang to prepare for an 
imminent confrontation with Japan.  
 
Chiang let it be known that he would frown on ‘forcible measures’ to raise funds for gift 
planes but such measures were taken all the same.
472
 In late March the official KMT 
news service announced a sliding scale of contributions: 2-10 % on civil service salaries 
of CH$50 -500 would be deducted for the fund of the National Aviation League. 
Shanghai had one of the most ambitious subscriptions which aimed to raise CH$1 
million for nine bombers.
473
 In a radio message the mayor of Shanghai, General Wu 
Teh-chen gave a speech entitled ‘Aviation Movement and National Revival’ which 
provided the rationale for the campaign: ‘ an adequate air force...constitute[s] the least 
expensive, the most useful and most progressive line in national defence.’474 By mid-
September CH$3.5 million(US$1 million) had been raised for Chiang’s birthday 
planes.
475
  
 
Through this six month long campaign, the regime transformed Chiang into the leader 
of national resistance to Japan. On 31 October 1936 the celebrations commenced. As 
CWR reported, the gifts presented to Chiang were not ‘precious stones’ or other 
‘valuables’ but ‘patriotic fighting planes.’476 Banners displayed slogans such as ‘Give 
full support to our leader—Gen. Chiang Kai-shek,’ or ‘to strengthen the air forces is to 
strengthen our national defence.’477 In addressing the crowd, Chiang used the highly 
charged rhetoric of redemption:  
 
so long as the people are still in distress, I have not fulfilled my mother’s long cherished wish 
and that so long as the task of national salvation is not yet accomplished, I shall be responsible 
for the distress and suffering of the people... Therefore I appeal to my countrymen to help me 
fulfil my mother’s ardent wish – to fulfil the great task of national salvation.478 
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Some months later in May 1937 the American ambassador Nelson Johnson speculated 
that Madame Chiang had been instrumental in ‘the identification of her husband with 
China’s destiny and his enshrinement as China’s indispensable leader toward unified 
nationhood and national salvation’.479 He suggested that the Chiangs’ trusted friend and 
adviser W.H. Donald had assisted her.
480
  
 
According to CWR, 56 planes were presented to the government on Chiang’s birthday, 
compared to a target of one hundred.
481
 After the numerous aircraft christenings in 
China’s principal cities, a US naval intelligence officer heard from a reliable source that 
many had been taken ‘from stock’ for presentation purposes. ... It is also a matter of 
conjecture if the full number of planes subscribed for is ever added to the air strength of 
China.
482
 
 
As was the case in 1933 there was no accountability for the funds raised to purchase 
Chiang’s birthday planes: the sums reported very likely represented a fraction of the 
cost of purchasing new C-W Hawks, Shrikes and Vultee bombers from Intercontinent. 
The key purpose of the campaign was not financial but political and psychological. The 
Chiangs set out to rally the country around the Generalissimo as their leader against the 
common enemy Japan. He used the air force as the most visible symbol of a modern 
fighting force. Having raised popular expectations, the question hovered in the air: 
could the CAF deliver national salvation for China. The answer as numerous foreign 
diplomatic reports indicated was no. 
 
The Air Force Clique and CAF training 
 
At the end of 1935 Ralph Ofstie commented on the personal interest which Chiang Kai-
shek took in the air force and the group of generals that surrounded him: Chan Hing-
wan, P.T. Mow (Mao Pang-shu), T.H. Shen (Shen Teh-Hsien), Chow (Chou) Chih-jou 
and Chien Chang-tsu (C.T. Chien, formerly chief of Technical department in the 
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CoAA).
483
  Ofstie noted that ‘the present administration do not want foreigners 
controlling or actually directing their aviation...foreign experts must come in as part of 
the organization and subject to Chinese control, rather than as members of a mission 
and responsible primarily to the leader of that mission.’ At the time of Ofstie’s visit, 
General Chow was the commandant of the Hangchow school: all the generals 
mentioned by Ofstie, apart from T.H. Shen, held a senior position at Hangchow at some 
point in the 1930s and all had top jobs in the CoAA or the CAF through to the end of 
the Sino-Japanese war. 
  
The quality of training at the Hangchow school declined after John Jouett and his team 
left in June 1935 as became evident in January 1936 during the mid-year graduation 
exercises at Hangchow which the Generalissimo attended.
484
 On that occasion, a US 
Naval attaché described the aerial acrobatics and flight formation as good: diving, target 
practice and firing machine guns as poor or fair; in bombing practice there were no 
direct hits.
485
 He concluded that the 68 new graduates ‘could probably qualify in the 
United States as ‘limited commercial’ pilots.486 By Chinese standards, this may have 
been adequate as the CoAA generals tended to believe that military aviation should be 
no more dangerous to pilots than civil aviation. 
 
When the Chiangs returned in October 1936 for another inspection, the new British Air 
attaché Wing Commander Harold S. Kerby wrote that they were ‘thoroughly disgusted 
with what they saw. The Generalissimo said the buildings were fair to outward view but 
were merely a cloak for the rottenness within, whilst Madame Chiang likened 
Hangchow to a whitened sepulchre.’487 According to a US Naval Intelligence officer,  
the new commandant, General K.Y.Wong received a ‘dressing down:’488 Kerby heard 
from W.H. Donald that Chow Chih-jou (now head of the CoAA) was told to ‘ “change 
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his tune” and make every use of his Foreign Advisers.’489 Chow was adamant, however, 
that he could not work with Roberto Lordi’s successor, General Silvio Scaroni or any of 
the Italians: in his memoir, Scaroni referred to two air force cliques one led by General 
Chow and P.T. Mow aligned with the Americans and the other at Nanchang who 
worked alongside the Italian mission.
490
 Chow was willing, however, to cooperate with 
another adviser, the Australian aviator, Squadron Leader Garnet Malley who, having 
served as an instructor for the KAF was also close to K. Y. Wong.
491
 
 
The CoAA, Foreign advisers and Madame Chiang in 1937  
 
Because of her fluent English, Madame Chiang routinely served as an interpreter for her 
husband with officials including air advisers. Through this process, she became directly 
involved in China’s military aviation and took part in Chiang’s consultations with Silvio 
Scaroni.
492
 By the end of the 1936 she was Secretary General of the CoAA which had 
continued to expand over the years: by February 1937 CoAA personnel had reached 
16,370: two thirds were unskilled workers while only 775 CAF pilots were on ‘flying 
duty’.493   The challenges of reforming the CoAA and the CAF were greater than ever 
and more crucial as tensions grew with Japan. 
 
After their inspection of the air school in October 1936 the Chiangs gave Silvio Scaroni 
a ‘free hand’ to assess the air force’s combat-worthiness. Touring air bases around the 
country, he created a score-card to assess each squadron. According to US military 
attachés, the German adviser General von Falkenhausen received a copy of the final 
report which concluded that ‘the Chinese air corps is still in a state of disorganisation 
and is certainly in no condition to participate in hostilities even against an enemy with 
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no greater plane strength.’494 American officials may not have had access to Scaroni’s 
report owing to the general ill-will between Italian and American air instructors.  
 
W.H. Donald described to Wing Commander Harold Kerby in blunt and colourful terms 
a meeting between Scaroni, Madame Chiang and himself on 16 November 1936. 
Scaroni’s opening words were ‘your Air Force is rotten and as a weapon of war, it is 
entirely useless’ were Scaroni’s opening words.495 He was not prepared to take any 
blame for this state of affairs ‘as General Chow Chih-Jou (Head of the Commission on 
Aeronautical Affairs) was completely incompetent and had constantly refused to 
cooperate in the slightest degree.’496 Madame responded that ‘if every incompetent 
official in CHINA was removed, there would not be enough ammunition in the country 
to shoot them all.’497   
 
In early December Madame took up her position as CoAA Secretary General.
498
 The 
Generalissimo also gave specific instructions to General Chow to reorganise the CoAA. 
All such initiatives were postponed, however, because of dramatic events in Sian in 
North China.
499
 On 12 December 1936 as Madame Chiang was holding an aviation 
meeting at her house in Shanghai, her brother-in-law Dr. Kung interrupted to announce 
that in Sian, the Young Marshal had kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in order to pressure 
him into forming a united front with the Communists.
500
 It lies beyond the scope of this 
thesis to examine an incident which has been the subject of debate since its 
occurrence.
501
 Virtually all contemporary accounts, however, remarked on the fact that 
when Chiang was released on Christmas day, he emerged a far more popular national 
leader than he had been weeks before.  
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On 9 January 1937 Kerby managed to see Scaroni’s ‘secret’ report, copied the chart and 
summed up ‘the critical state of affairs.’502 Kerby pointed out that ‘not one Squadron in 
the Chinese Air Force is completely efficient for war and some seven out of twenty five 
are entirely inefficient while the average efficiency of all squadrons is only 17.4%... 
...Salvation by Aviation would, therefore, appear little better than a pious hope at 
present in CHINA.’ 503 Kerby concluded that ‘Madame Chiang Kai-Shek has every 
reason to be angry with the Officers that have allowed this condition to obtain.’504  
In mid-January 1937 General Chow came under pressure to resign over his refusal to 
cooperate with Scaroni or his peers.  
 
Donald brief Kerby about a crisis meeting at Shanghai in mid-January 1937. Madame 
Chiang emphasised that ‘China must depend upon aviation to save the country and that 
the Air Force must be brought to a state of efficiency.’505 As Kerby reported, she 
expressed her concern that ‘the people believed their Air Force is capable of bombing 
Japan. This is, however, a mistaken idea and she was very worried, as, if it were 
generally known, public opinion would insist that someone be held responsible.’506 
Madame found relations with General Chow too serious for her to handle on her own: 
the Generalissimo had to come to Shanghai to consider the situation. As Malley pointed 
out to Kerby, some formula had to be found for Chow’s resignation to be accepted 
without ‘loss of face.’507 The Generalissimo, however, decided to retain Chow and 
appoint him to the Air Committee as ‘senior member and Chairman:’ Chiang’s 
indulgence towards Chow was considered a sign of either intense loyalty or that Chow 
had some hold over him.
508
 
 
In the spring of 1937 the Chiangs reorganized the CoAA  and the resulting hierarchy 
remained in force until Madame’s resignation the CoAA in March 1938.509 Although 
the Generalissimo was overall Commander in Chief, Harold Kerby commented that 
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Madame as Secretary General was ‘virtually the Commander’ with ‘full authority to 
handle all affairs of the Commission in the absence of the Commander in Chief. In 
practice, therefore, the Generalissimo seldom interferes with the decisions of the 
Aeronautical Affairs Commission, except at Madame’s direct request.’510   
Figure 1 CoAA organisation chart April 1937 
511
 
 
 
The CoAA organisation chart revealed the control of Generals Chow, Wong and Whang 
over assets and personnel but said nothing about the line of command in the event of 
war. In May 1937 the Chiangs further refined the relationship between the CoAA and 
the CAF by dividing the CAF into six regional zones. The purpose of decentralising 
CAF command and organisation was to compensate for the inability of the CoAA to 
maintain direct control over air bases which were thousands of miles from the seat of 
power: separate CAF headquarters were established at Nanking, Taiyuanfu, Nanchang, 
Canton, Sienfu and Chengdu.
512
  Chiang envisaged quarterly inspection of each zone 
and annual rotation of the commanding officers ‘to prevent them from attaining 
personal influence and forming private cliques in a particular locality.’513 Chiang also 
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desired the presence of two foreign instructors for training in each of the six zones: it 
was notable, that the commanding officer of each area did not necessarily have to be an 
aviator whereas officers in charge of training and discipline had to be pilots. 
514
   
 
Strategy, procurement and training  
 
At the end of January 1937 the CoAA followed Scaroni’s recommendations and 
reduced the active squadrons from 31 to 21 in order to overcome the problem of 
insufficient spare parts and reserve aircraft for each unit which he had highlighted in his 
report.
515
 Old bombers were weeded out and the number of bomber squadrons reduced 
from nine to five; pursuit squadrons, predominantly composed of Curtiss Hawks were 
trimmed from ten to seven. There were also two ‘attack’ bomber squadrons formed of 
Curtiss Shrikes. Officers in the CoAA or the CAF appear to have favoured Hawks 
which could serve the dual purpose of fighter or light bomber. The reclassification 
yielded a new total of 686 planes: 284 Service aircraft; 334 training or observation 
planes; 68 obsolete planes.
516
  
 
On 3 March 1937 Kerby reported that six Martin heavy bombers, ordered in 1934, had 
finally arrived. The original rationale for acquiring these had been to threaten 
bombardment of Japan, Taiwan or islands in the South China Sea.
517
 As few airfields 
(perhaps Nanchang and Nanking) could accommodate these large twin engine planes, 
the Chinese had little immediate use for them. In March 1937 the CoAA decided that in 
future it would only purchase single engine bombers, the idea first raised by Art Lim of 
the KAF. Once existing air strips were upgraded to all weather fields, the air force  
would be able to acquire large bomber/transport planes.
518
  
 
The new procurement philosophy implied a shift in strategy from defensive tactics to be 
handled by pursuit squadrons towards offensive operations carried out by single engine 
‘attack’ bombers. In their History of the Sino-Japanese War Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang 
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Ming-kai provide some explanation of how the Chinese air force planned to use its 
assets: because the Chinese air force was so inferior to the Japanese, by a ratio of 7:1, it 
would have to use stealth and surprise to achieve limited results.
519
  As Hsu and Chang 
noted, these attacks in theory would be so swift or unexpected that the enemy would not 
have time to deflect them. Hsu and Chang appear to refer to tactics which harked back 
to the Sun Tzu ‘when the enemy is strong, avoid it; when the enemy is angry, stir it.’520 
 
After the Fukien rebellion when Chiang discovered bomber power, he had abandoned 
the Jouett/Soong approach to air defence which sought a balance between bombing and 
pursuit aviation. By 1937, the pattern of procurement revealed that Chiang and his 
advisers had decided to adopt a ‘first strike’ strategy based on stealth – surprise, night 
flying and flying under cover of cloud. If the strategy was to depend entirely on the 
deployment of fast attack bombers, Chinese aviators would require an exceptionally 
high level of competence to hit targets. CAF aviators, however, had received inadequate 
experience in target practice as western observers reported. Indeed most western forces 
at this time were far from competent in precision bombing.  Carpet or indiscriminate 
bombing was the main manoeuvre of which Chinese pilots were capable in 1936-1937. 
  
Even if the emphasis was entirely on attack, there were not enough pilots with adequate 
experience to fly attack bombers. At the end of February 1937 the Chiangs 
acknowledged that the CAF was inadequately trained but seemed unable to decide 
whether to hire more Italian or American instructors.
521
 In considering the options, 
Madame Chiang wanted clarification about the Italian government’s attitude towards 
China in the event of war with Japan. Scaroni cabled directly to Rome and received the 
reply, ‘Italy was one hundred % free to do as she wished in such an eventuality.’522 This 
brusque response discouraged the Chiangs from increasing their reliance on the Italian 
mission. Madame Chiang finally yielded to appeals from one of the remaining Jouett 
instructors, Roy Holbrook who had urged her to hire eight more instructors as soon as 
                                                     
519
 Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) 
(Taipei,1971), p.266  
520
 Liu, Military History, p.282 
521
 TNA, FO/371/20968 F2524/31/10 ‘Italian attitude in the event of a Sino-Japanese War’ 3 
May 1937, p.68 
522
 TNA, FO/371/20968 F2524/31/10  3/5/37, p.68 
115 
 
possible for the Hangchow school.
523
 Only one new adviser arrived at the very end of 
May 1937, the recently retired US Army Air corps pilot, Captain Claire Chennault 
(AR).
524
  
 
Chennault had corresponded for several months with Roy Holbrook, an original 
member of the Jouett Mission who also had hired Billy MacDonald and Luke 
Williamson, Chennault’s colleagues in the USAAC aero-acrobatic group, ‘Three Men 
on a Flying Trapeze.’ They had arrived in August 1936 to take up appointments at 
Hangchow.
525
 By his own account, Chennault had come to the end of the line with the 
USAAC where as a specialist in pursuit tactics, he had grown weary  of the doctrinal 
battle ‘between the bomber radicals and the handful of fighter advocates.’526 In his 
memoir, Way of a Fighter Chennault described Holbrook’s offer to conduct a three 
month tour of the CAF at US$1000 a month plus expenses, considerably less than the 
fees paid to Jouett in 1932-1935.
527
 This assignment came under the new plan for 
inspecting the six air zones which Chiang had instructed Chow to organize.
528
  In June 
Chennault and Billy MacDonald embarked on the first inspection for Madame Chiang 
starting with zone 1 at Nanking: he promised a full report in three months.
529
 
 
It was never clear exactly how the CAF reorganisation might work in the event of war 
but certain inferences can made about the chain of command. First there was no senior 
commanding officer in overall charge of the CAF immediately beneath the Chiangs: 
instead there were six regional generals subject to the orders of the Generalissimo or in 
his absence, Madame. Second the line of command for operations was not defined: it 
was implicit that the Chiangs issued all orders but unclear what authority a commanding 
officer in one of the zones might assume during an emergency. If he took initiative 
without direct instructions from the Chiangs for defending his zone or attacking enemy 
positions, he might be at risk of court-martial for insubordination. Third, the Chiangs 
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had no expertise in air strategy and operations: neither ever piloted a plane themselves. 
The only operations which Chiang had authorised were those in 1933-1935 against the 
Communists who had no air force or anti-air artillery: actions ordered against Canton in 
1936 had been cancelled because of the KAF defection. Nonetheless the Chiangs had no 
confidence in their air force commanders.  Hence Chiang and Madame were more likely 
to consult a foreign air adviser or one of Chiang’s trusted field Army Generals when 
planning operations than to rely on one of their Chinese officers who might realise the 
extent of their ignorance in aviation affairs. When war came, they consequently turned 
to Claire Chennault even though he had been in the country for only three months. 
 
Conclusions 
 
From 1934 onwards, the China Yearbooks published by the North China Daily News 
and Herald contained a section on military aviation which explained that during the 
Shanghai War of 1932 the employment of bombing by the Japanese and ‘the obvious 
inferiority of the Chinese forces in this type of weapon’ gave a major impetus to 
developing military aviation in China.
530
  As this chapter has suggested, the Chinese and 
their foreign partners in aviation had different ideas of what that impetus should be, who 
should administer it and to what end. 
 
During the Shanghai war, the Nanking Air Bureau may have been numerically inferior 
to the Japanese air force but pit behaved with exemplary prudence: by avoiding flight 
over the city or attempts to bomb Japanese targets, it did not add to the damage inflicted 
by the Japanese on the people and industry of Shanghai. Furthermore, as western 
observers noted, China’s air bureaus had never launched operations against a foreign 
enemy: their experience came through civil war when they bombed civilians or military 
forces which had no means of firing back. The unopposed air attack was typical of 
Chinese air strategy in the 1920s and early 1930s. It remained a central feature of 
Chiang’s approach to airpower in the Fukien rebellion and the opening phase of the 
Sino-Japanese war in August-September1937. Unopposed attacks on dissidents and 
political opponents was a woefully inadequate training for combat against an invading 
force. 
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In the Shanghai War, westerners not only witnessed the brutality of the Japanese but 
also the non-performance of the central government’s air bureau. What in the past might 
have been considered sound strategy – to avoid an enemy when he is strong – now 
looked like cowardice. The death of the American pilot, Robert Short caused a 
sensation. While Chinese troops had proved their worth on the ground, there had been 
no heroes in the air, apart from Robert Short. The Nanking Air Bureau lost face which 
was an embarrassment for Chiang as head of the Military Council. 
 
The Nanking Air Bureau’s image was not the only consideration. It was inevitable that 
China would have another war with Japan: as matters stood, the army alone would have 
to bear the brunt of resistance because the country had neither an adequate Navy nor an 
adequate air force. The lesson of the Shanghai War was that the enemy would arrive by 
sea as well as land. Airpower had to be developed for its own sake but also to 
compensate for the lack of naval power.  
 
Finance Minister T.V. Soong rather than Chiang initially took charge of efforts to 
improve the Nanking Air Bureau. After the defection of the ‘Chinese Lindbergh’ Chang 
Wai-jung ,Chiang became wary of the air force. The defection had been an object lesson 
that a weapon as flexible and mobile as an airplane could not be entrusted to any but the 
most loyal officers. Secondly there could be no air force improvement without funds. 
Only T.V. Soong had the talent and prestige to manage the central government’s budget 
and fragile creditworthiness.  
 
At first there was mutual self-interest between Soong and his foreign partners in 
organising aviation projects:  the Italians and Americans were eager to sell planes and 
Soong was ready to buy them. Procurement of large powerful planes was the most 
straightforward aspect of building the air force and thus the element which China’s 
leaders could most readily grasp. While Soong focussed on funding, he delegated to 
others the development of a training programme and recommendations about air force 
reform. No one with authority over China’s air affairs had any direct experience of 
aviation. No-one had considered how to deal with two foreign missions simultaneously 
-- it had been hard enough to accommodate one mission given the Air  Bureau’s 
resentment. Furthermore Jouett had already indicated that he could not work with the 
118 
 
Italians. The competition between the American and Italian mission was bound to lead 
to duplication of effort and waste of money.  
 
Soong’s American admirers made the mistake of regarding him as more important to 
their interests than Chiang. Thus Jouett failed to develop a rapport with Chiang in stark 
contrast to Roberto Lordi.  This can be explained possibly by the incompatibility of the 
American military mind set and the ‘Whampoa Mind,’.531 Chiang and the old guard of 
the Chinese military were imbued with values which stressed above all else the 
willingness to fight but, as F.F. Liu has observed, they ‘looked with an air of ill-
concealed contempt on the teaching staffs of the military schools, calling them lo-wu 
fen-tzu ( the backward elements)’.532 Roberto Lordi was willing to fight while John 
Jouett was willing to fulfil his contract. Chiang either did not appreciate the importance 
of a competent administrator and teacher such as Jouett or he did not want to have an 
adviser who was dedicated to bringing discipline and structure to Chinese air force 
training. Too strong and independent an air force under foreign influence was not 
necessarily in Chiang’s interest. 
 
Airplanes also had propaganda value as George Westervelt pointed out to Soong. The 
focal point of all the fundraising campaigns in 1932-1933 was the new C-W Hawk 
acquired from Bill Pawley. This sturdy biplane became the physical manifestation of the 
nation’s ‘air mindedness’ about national defence. It also became the backbone of 
Intercontinent’s sales and manufacturing activities in China up to the outbreak of war 
with Japan in 1937. Aircraft sales to Chiang’s regime in the Nanking decade made Bill 
Pawley’s fortune. He was listed among the Highest Salaries Paid in 1936 published by 
the New York Times:  at US$156,087, Pawley had earned somewhat more than the 
President of Coca Cola: the largest salary declared that year was $561,311 for Alfred 
Sloan, the head of General Motors.
533
   
 
Every other aspect of transforming an air bureau into an air force involved difficult 
reforms. The air force faced the same challenges as the army and society at large where 
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modernisation was concerned. In the space of only five years the ranks of the Nanking 
air bureau had grown to thousands of untrained personnel, ill equipped for modern 
warfare.  It became a safe haven for senior officers who themselves were not trained 
aviators and were not interested in having their organisation upgraded into a national 
defence force. They had the support of the Generalissimo who wanted the air force to 
eliminate his internal enemies before deploying it against Japan. Bombing the 
Communists, however, with impunity hardly constituted a preparation for modern 
warfare with Japan. The success of operations for ‘pacification’ lulled Chiang into a 
false sense of security that he had an effective air force.   
 
The most original aspect of Chiang’s fascination with airpower -- possibly inspired by 
Lordi -- was his decision to acquire long- range Northrop bombers from Intercontinent 
in December 1933. Because the Northrop bombers could in principle attack Taiwan 
from South China, Chiang saw in this capability a deterrent to Japan. Chiang was not 
the only politician to believe that the possession of bombers could keep the enemy at 
bay. Roosevelt adopted a similar notion about using large airplane fleets to deter Nazi 
Germany: Roosevelt believed that Hitler would not attack his European neighbours as 
long as they had large air fleets with which to threaten retaliation.
 534
  
 
In 1934, Chiang’s acquisition of long range bombers had the desired effect of posing a 
threat to Japan if it made a military move in South China. It was also a way of 
demonstrating some limited resistance of Japan to those who accused him of 
appeasement. Of all the activities in aviation which Chiang undertook in this period, the 
procurement of the Northrop bombers was probably the only initiative which the 
Japanese took seriously. Hence they issued a warning to the United States through the 
Amau Statement about American military assistance to China. Chiang did not foresee 
that the US government for the first time would adopt an explicit policy of not helping 
China in order to appease Japan. This was a setback which undermined the efforts of 
Chiang’s regime to secure financial and material assistance in the United States over the 
next four years.  
 
                                                     
534
 Robert Dallek Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York, 
1979&1995), pp.186-187  
120 
 
In 1936-1937 Chiang’s regime further developed the propaganda potential of the air 
force through a nationwide campaign for National Salvation through Aviation 
associated with the Generalissimo’s Fiftieth Birthday. By the spring of 1937, however, 
the gap between appearance and reality was painfully evident to the Chiangs. In many 
respects the air force was still an air bureau. It had been expanded, divided and 
distributed around the country but it remained incapable of coalescing to mount any 
concerted action against Japan.  
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Chapter III: Bloody Saturday 
 
On Sunday 15 August 1937 the North China Herald reported the accidental bombing of 
Shanghai by Chinese pilots : instead of hitting the battleship the Idzumo they overshot 
and released missiles in the city centre, killing at least 600 people and wounding another 
1000. The editor urged all authorities ‘to avert a further extension of this wicked ... 
wanton crime against civilization’.535 A week later, however, on Tuesday 24 August 
another Chinese plane, flying at high altitude, dropped two 1,000 lb bombs killing 170 
in or near large department stores in Nanking Road.
536
 Chinese diplomats blamed the 
first bombings on damaged bombed shackles and denied that the second incident was 
caused by a Chinese plane: they ‘regretted the loss of civilian lives ‘sacrificed in 
China’s defence for democracy against “insatiable Japanese militarism”’537 
 
This chapter examines the role of airpower and American air assistance in the Shanghai 
offensive during August, 1937. It suggests that the Chiangs and their air adviser Claire 
Chennault were entirely responsible for ‘Bloody Saturday’ and subsequent damage to 
Sino-American relations in 1937-1938. Chennault recommended operations which were 
beyond the capability of the best trained western air force at that time:  precision 
bombing of enemy targets near a civilian population which, in principle, the armed 
forces were meant to protect.  
 
In the summer of 1937, the Chiangs brought the war to Shanghai in the hope of 
reproducing the ‘miracle’ performed in the 1932 Shanghai war when the army’s 
resistance inspired the world’s admiration for China and condemnation of Japan. The 
Shanghai offensive, however, backfired in every sense: the military strategy was wrong, 
the tactics ill conceived and the propaganda effect disastrous. The battle of Shanghai 
was all the more tragic for being unnecessary: the danger lay elsewhere at the coast 
where Japanese reinforcements landed and began to penetrate the Yangtze River valley 
while Chiang committed his best troops and air force to a fruitless struggle to drive a 
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smaller group of Japanese marines and guards from the Northern sector of the 
International Settlement.  
 
In Way of a Fighter, Claire Chennault described how the air force became involved in 
the Shanghai offensive and his part in its operations, including ‘Bloody Saturday’. As 
his biographer Martha Byrd and other reviewers pointed out at the time of publication, 
Chennault’s memoir was so riddled with anomalies that its reliability has been called 
into question.
538
 Nonetheless if his recollections are put in context and compared with 
other contemporary accounts, it is possible to treat Way of a Fighter as historical 
evidence about his contribution to China’ military aviation during and after the 
Shanghai offensive. His influence in August 1937 was wholly negative, in 1937-1938 
he disassociated himself from an International Volunteer squadron organized on the 
orders of Madame Chiang. In 1938-1940, his impact on flight instruction was neutral: in 
October, 1940 he admitted that the CAF was wholly useless for war operations. That 
same month Chennault joined T.V. Soong in Washington to lobby the US government 
for massive air assistance which Roosevelt had no intention of ever providing. 
 
The military setting 
 
After the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking on 7 July 1937, foreign 
observers such as the Dutch intelligence officer Henri J.D. de Fremery were baffled that 
the Nationalists could not block the enemy’s advance. 539  China had a standing army of 
at least 1.7 million troops – eight times the size of the Japanese Imperial army (247,000 
at the start of the war).
540
  Manpower alone, however, could not make up for the 
Chinese deficit in equipment and training, nor could the immense army compensate for 
an under equipped navy and poorly trained air force.  
 
The Chinese Navy consisted of eight small cruisers, forty gunboats and four torpedo 
boats whereas the Japanese Navy had three fleets: the third fleet alone, responsible for 
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China, had four light cruisers, thirteen frigates and twelve gunboats.
541
 The First and 
Second Fleets together had five battleships and three aircraft carriers.
542
 Because of 
limited funds, Chiang decided to develop the air force instead of the navy believing that 
airpower offered greater flexibility for internal ‘pacification’ as well as coastal defence 
against an external enemy. Although the regime made some strides in military aviation, 
the Chinese were still at a severe disadvantage compared to the Japanese whose 
combined forces in the summer of 1937 were estimated to outnumber the CAF by 4:1. 
Japan had 1,220 aircraft (620 Army with 25 % reserves, 600 Navy), the CAF only 220 
war planes with 30 % reserves ‘of doubtful value’ according to estimates reported by 
Brigadier Anderson of the British War Office: he concluded that ‘the Japanese are in a 
position to secure air superiority over the Chinese in a very short space of time.’ 543   
 
After the Shanghai war, the ceasefire agreement prevented the Chinese army from 
entering the city but permitted a police force – the Peace Preservation Corps (PPC) to 
provide security. The PPC was initially limited to 2,000 lightly armed patrolmen but by 
June 1937 it had swollen to 6,000 guards equipped to a military standard.
544
 The same 
ceasefire terms reconfirmed the right of Japan to maintain the Naval Landing Party 
(marines) and other military personnel for the garrison in the International Settlement to 
the north of Suchow Creek where most of the Japanese community was based.
545
 After 
the Marco Polo Bridge incident, the Japanese Naval Landing Party was increased from 
2,700 to at least 3,200 marines.
546
 On 12 August another 1,000 -1,400 marines 
disembarked from cruisers of the China (Third) Fleet.
547
 Thus there were nearly 5,000 
Japanese marines in or near the northern sector of the International Settlement in mid-
August 1937 compared to 6,000 members of the Chinese PPC.  
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For years, Chiang had feared that because of its military inferiority China would lose a 
war with Japan. Therefore when war came, it would require total sacrifice on the part of 
the army and the Chinese people.
548
 Nevertheless in the interlude between the Shanghai 
War of 1932 and the Marco Polo Incident of 1937  the Nationalists found ways of 
defying Japan without committing the country to total war. Chiang’s German military 
adviser, the retired army officer Alexander von Falkenhausen advised Chiang, whenever 
possible, to show genuine resistance to Japan.
549
 Even if these confrontations were brief 
and confined to specific locations, von Falkenhausen believed that small victories 
would inspire Japan’s respect for China. One might call this concept ‘opportunistic’ 
resistance for it allowed Chiang to choose occasions which offered some prospect for 
success. It was also in keeping with traditional Chinese strategy as expressed by Sun 
Tzu in the Art of War – to attack the enemy when it was at a disadvantage..550 
 
Also to be factored into war planning was Chiang’s longstanding belief that the area 
which was vital to China’s survival was south of the Yangtze River, not in North China. 
In 1934 Chiang told von Falkenhausen’s predecessor, General von Seeckt that as he had 
neither personal nor political control north of the Yellow River, he was not confident of 
holding it against the enemy.
551
 Furthermore he was disparaging of the Northern 
Chinese who took no interest in politics and ‘northern soldiers were worthless.’552  Until 
he could build up an army to handle both north and south, he would give priority to 
defending the region south of the Yangtze, the economic hub of the country and his 
political base.
553
  
 
When the Japanese occupied both Peking and Tientsin at the end of July 1937 there 
were violent protests and appeals to the Generalissimo to drive the enemy out of the 
country. Chiang wrote in his diary that war was inevitable and as leader of the nation, 
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he must do nothing to make the Chinese people ashamed of him.
554
 He faced the 
dilemma of trying to maintain his political hold on the country when his armed forces 
seemed destined to defeat. On 30 July the commander of the Nanjing-Shanghai 
garrison, General Chang Chih-Jung (Zhang Zhizhong) proposed a possible solution: if 
the situation at Shanghai deteriorated, they should launch a pre-emptive strike on the 
5,000 strong Japanese ‘defence force’ based in the north sector of Shanghai: Chinese 
troops would outnumber them and have strong prospects for defeating them.
555
  General 
Chang had commanded the German trained 87
th
 and 88
th
 Divisions of the Fifth Army 
during the 1932 Shanghai war.
556
 Success at Shanghai in 1932 convinced him that the 
Chinese could maintain an advantage over the Japanese by fighting the enemy in a city 
rather than in open field operations.
557
  The Generalissimo concurred and is alleged to 
have said, ‘we must make the first strike against our enemy but you must await orders 
on the timing.’558  
 
On 1 August the diplomatic corps in Nanking learned that Chiang planned to send 
troops north to a new frontline just south of Peking.
559
 By 7 August some 130,000 
Chinese troops had reached the new frontline where General von Falkenhausen was also 
based.
560
 This announcement was a diversion: Chiang was following General Chang’s 
advice and preparing to send his best troops to attack the Japanese defence force in the 
Northern Settlement of Shanghai.  
 
As De Fremery pointed out in his intelligence reports, the attack on the Japanese 
defence force in the Northern Settlement had political and psychological value: ‘the 
Chinese people wanted to see action, wanted to hear the battle.’ 561 Their military 
leaders became convinced that they could rid Shanghai of the small Japanese defence 
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force and demonstrate resistance to both the enemy and the Chinese people.
562
 De 
Fremery surmised that ‘the commander at Shanghai would have never been forgiven 
had he made no attempt to do this.’563 Nonetheless in his view, the Shanghai offensive 
distracted from the overarching strategic task of keeping Japanese reinforcements from 
arriving along the coast near Shanghai
 564
 ‘If it is true,’ De Fremery continued, ‘that of 
the 7 Chinese divisions present on 23
rd
 August four fought against the Japanese 
occupation of the Settlement, it seems to me that the Commander–in-chief had 
neglected his main task or perhaps had underestimated it.’565  In focussing on a minor 
but possibly winnable offensive against the Japanese in North Shanghai, Chiang and his 
generals made no provision for the major task of defending the coast from Japanese 
invasion. 
 
General Chang’s idea of a pre-emptive strike had to be done quickly or not at all. 
Japanese reinforcements were already on the way. By 11 August Japanese naval and 
merchant marine troop transports were beginning to reach the outer banks of the 
Whangpoa River: the US consul at Shanghai Clarence Gauss reported that four light 
cruisers arrived and were landing reinforcements; six Japanese destroyers were in the 
river and six more were further out near the Woosung fortifications.
566
 Chiang learned 
of their presence at the same time as everyone else. Since the Chinese lacked a proper 
navy, they could not mount an effective blockade: they created a barricade in the river 
close to the city by sinking junks and steamers ‘from the boundary between the French 
Concession and Nantao to Pootung.’567 Land forces had to shoulder the burden of 
protecting the coast line while Chiang’s best troops were reserved for the attack on the 
Japanese garrison in the North sector of the International Settlement at Shanghai. On 11 
August the Generalissimo ordered Chang to send the 87
th
 and 88
th
 divisions to positions 
at the Woosung fort and elsewhere around Shanghai.
568
 In the meantime, the Japanese 
defence force stayed inside the North sector of the Settlement where they built up a 
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barricade of sandbags running east-west for 12 kilometres across the settlement to guard 
against attack from the north: they did not break out from the Settlement until 23 
August when reinforcements finally arrived.
569
 
 
The evacuation  
 
There were at least 50,000 foreigners in Shanghai including 9000 British residents and 
an estimated 10,000 Americans. The Japanese, however, were the largest national 
group.
570
 Some 25,000-30,000 lived in or near ‘Little Tokyo’ the area around Hongkew 
in the north sector of the International Settlement which was the centre of Shanghai’s 
trade and industry: along the north side of Suchow creek were Japanese warehouses and 
mills where thousands of Chinese workers were employed.
571
  The other great powers 
were also present in North Shanghai. Just over the Garden Bridge and to the east were 
the consulates of Germany, the USSR and the US immediately next to the Japanese 
consulate: a hundred metres from the Japanese consulate was the flagship Idzumo 
anchored in front of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) Wharf (Figure 2 below). All 
foreign diplomats, but especially the Americans would be at risk if the Chinese decided 
to target the Japanese consulate or the Idzumo. 
 
From 7 August onwards, the diplomatic corps appealed to the Chinese government to 
avoid any military engagement at Shanghai and to the Japanese that their defence force 
would not engage Chinese forces within the International Settlement.
572
 At this point the 
Japanese made an effort to negotiate a withdrawal of their naval forces if the Chinese 
pulled back their troops.
573
  Officially, Chiang continued to prepare for a confrontation 
in North China, but at Shanghai the Chinese and the foreign community knew better and 
prepared to leave.  
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On 1 August the Japanese began a compulsory evacuation of its citizens from the treaty 
ports along the coast and the Yangtze River.
574
 Foreign concessions were cleared and 
consulates closed: Wuhu (6 August), Hankow (7 August) and Nanking (8 August).
575
 
Nonetheless when hostilities broke out on 13 August the Japanese population had yet to 
be fully evacuated from ‘Little Tokyo’.576  By 21 August however, 15,000 Japanese had 
been repatriated and the rest left sometime thereafter.
577
 As residents left the sector, the 
North part of the settlement was set to become a theatre of war. 
 
On 7 August the Chinese began to pour out of the North Settlement; an estimated 
50,000 left that day but they had nowhere else to go than over the Garden Bridge to the 
foreign concessions south of Suchow Creek.
578
  Some facilities were set up for refugees 
most notably in the Great World Entertainment Center in the French Concession.   On 9 
August a confrontation between Japanese and Chinese soldiers at the Hungjao airport 
led to deaths on both sides and fuelled panic about a war.
579
 On 12 August the situation 
at Shanghai became ‘acute and dangerous’ when the 87th and 88th divisions arrived, 
taking up positions in Chapei, the Chinese working class area next to Japanese 
dominated Hongkew on the north side of Suchow Creek. As the threat of hostilities 
intensified, the Mayor of Shanghai moved his administration out of the Shanghai Civic 
Center, the vast new complex in Kiangwan, well to the north of the city beyond the 
boundary of the North Settlement.
580
 The Civic Center, designed by the American 
architect Henry K Murphy and built in the early 1930s was a symbol of the Nationalists’ 
modernisation project and a hub of the Chiangs’ New Life Movement.581  
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Local diplomats lost confidence in Chinese assurances that Shanghai would be 
preserved from war: their best hope was that the area south of Suchow Creek would 
remain off limits and that the belligerents would ‘localise any clash in the northern area 
of the settlement as in 1932.’582 On 12 August the KMT secretly declared that a state of 
war existed.
583
  The stage was set for the Shanghai offensive. 
 
The CAF at Shanghai 
 
The Shanghai war of 1932 provided the point of departure for planning the Shanghai 
offensive. In 1932 the Nanking air bureau had been so cautious about using airplanes at 
Shanghai that its commanders were criticized for their mediocre performance. Five 
years later, however, the Chiangs had become airpower converts. At some point in the 
first two weeks of August they decided to use the CAF at Shanghai.
584
 As a US naval 
intelligence officer noted, ‘in contrast with the fighting which took place in 1932 when 
the Chinese Government had no effective air force, on August 14
th
 the Chinese began to 
launch bombing attacks on Japanese vessels in the Whangpoa’.585  
 
The air force had no essential role to play in a ground offensive conducted by Chiang’s 
best Chinese troops against the Japanese marines in the North sector of the Settlement. 
Squadrons could have been put to better effect if they had been restricted to coastal 
observation and attacks on Japanese shipping:  missiles which missed their target would 
have fallen into the sea. Chiang and his generals, however, had another purpose in mind 
for the air force at Shanghai.  
 
Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai in their History of the Sino-Japanese War 
emphasised that because of the CAF’s inferiority, ‘air operations during the first phase 
aimed, in principle, at attacking enemy air bases by surprise, bombing enemy ships and 
assuming the air defence of major cities.’586  Hence the air force had a part to play in 
offensive as well as defensive operations, particularly when the Chinese perceived that 
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Japanese positions were at a disadvantage and could be attacked before there was time 
for retaliation. Although in overall terms, the CAF was inferior to Japanese air forces, 
there were a number of courageous and relatively competent pilots capable of carrying 
out surprise attacks.
587
 Several also proved their worth in defending airbases at Nanking 
and Hangchow in August 1937.
588
 
 
At first, air units were ordered to North China to attack the Japanese at Tientsin while 
others were stationed for reconnaissance and security near Shanghai.
589
 On 6 August 
Madame Chiang informed Wing Commander Kerby that the air force would not be used 
until troops were ready to advance from positions as planned on the recommendation of 
Chiang’s German advisers.590 She added, however, that if the Japanese Navy started an 
airborne attack, the CAF would retaliate against its carriers. At this time, Madame was 
Secretary General of the CoAA –theoretically the equivalent of the British air ministry: 
foreign diplomats and businessmen regarded Madame Chiang as in control of Chinese 
aviation.
591
  As the vice president of Intercontinent Bruce Leighton wrote in September 
1937 ‘never forget that Madame is not merely supervising the activities of the 
Commission. She is the Commission.’592 The CAF did not have an independent 
commander with the authority to plan operations: orders came exclusively from either 
the Generalissimo or Madame. 
 
According to his memoir, Chennault attended a meeting with General Mow and the 
Chiangs on 10 August: the Generalissimo exploded with rage on learning that there 
were only 91 ‘first line planes ready to fight.’593   With Madame’s consent, Chennault 
described conditions as he had found them during his inspection tour until Madame 
signalled that he had said enough.
594
 While there is no complete record of this 
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conversation, his biographer Martha Byrd had access to Chennault’s diary in this period 
which revealed his dismay at the state of air force. He wrote that facilities were so poor 
as to be ‘worthless in war’ and that the air force was not ready for war: at  Nanchang he 
commented, ‘Chinese fighter pilots supposedly ready for combat spun in and killed 
themselves flying basic trainers.’595 For this poor state of preparedness, Chennault 
blamed the Italian air mission which ‘had all but wrecked the air force.’596 This 
condemnation was not entirely fair: six months before, Silvio Scaroni had been just as 
scathing about the air force and recommended important reforms to the Chiangs.
597
   
The Chiangs had only themselves to blame for the dismal state of the air force. In the 
50
th
 Birthday celebrations, they glorified the CAF as a symbol of National Salvation 
through Aviation but never tackled the changes to organisation and training required to 
ensure its most basic operations. Now that China was at war, the Chinese people 
discovered that the air force which was supposed to save the nation from Japan was 
more likely to wreak havoc upon them.  
 
Bombing the Idzumo  
 
In scenes reminiscent of the 1932 Shanghai war, on Friday 13 August shots were fired 
in Chapei near the headquarters of the Japanese Landing Party.
598
 Fighting quickly 
spread east into Hongkew’s ‘Little Tokyo’ and skirmishes continued through the day. 
On 12-13 August when the 87
th
 and 88
th
 Divisions arrived to reinforce the PPC: Chinese 
soldiers outnumbered the Japanese defence force by 10:1.
599
 According to Clarence 
Gauss, the US consul at Shanghai, there were 10,000 Chinese troops from the 88
th
 
Division in Chapei as well as 20,000-30,000 troops between Chapei and the Woosung 
Forts.
600
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Soldiers from a third Chinese unit (the 55
th
 Division) were on the east side of the 
Whangpoa River on Pootung (Pudong) Point diagonally opposite the Japanese 
consulate. During the opening days of the offensive, batteries of the 55
th
 Division on 
Pootung Point fired at the flagship Idzumo (an armoured cruiser) and other warships 
near the Japanese consulate.
601
 As De Fremery pointed out, the Chinese failed to hit the  
even once.
602
 As the average range of Chinese artillery was 1,200 yards compared to 
8,000 yards for Japanese field artillery, the Chinese lacked the range to reach the 
Idzumo and shells fell into the river.
603
 ‘This pointless shooting party’ continued on and 
off until Japanese reinforcements eventually forced the Chinese division out of Pudong 
point.
604
  It is possible that to compensate for the inadequate range of Chinese artillery, 
Chiang and his advisers turned to the CAF to attack the Idzumo. 
 
On Friday, 13 August1937, the Whangpoa River was crowded with 15 Japanese 
warships close to the International Settlement.
605
 Japanese naval headquarters were 
based on the flagship Idzumo anchored at the NYK Wharf, near the string of consulates 
just over the Garden Bridge from the city centre (see Figure 2 below).  The Idzumo was 
at the same berth which it had occupied during the Shanghai War of 1932 when it had 
been the flagship of Admiral Nomura, commander of the combined Imperial Army and 
Naval forces.
606
 The destroyer had four 8 inch and eight 6 inch guns as well as a 
squadron of seaplanes on board.
607
 Although it was a legitimate military target, its value 
was more psychological than tactical. As the Australian journalist Rhoads Farmer noted, 
‘the Chinese regarded her as the main symbol of Japan and desperately tried to gain face 
by sending her to the bottom.’608  
 
Chennault wrote that on 13 August he was with the Chiangs in Nanking when they 
heard that the Kiangwan Civic Center was being shelled. Madame Chiang sobbed ‘they 
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are killing our people.’ Chennault asked what she would do next: ‘she brushed away her 
tears, threw back her head proudly. “We will fight.”’ 609 Madame then asked Chennault 
what the air force squadrons could do the next day, Saturday 14
   
August. Chennault 
recommended ‘dive-bombing and high-level-bombing attacks on the Japanese warships 
that were providing enemy infantry with heavy artillery support.’610  As Chennault 
stated in his memoir, after years of theoretical debate about his ideas of air warfare he 
wanted ‘a chance to give them an acid test in combat.’611 By his own account, he also 
was somewhat infatuated with Madame Chiang. When Roy Holbrook introduced him to 
Madame Chiang in June 1937, Chennault described it as ‘an encounter from which I 
never recovered’: ‘that night I wrote in my diary, “She will always be a princess to 
me.”’612  Like a knight in shining armour, he wished to prove his worth to Madame, his 
eternal princess. 
 
According to Chennault, Madame ‘suddenly discovered’ that none of the Chinese air 
officers knew how to organize a combat mission and asked him to take charge.
613
 After 
the conference with the Chiangs at Nanking, Chennault found himself planning his first 
combat mission ‘without a moment’s preparation and only the vaguest knowledge of the 
two opposing forces.’614 On the night of the 13 August he and MacDonald stayed up to 
4 am ‘poring over maps’ and in his words ‘unknowingly setting the stage for Shanghai’s 
famous “Black Saturday”.’615 By employing the adverb ‘unknowingly’ Chennault in the 
post-war era hoped to deflect any blame for his subsequent actions but this excuse does 
not hold up to scrutiny. 
 
 
As he related in Way of a Fighter, Chennault ‘decided to send the Curtiss Hawk dive 
bombers against the Japanese cruisers and the Northrop light bombers against Japanese 
naval headquarters, then aboard the heavy cruiser Idzumo, which was anchored in the  
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Figure 1 [Garden Bridge] Chinese Refugees pouring into International Settlement 
August 1937
616
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Whangpoa opposite the Japanese consulate at the edge of the International Settlement 
[my italics].’617   
 
Anyone who had ‘pored over maps’ or knew Shanghai would have known that the 
Idzumo was not at the edge of the International Settlement but in it (Figure 2 below): its 
location, only 100 metres from a string of consulates and the Garden Bridge made an 
attack on the Idzumo as hazardous as bombing HMS Belfast anchored in the Thames in 
the centre of London. Numerous photographs recorded the impact of Chinese aerial 
bombardment of the Japanese warships lined up along the north shore of Whampoa in 
front of the North sector of the International Settlement: those reproduced in this thesis 
come from a lengthy account of the Shanghai Offensive written by Captain W.A 
Angwin (USN) for the US Navy (Figure 3 below).  
 
Figure 2 Shanghai 1937 
618
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 Figure 2: A portion of "Plan of Shanghai" (Sheet 1), original scale 1:15,840. heliographed at 
O.S. from drawings of the 1933 Municipal plan, and printed at O.S., 1937, U.S. Army Map 
Service, 1945. I have added arrows to highlight the Location of the hotels bombed on 14 August 
and the NYK wharf where the Idzumo was anchored. 
136 
 
The Japanese Navy also had planned to open its own offensive on the morning of 14 
August with air raids by all the carrier-based planes (including a few seaplanes on the 
Idzumo) against airfields around Shanghai. Due to the bad weather, its commanders 
postponed operations.
619
 That morning, as the Australian journalist Rhoades Farmer 
recalled, a typhoon screamed through the city at 80 miles an hour.
620
 Nevertheless CAF 
pilots went ahead with their mission: the tactics behind the offensive were to exploit the 
enemy’s temporary disadvantage. Therefore it is logical that the Chiangs ordered pilots 
to fly through the typhoon to catch the enemy off guard: the Japanese high command 
may not have expected the Chinese to fly in conditions which it considered to be too 
daunting for their own aviators. 
 
A US Naval Intelligence report (1939) stated that CAF squadrons composed of 12 
Hawks, 6 Corsairs and 6 Northrops set off on the morning of 14 August from the 
Hangchow air base to attack the Idzumo, and other enemy targets along the Yangtsepoo 
Creek in the eastern sector of the International Settlement.
621
 Japanese reports also 
described CAF attacks on installations that morning: at 10.50, four planes raided the 
Shanghai Special Marine Force Headquarters [on land]; at 10.55 five CAF bombers 
attacked the 8
th
 Cruiser Division near the Woosung fort on the Whangpoa to the 
northeast of the city.
622
 At 11.22 am, three CAF ‘attack planes’ made their first attempt 
to hit the Idzumo but failed: bombs fell into the river, struck some wharves and caused 
damage in Hongkew which went largely unreported.
623
  
 
Rhoades Farmer watched the Chinese planes try to attack the Japanese golf course in the 
eastern sector of the North Settlement which was being converted back to an airfield (as 
it had been in the 1932 Shanghai war).
624
 They came in so low that he could see CAF  
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Figure 3 Chinese aerial bombing of Japanese warships 15 August 1937 
625
 
 
 
 
markings. Although they caused little damage to the golf course, they hit several 
Japanese cotton mills on the river.
626
  
 
Nelson Johnson confirmed to the State Department that during the morning of 14 
August the CAF struck the headquarters of the Japanese Landing Force in Hongkew and 
the Kunzta factory where the Japanese had stored ammunition.
 627
 That morning, 
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however, the only serious damage to the Japanese fleet on the Whangpoa was the result 
of bomb fragments which killed some of the crew on the Okinawa Maru, part of the 8
th
 
Cruiser Division anchored out near the Woosung Fort.
628
  
 
In retaliation for CAF action in the morning, the Japanese decided, despite bad weather, 
to order squadrons based in Taiwan as well as on carriers to raid the Hangchow air base 
in the afternoon.
629
 Only two seaplanes managed to take off, one from the Idzumo and 
one from the Kawauchi which attacked the Hungchao airfield at Shanghai and Chinese 
positions in Chapei. They brought down two enemy planes while Army air force 
squadrons from Taipei succeeded in bombing the Hangchow airfield. 
630
  
 
The typhoon conditions on 14-15 August worked to the advantage of the CAF in 
defending Nanking and Hangchow where pilots downed three large Japanese planes.
631
 
Thus from Chiang’s standpoint, the first two days of combat produced excellent results. 
He understood that the CAF had destroyed 17 enemy aircraft while losing only three 
planes although this was probably an exaggeration: Peattie notes that the Kisarazu Air 
Group lost 4 bombers while attacking Nanking on 15 August.
632
  In his diary Chiang 
wrote that ‘Japan’s flying technique is so poor that we can foresee success.’633 In his 
summary for August 1937 Chiang expressed his satisfaction with the CAF victories 
over Japanese pilots:  
 
We were at a great advantage, especially the air force. The air force success was 
unbelievably good. We would count on one taking on ten. People from outside might 
think this is an exaggeration but if you saw the real situation, you would believe it. So in 
fact we attacked and downed 42 out of 52 brand new heavy airplanes held by the Japan 
in Taiwan. You can imagine how bad the casualties for Japan were. I have heard that 
some Japanese air force generals attempted suicide but this might be a rumour.
634
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Mark Peattie’s research supports Chiang’s impression of CAF superiority in the opening 
days of the war: the Japanese air forces were as much on a learning curve as the 
Chinese; both the Imperial Navy and Army air forces operated with semi-obsolete 
aircraft and outmoded ideas.
635
 At Hangchow the Chinese used their Curtiss Hawk IIIs 
to good effect.
636
 Pilots at Nanking handled their Boeing 281s (Peashooters) equally 
well.
637
 As one Japanese aviator later recalled, the Curtiss Hawk III mounted with 12.7 
mm machine guns was faster and more effective than its Japanese counterpart.
638
  
 
The Japanese high command also had various idées fixes about bombing power which 
played into the hands of the Chinese, notably the belief that bombers could outperform 
pursuit planes and did not require any fighter escorts: they dispatched groups of three 
bombers on a regular schedule of morning flights when visibility was so good that 
Chinese lookouts were easily alerted to their arrival.
 639
 Chinese pilots quickly learned 
how to outmanoeuvre the Japanese. Moreover the Mitsubishi G3M bomber, once 
strafed by bullets proved to be highly flammable.
640
 Thus in the early stages of the war, 
Japanese doctrine and design faults contributed to China’s air victories and Chiang’s 
optimism about the future conduct of the air war.  To commemorate China’s first air 
victory over Japan, ‘14 August’ was later designated Air Force Day.641 The foreign 
community at Shanghai, however, heard little or nothing about CAF triumphs in air 
defence. 
 
In the afternoon at 4.30pm, the Northrops returned to raid the Idzumo, but missed their 
target again. In Way of a Fighter Chennault described the results: two 1,100 pound 
bombs fell from the Northrops into the crowded Nanking Road: ‘one was a dud. The 
other killed 950 people and wounded 1,150 more’.642 He omitted from his memoir the 
second catastrophe which occurred in the afternoon. Twenty minutes after the bombing 
of the Cathay and Palace hotels, pilots released two more bombs at the intersection of 
Avenue Edward VII and Thibet Road (Yu Ya Ching Road) where the Great World 
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Amusement Center had been converted into a shelter for refugees: thousands were 
moving towards the old Chinese city south of the French Concession at the time.
643
 A 
CAF bomb blew open the front of the Great World. De Fremery reported ‘1,012 dead 
and 1,007 wounded.’644 In addition to the casualties in Nanking Road earlier in the day, 
casualties came to at least 2,000 mainly Chinese dead and 2,150 wounded on 14 August 
1937.  
 
There were countless witnesses to the afternoon attack on the Idzumo.
645
 The North 
China Herald stated that ten CAF airplanes had flown over the city.
646
 When the 
Idzumo fired its anti-aircraft guns against them, six veered away while the other four 
passed over the Bund and released four aerial torpedoes ‘far from their apparent 
objective’: two landed in the Whangpoa [near the Augusta] creating a tidal wave far into 
the Bund and the other two fell on Nanking Road – one on the roof of the Palace Hotel, 
the other in Nanking Road.
647
   
 
The Australian journalist Rhoades Farmer watched five Chinese bombers fly down the 
Whangpoa between the Bund and Pootung Point, heading straight for the Idzumo: they 
flew in a tight V formation at an altitude of about 5,000 feet. Japanese anti-aircraft guns 
fired on them as they passed over the Idzumo: they headed off in the direction of the 
Japanese naval headquarters in Hongkew. They were followed by another group of 
medium bombers. One broke formation and released two bombs which the typhoon 
carried towards the shoreline, just missing a British destroyer and the other hit sampans. 
Farmer thought to himself ‘whoever briefed these aircrews and set their course into this 
raging side wind ought to be tied to the muzzle of one of Idzumo’s guns.’ 648  At that 
point he ‘saw the other two bombs racing towards the roof where...we had been 
watching hundreds of A.A. shells...one disappeared into Nanking Road. Then the roof 
of the Palace Hotel erupted...another terrific explosion sounded in Frenchtown.’  
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Figure 4  North China Herald 18 August 1937
649
 
  
 
Nonetheless, Farmer regarded the Nanking Road bombing as a minor tragedy compared 
to the disaster in front of the Great World Amusement Center (figure 5 below): ‘more 
than 3,000 Chinese died or were seriously injured as they cheered the damaged Chinese 
bomber as a symbol of coming victory over Japan. Many of them had given their cents 
to the Chinese Government’s Buy-a Bomber fund.’650 Here were the fruits of National 
Salvation through Aviation.  
 
On 14 August Chiang was informed about one of the accidents at Shanghai. In his diary 
he noted that ‘the bomb racks of the No.2 squadron were hit by the enemy and two  
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Figure 5 Great World Amusement Center after bombing
651
 
 
 
bombs were released.’652 It seems likely that Chiang was utterly preoccupied with other 
military operations and did not grasp the full extent of the damage caused by CAF 
aviators over the International Settlement. He may have relied on Donald who acted as  
the regime’s ‘spin doctor’ for bulletins from Shanghai.  
 
Donald downplayed collateral damage to the foreign diplomatic corps, blaming the 
Japanese for damaging CAF bomb racks.
 653
  Late on 14 August he explained to US 
Ambassador Nelson Johnson that the pilots had tried to attack Japanese naval vessels in 
the river: ‘when in the course of diving they flattened out over the neighbourhood of the 
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Cathay Mansion Hotel, they were damaged by anti-aircraft guns and bombs were 
loosened and dropped.’654  Donald assured Johnson that ‘the pilots responsible were 
being called up for court martial and  instructions were being issued against any further 
flying by Chinese military planes over the foreign areas.’655 As for the thousand 
Chinese killed at the Great World Amusement Center, this too was ‘an unavoidable 
accident, due to the injury by anti-aircraft fire of the bomb-releasing mechanism of the 
plane.’656  
 
In Way of a Fighter Chennault provided an equally implausible excuse for ‘Bloody 
Saturday’ in which he exonerated himself and pinned the blame on the pilots for not 
following ‘careful’ instruction. 
 
Chinese bomber crews had been carefully trained to bomb at a fixed speed and an altitude of 
7500 feet. Their orders were to avoid approaching the Idzumo over the International Settlement 
as we all recognised that there was too much tinder in those polyglot streets ready to flare into 
an international incident that would damage the Chinese cause. Weather over Shanghai was bad 
for high-level bombing. Rather than turn back in an abortive mission, the Chinese pilots went on 
down below the overcast to make their bomb runs at 1500 feet in a shallow dive that boosted 
their air speed above their accustomed bomb run. They violated orders to avoid the International 
Settlement and failed to adjust their bomb sights for the new speed and altitude. As a result their 
bombs fell short of the Idzumo and smack into the middle of the International Settlement.’657  
 
Chennault’s account was full of contradictions. Any number of US military attaché 
reports indicated that CAF pilots were never adequately trained for bombing, especially 
in bad weather. They had certainly not received instruction in precision bombing 
comparable to that envisioned by American Air Corps training standards.  Chennault, as 
an experienced aviator and instructor must have known this. Moreover, it was 
impossible to approach the Idzumo without passing over the International Settlement:  if 
the Chiangs had wished to avoid an incident in the Settlement, they would never have 
ordered pilots to attack the Idzumo in the first place in good weather or foul. Chennault 
implied that the pilots took it upon themselves to carry on with their mission despite the 
typhoon. There could be only one reason for doing so, fear of a worse alternative, that 
is, court martial and a firing squad for disobeying orders.  One may infer from his 
remarks that Chennault persuaded the Chiangs that the mission would succeed because 
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Americans instead of Italians had been in charge of ‘carefully’ training the pilots. When 
the mission failed, he pinned the blame on the pilots just as the Chiangs and Donald did. 
He had been so intent on trying out his tactics or so dedicated to his new employers that 
he lost all sense of proportion. 
 
Chennault’s account becomes even more disingenuous when compared with the 
analysis of ‘Bloody Saturday’ provided by John Jouett to the New York Times on 16 
August. As head of the unofficial mission to China 1932-1935 Jouett was sympathetic 
but realistic about the plight of Chinese pilots. ‘These confident and enthusiastic young 
fliers were trying high-altitude bombing, a hard undertaking for anyone not constantly 
drilled in just that sort of thing. At modern airplane speed a mistake of one second 
makes a difference of more than 100 yards in where a bomb strikes. The ships in the 
harbour were too close to the congested area.’658  Jouett’s critique of his old CAF pupils 
was fair but forgiving. Chennault, like his employer, Chiang kai-Shek treated the CAF 
pilots as scapegoats.  
 
Madame Chiang was called to account by a prominent American, who was well 
disposed towards the Chinese. Mrs Theodore Roosevelt Jr sent a telegram asking 
Madame to ‘intercede’ with the Generalissimo to prevent a recurrence of such 
bombings, unaware, as was the entire world that Madame was implicated in the CAF 
bombings.
659
 In her published response, Madame adhered to Donald’s version of events: 
she expressed regret for the accidental bombings by ‘damaged Northrop bombers’ and 
explained that Japanese anti-aircraft fire had wounded the pilots and damaged the bomb 
racks which released the missiles.
660
  
 
Chennault also noted in passing that on 14 August bombs ‘shattered glass’ on the USS 
Augusta, the flagship of the American Asiatic Fleet.
661
  The photograph above suggests 
a near miss. At 4.40pm just after the bombing of the Nanking Road, CAF planes  
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Figure 6: Collateral Damage to the USS Augusta 14 August 1937
662
 
 
 
released two missiles into the Whangpoa twenty yards from the Augusta.
663
 The fleet’s 
Commander in Chief, Admiral H.E. Yarnell warned that if there was any further 
bombing of US vessels, he would use anti-aircraft battery in self defence.
664
 Not long 
thereafter on 20 August the Augusta suffered serious damage from an anti-aircraft 
projectile that killed one seaman and wounded 17 others: this proved to be a shell fired 
by Chinese at two Japanese aircraft flying nearby.
665
  
 
As Captain Angwin related ‘the Chinese were quite evidently making desperate and 
determined, though unsuccessful attempts to damage the Japanese flagship 
IDZUMO.’666 US Naval Intelligence later noted that the presence of the Idzumo was 
‘particularly annoying’ to the Chinese and CAF pilots had been plied with a reward to 
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hit the Idzumo
667
. Another witness came forward and stated that on the 14 August the 
pilots ‘had been well fortified with liquor for their exploit.’668  They continued attempts 
to sabotage it not only from the air but the river.
669
 On the night of 17 August a Chinese 
speed boat tried to fire a torpedo at the Idzumo which failed to hit its mark but 
thoroughly alarmed those living near the Bund.
670
 Rhoads Farmer reported that the 
sailors rammed their boat into a pier just astern of the Japanese destroyer.
671
After this 
attack, ‘all Shanghai breathed more comfortably:’ the Japanese finally removed the 
destroyer away from its mooring near the Consulate to a mooring near Pootung point 
the following day.
672
 At Nanking CAF General PT Mow also expressed relief that the 
flagship had been removed.
673
 Nevertheless the CAF still tried to hit the Idzumo and 
other enemy warships during night flights which started at about this time.
674
  
 
During the first ten days of the offensive, the Chinese had maintained some 80,000 
troops at Shanghai compared to the Japanese naval landing party of 12,000. Because 
Chinese air and ground forces failed to disable Japanese war ships or  demolish their 
barracks,  the Japanese Landing Party (marines) based in the Northern sector of the 
International Settlement was able to hold out until reinforcements arrived.
675
 In the early 
hours of 23 August Japanese troops accompanied by Japanese bomber aircraft and naval 
anti-artillery began to land near the Woosung fort on the banks of the Whangpoa north 
of Shanghai.
676
 Over the course of the next week or so, 30,000 troops arrived to support 
the Japanese marines at Shanghai: they met little opposition on the way, apart from 
pockets of resistance such as the village of Lotien where a battle raged for another 
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week: by the time it was over, more than half of the Chinese troops were dead. 
677
 On 
28 August Chiang noted that people’s confidence had been shaken because the war was 
not going well: he wrote in his diary that he had to stay calm.
678
 Up to then the Shanghai 
offensive had been a localised attack on the Japanese marines. On 23 August it turned 
into a defence to the last man against Japanese invasion. Even then, however, the 
Chinese still outnumbered the Japanese by three to one.
679
 
 
At Shanghai, foreigners remained pre-occupied by the continuing threat from the CAF. 
On 23 August a Chinese pilot flying a Douglas DC-2 transport fitted with bomb racks 
came in at about 10,000 feet over the International Settlement and released two 500 lbs 
bombs which struck the Wing-on and Sincere Department stores at the intersection of 
Nanking and Chekiang Roads. Nearly all the windows were blown in and several 
hundred people in the stores were killed or injured while on the street there were 
numerous casualties.
680
 The second bomb, although a dud, destroyed a US Navy ‘go-
down’ five blocks south of the department stores.681 De Fremery reported that 215 
people were killed and 558 wounded: according to his estimate the bombing of the 
department stores brought casualties from CAF pilot error up to at least 4,382 in the 
month of August.
682
  A foreign admiral complained to the New York Times that ‘the 
fliers are so badly trained as marksmen or so hysterical, excitable and irresponsible that 
they are like children playing with destructive weapons. In common decency they 
should not be entrusted with death-dealing airplanes.’’683 At the same time, however, 
CAF planes were ‘conspicuous by their absence’ in harassing the Japanese troops as 
they headed towards Shanghai on 24 August.  
 
On 30 August the CAF committed its final blunder for the month, the bombing of the 
luxury ‘Dollar’ ocean liner, the USS Hoover which had been seconded for the 
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evacuation of Americans from the Yangtze river ports further inland.
684
 With 263 
passengers on board, it was anchored 17 miles off the coast when three CAF planes 
approached and dropped eight bombs around the ship, allegedly mistaking it for a 
Japanese transport although the nearest Japanese vessel was a destroyer five miles 
away.
685
 The pilots repeatedly aimed their machine guns at the ship.
686
 Three passengers 
and six crew members were killed.
687
 Admiral Yarnell protested that the bombing of the 
Hoover coupled with previous incidents demonstrated ‘either an amount of inefficiency, 
ignorance or lack of control by higher authorities of Chinese aviators which renders 
these planes a greater menace to neutrals than they are to the enemy.’688 From 13-31 
August CAF pilots had bombed the USS Augusta once, the Sacramento twice, the 
Ramapo once and the US Naval submarine S-37 once while managing to strike only 
Japanese ship in the same period: Yarnell surmised that Chinese aviators lacked the 
training and discipline to respect any orders ‘if received.’689   
 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull instructed Johnson to make a stiff protest to the Chinese  
authorities and called in the Chinese Ambassador.  When Hull pointed out that this was 
the fifth case of accidental bombing, the ambassador expressed ‘surprise and inquiry.’690 
Stanley Hornbeck gave details of each incident emphasising that ‘such occurrences 
necessarily make a very bad impression and tend to aggravate and complicate the whole 
situation.’ The Chinese ambassador, while expressing regret, replied that ‘these things 
had occurred by accident and through misapprehension and that, so far as the ships in 
the Whangpoa were concerned, those ships were within the area of military 
operations.’691 
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On hearing about the Hoover, Chiang finally expressed disappointment in the air force. 
On 30 August he wrote in his diary that the US was very upset about the casualties in 
the Hoover incident. He felt that the air force was made up of complete beginners, 
unable to follow orders and it made him very angry.
692
  In his summary of the month, 
Chiang noted that ‘when the President Hoover was mistakenly bombed by the air force, 
our government did not hesitate to apologise and to claim responsibility and pay 
compensation for losses. We admitted it and didn’t make any excuses...So this moved 
America. Even though our country is weak, our dignity is very strong.’693   
 
One of the pilots who had bombed the President Hoover surrendered immediately and 
was called up for court-martial.
694
 Chiang was so incensed that he sought ‘a verdict of 
death on the young aviator or aviators responsible.’695 At the same time, Madame’s 
Australian air adviser Garnet Malley offered fresh excuses to the American 
Ambassador. Malley alleged that control over training and discipline had only recently 
been ‘centralized’ under the Madame Chiang whereas previously it had been ‘shot 
through with petty politics.’696 Now into their third week of combat without a break, 
pilots were suffering from nervous strain and lack of sleep, particularly the young ones 
who had shown ‘courage and nerve.’ Johnson was so touched by this story that he wrote 
to Madame to have the young pilot spared the death penalty.
697
 He also had second 
thoughts about delivering a stern protest to the Foreign Ministry.
698
 Hull, however, had 
reached a limit: he told Johnson to present the note as soon as possible.
699
  
 
Towards the end of August Chiang’s generals recognised that the air war was affecting 
the ground war. On 24 August General Chang Chih-Jung wired Chiang that incessant 
Japanese bombing was paralysing Chinese troops.
700
 The Kwangsi General Pai Ch’ung-
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hsi (known for his acumen as a tactician) concurred: ‘there is no way that we can fight 
without control of the air. In daytime, our troops cannot fight because of Japanese 
aircraft. At night, our troops cannot fight either because of the enemy’s searchlights. If 
we want to wage a protracted war of resistance, we must work out some other plan.’701 
Much later, Chiang admitted that he had adopted the wrong strategy at Shanghai: ‘while 
we were exhausted, I reinforced Shanghai and stuck to resistance. We were totally 
defeated. It was my fault.’702 Chiang’s remarks applied equally to the air force.  By the 
middle of September the Japanese had gained control over China’s air space. The CAF 
continued to defend air bases but it was rapidly running out of fuel, spare parts and 
reserve airplanes required to maintain full operations. 
 
In his memoir, Chennault commented that ‘Black Saturday’ ‘made only a brief splash of 
headline horror and was quickly forgotten by all but the survivors.’703 This was hardly 
the case. It devastated the city and destroyed the reputation of the Chinese Air Force. As 
Christian Henriot pointed out, the two accidental bombings on the 14 and 23 August 
delivered the highest number of civilian casualties at Shanghai during the entire war.
704
 
The Dutch spy, Henri de Fremery commented in his reports that the impact of the 
bombings – 4,382 casualties -- represented 730 per bomb and ‘probably exceeded 
everyone’s expectations.  The North China Herald referred to the bombing on Bloody 
Saturday as a ‘fearful holocaust’ and a ‘crime against civilisation.’705  
 
Over the past thirty years, few historians have failed to mention ‘Black Saturday,’ in 
describing the Shanghai offensive: it became emblematic of Chiang’s misguided 
strategy and the incompetence of his Air Force, overshadowing any success in 
defending Shanghai and Nanking.
706
 Only in the past 15 years or so have western 
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aviation historians such as Mark Peattie and Xu Guangqiu highlighted the CAF’s 
victories during the first two months of the war 
707
   
 
In Way of a Fighter Chennault was ambiguous about his role in China: ‘although on 
many occasions, I directed combat operations of the Chinese Air force, I never issued an 
order. Everything was “suggested” often with an endorsement by the Generalissimo 
requesting compliance “without fail.” Later I learned that “without fail” on the 
Generalissimo’s orders meant that the penalty for failure was a firing squad.’708 In 
dealing with Chinese officers, the Chiangs tended to equate failure with disobedience 
and punished the guilty accordingly. They did not apply the same criteria to a foreign 
adviser such as Chennault: the Chiangs made foreign advisers virtually their peer, 
occupying a position above the highest ranking Chinese officers in the CoAA hierarchy. 
For his participation in the air force operations during the Shanghai offensive Chennault 
received a gift of $10,000 from the Chiangs ‘in appreciation of his services’709 
 
Conclusions 
 
There is a broad consensus among historians – reinforced by Chiang’s own views – that 
the Shanghai offensive was a disaster in strategic and humanitarian terms. As Henry de 
Fremery observed, the Generalissimo and his generals underestimated the task of 
preventing Japanese reinforcements from reaching China by sea. They were indifferent 
to the fate of Shanghai and its people. They also ignored a broad and fundamental 
objective : to maintain good relations with the western powers whose support they 
needed for protracted warfare with Japan.  
 
The Chiangs had only the crudest ideas about military aviation which they wanted to 
use for psychological impact on the enemy as much as their own people. As Henry de 
Fremery pointed out, the Chinese people clamoured to see the Chinese army and air 
force attack the Japanese at Shanghai. The Idzumo was a military target of particular 
symbolic value because it had been present during the Shanghai War of 1932 and 
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accommodated commanders of the Japanese Imperial Navy. By damaging the Idzumo, 
the air force would demonstrate its capacity to achieve National Salvation through 
Aviation.   
 
The Chiangs and Chennault knew that air force pilots were poorly trained for combat 
generally and for precision bombing specifically. The Chiangs also knew from the 
experience of the Shanghai war how vulnerable the city was to aerial bombardment. 
Therefore in deploying the CAF to bomb the Idzumo and other enemy warships in the 
river near the city, they consciously decided to expose the civilian population to 
collateral damage. It seems likely that they justified the risk of non-combatant casualties 
on the grounds that, in their eyes, the Idzumo was a ‘legitimate’ military target and the 
Chinese people were expected to make sacrifices – and be sacrificed – in the cause of 
national resistance. Therefore they were indifferent to the casualties at Shanghai. 
Clarence Gauss, the consul general at Shanghai estimated that the CAF bombardment 
combined with Chinese anti-aircraft missiles caused casualties in the neutral foreign 
protected areas at Shanghai of 1,990 Chinese and 16 foreigners dead as well as 2,800 
Chinese and 27 foreigners injured.
710
 
 
The assaults on the Idzumo revealed the extent to which the Chiangs and Chennault 
confused psychological and tactical objectives in approaching strategy. For the Chiangs 
war was theatre and Shanghai was the theatre of war : the sight of the CAF damaging or 
possibly sinking the Idzumo was to be the centre piece of a first act which would dazzle 
the Chinese and devastate the Japanese. The scenario was loosely based on the time-
honoured principles of Lao Tzu who advised military leaders to seize opportunities for 
attack when the enemy was at a disadvantage. For a few weeks, the Chinese had 
superior troops and airpower but they were in the wrong place at the right time – in 
Shanghai instead of the coast North of Shanghai or in Hangchow Bay.  
 
By his own admission Chennault went to China to keep flying and test his airpower 
theories.
711
 In Way of a Fighter  he emphasised his conviction that as the United States 
would eventually end up at war with Japan, he felt that the more he could learn about 
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Japanese tactics, the better he would be able to serve his country eventually.
712
 
Ambition and infatuation with Madame Chiang were the driving forces behind his 
conduct at Shanghai. He used the air offensive as a laboratory for ideas which he would 
not have been allowed to attempt in the United States. From this moment on, Chennault 
‘went native.’ He became antagonistic to US officials in China and to anyone whom he 
suspected of disloyalty to the Chiangs.   
 
Black Saturday may not have been a crime against humanity but it was a crime against 
civilisation as the North China Herald put it. The mishandling of airpower at Shanghai 
had serious consequences. By perpetrating such a catastrophe on their own people, the 
Chiangs destroyed the image which they had hoped to project as victims of Japanese 
aggression. Instead of arousing sympathy from the United States, they alienated 
American military and diplomatic representatives who in turn advised their 
governments to avoid any involvement with the Chinese military, particularly the air 
force. US-China relations reached a low point during 1937-1938:  the Roosevelt 
Administration took specific steps to discourage Americans from becoming involved 
with the Chinese Air Force.  
 
It could have been otherwise. Even though Roosevelt had no intention of abandoning 
the isolationist policies engendered in the Neutrality Acts, he had the power, if he so 
chose, to discreetly help ‘victims of aggression.’ For example, in January 1937 he 
invoked an arms embargo against the belligerents in the Spanish civil war. Roosevelt 
regretted its impact the on the Loyalists and therefore in June 1938 he secretly arranged 
a shipment of planes through France to the Spanish Loyalists.
713
 In 1938 he also 
circumvented the Congress and his own military by discreetly allowing French agents to 
test and buy the latest combat planes.
714
 Had Chiang staged a more competent and 
cautious performance in the opening round of the war at Shanghai, he might have 
gained Roosevelt’s sympathy and obtained indirect, unofficial help through 
intermediaries with access to the White House. That would have to wait until the 
                                                     
712
 Chennault Memoirs, p.39 
713
 Dominic Tierney, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt and Covert Aid to the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil 
War, 1936-39’ Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Jul., 2004), pp. 299-313 
714
 John McVickar Haight Jr., ‘Roosevelt as Friend of France’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 3 
(Apr., 1966), pp. 518-526 
154 
 
autumn of 1940 and when Roosevelt decided to extend a helping hand to Chiang, he did 
so primarily to serve American and British interests. 
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Chapter  IV American Volunteers, Russian Volunteers 
 
In September 1937 Major James McHugh (USMC) arrived in China with instructions 
from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) to gather information on the foreign 
volunteers working for the Chinese military: Russians, Americans Germans, and 
Italians. Naval intelligence provided a detailed set of questions about the relationships 
of the first three nationalities towards each other and towards the Chinese. In the case of 
Americans, there were three questions: their number and functions, their treatment by 
the Chinese and their ‘motivation – adventure, pay, sympathy.’715 
 
After the start of the Sino-Japanese war a few American pilots, mechanics and aircraft 
agents stayed on in China to pursue different activities for the CoAA and towards the 
end of the year were joined by a few mercenary aviators who responded to Madame 
Chiang’s appeal for ‘volunteers’ to form a new international squadron. By the end of the 
year Madame had asked the Italian air advisers to leave China because of Mussolini’s 
open support for Japan. In May-June 1938, to Chiang’s regret, Von Ribbentrop recalled 
most of the German advisers and valuable barter agreements were allowed to lapse.
716
  
The Americans might have restored their pre-war influence but at the end of November 
1937  Russian planes and personnel dispatched by Stalin began to arrive and their ranks 
steadily grew over the coming year. The Americans and Russians had little to do with 
each other but were linked through an ill-defined chain of command to the CoAA.  
 
This chapter assesses how the American, Chinese and Russian aviation interests 
interacted in 1937-1939. It suggests that after the Shanghai offensive, Chiang gave up 
on his air force and came to rely entirely on Soviet assistance for air operations against 
Japanese air forces. From a tactical standpoint, American aviation interests contributed 
little directly to the war effort : they had limited success in training the air force and 
apart from William MacDonald, they did not engage in combat.  In 1937-1940 there 
were no heroes to compare with Robert Short in the 1932 Shanghai War. Nonetheless 
Chiang and his entourage kept Americans engaged in China’s military aviation because 
                                                     
715
 CUL,, McHugh, Box 3 Folder 3, ‘Memorandum for Observers Sino-Japanese Operations, 
1937’ 30 September 1937, p.2 
716
 William Kirby, Germany and Republican China, (Stanford,Ca.,1984), pp.235-237 
156 
 
if and when Stalin withdrew his mission, the Chinese would have to cultivate the US  
government for materiel and aircraft.   
 
Towards the end of 1938 the Roosevelt Administration began to emerge from its shell 
where China was concerned.  Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr and the Chinese 
banker K.P. Chen negotiated a US$25 million loan to be secured by supplies of Tung oil 
( an essential ingredient for varnishes and paint): the credit was intended to subsidise 
Chinese purchases of equipment for the newly constructed Burma Road. This 
arrangement particularly served the interests of the American motor vehicle industry: 
American trucks were amongst the very first orders made by the Universal Trading 
Corporation (UTC) the Chinese purchasing agent which administered the loan. Chiang 
wanted to capitalise on the Tung ( or Wood)  Oil Loan by resuming relations with 
American aviation interests in China.  
 
Circumstantial evidence suggests that Dr. Kung embarked on ‘phantom’ negotiations 
with the two main American aircraft brokers in order to create the impression that China 
was not entirely dependent on Soviet largesse. Kung also wanted to keep his options 
open in the event that Soviet planes did not come through as promised.  Through 
contracts with Bill Pawley and Pat Patterson, Dr. Kung created the illusion of renewed 
Sino-American cooperation in aviation following quickly on the heels of the Tung Oil 
loan. Some observers suspected that from the outset, the Chinese never had any 
intention of buying American planes for CAF: the Patterson contract, as the entire affair 
became known, was an elaborate show played primarily for the benefit of Stalin. It was 
more important to be seen negotiating large aircraft contracts than to actually procure 
planes.  
 
US policy about American citizens and business in Shanghai 
 
In the opening months of the Sino-Japanese war, the US government searched for a way 
to deal with the fate of the 10,000 Americans living in China.
717
 In early September the 
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whole situation was ‘an awful mess’ as Roosevelt declared.718 His instinct was to 
evacuate all Americans and announce that ‘any American who stayed in Shanghai was 
doing so at his own risk.’719 Nonetheless, there were divisions within the country, the 
cabinet, and the US government about preserving American interests in China. Peace 
groups and isolationists demanded the withdrawal of all US citizens, military personnel 
and American businesses in China.
720
 At the same time foreign missionary 
organisations and the US Chamber of Commerce appealed for the protection of 
American business in China.  Senator Key Pittman of Nevada called it ‘cowardly and 
unpatriotic’ to call for the withdrawal of the military from China which would leave 
American citizens to their fate.
721
  
 
In mid-August Harold Ickes, Roosevelt’s Interior Secretary, reflected his own anti-
business bias when he wrote in his diary, ‘as usual, Americans who went abroad to 
engage in business because of the big profit that they thought they might make expect 
us to sacrifice thousands of lives if necessary and millions of treasure in an attempt to 
protect their investments when we can’t do it anyhow.’722  To guarantee the safety of 
American citizens, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State, Cordell Hull wanted a 
rapid evacuation. Hull based the objectives of US Far East policy on three principles: 
‘(1) avoid involvement ... (2) protect the lives, property and rights of American 
citizens,’ and [3] ‘absolute impartiality’ to both sides in the conflict.723  
 
In late September 1937, however, Admiral Yarnell came out with his own robust 
position: it was the duty and obligation of the US Navy protect American citizens ‘even 
after our nationals have been warned to leave China.’ Yarnell sympathised with 
American citizens who were engaged in businesses or professions ‘which are their only 
means of livelihood.’724 His pronouncements deeply irritated Roosevelt who 
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complained that the Admiral had not consulted the State Department before holding 
forth.
725
 Leahy apologised and promised that it would not happen again. Nonetheless 
the fracas over Yarnell’s statements revealed that debate over the question of American 
citizens in China involved taking a position for or against confronting Japan.   
 
In addition to evacuation plans, the US government took steps to prevent American 
citizens, goods and ships from reaching China. Under the Passport Act of 1926, the 
State Department could restrict the issuance of passports for countries where there was 
armed conflict or American citizens might be endangered.
726
 Therefore the Secretary of 
State only permitted travel to China in exceptional circumstances.
727
   In late August 
1937 the Department stamped all new passports with an awkwardly phrased 
endorsement to the effect that ‘this passport is not valid for travel to or in connection 
with entrance into or service in foreign naval or military forces.’728  
 
At the same time diplomats in Shanghai tried to trace those Americans already working 
for the Chinese military in some capacity. On 14 August Gauss reported to the 
Department rumours that ‘American aviators threatened to join Chinese air forces. It is 
intimated that Colonel Chennault, retired officer United States Army Air Corps, now 
believed to be at Nanking, is implicated’.729 On 15 August the day after ‘Bloody 
Saturday’ Luke Williamson consulted Gauss about his legal status in China.730 He 
revealed to Gauss that he and other instructors working for the CoAA were expected 
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during the present conflict to advice  on or direct operations from the ground. He was 
uncertain if such service for the CAF was in violation of American law.
731
  
 
Hull informed Gauss that Section 4090 of the Revised Statutes applied to the American 
air instructors in China. Gauss in turn cautioned Williamson that Americans ‘engaged 
by the Chinese in instructing, advising, and counselling military flying’ came ‘squarely 
within the purview of the statutes.’732 On receiving this legal opinion, Williamson 
decided to leave China as soon as possible and requested that Gauss pass the same 
advice to his colleagues. Gauss soon warned Claire Chennault that he should leave 
China or face loss of citizenship. Chennault ignored the warning and wrote in his diary, 
‘Guess I am Chinese.’733 
 
Section 4090 of the Revised Statutes (1860) was an obscure law which had hardly ever 
been used to prosecute Americans abroad. Through various treaties, the US government 
extended its jurisdiction over  US citizens living in five countries, China, Japan, Siam, 
Egypt and Madagascar.
734
 Therefore Americans based in these countries were treated as 
if they were living in US territory and subject to the full force of American law. Section 
4090 derived its authority from US laws of neutrality (1794, 1818, 1838) which forbid 
anyone on US soil to serve, or enlist anyone to serve a ‘belligerent’ state with which the 
United States itself was at peace.
735
 China and Japan were de facto ‘belligerents’ even if 
they had not formally declared war on each other. Therefore the Department tried to use 
Section 4090 along with passport restrictions to discourage Americans from engaging in 
the Chinese military.     
 
Section 4090 constituted threat enough to induce Williamson to return to the United 
States and Chennault to keep a low profile. As James McHugh observed a few months 
later, Chennault did not see anyone in Nanking ‘partly because he and his crowd were 
afraid of the status of their citizenship and partly because he did not want to 
                                                     
731
 FRUS, 1937 Vol. IV Gauss to the Secretary of State 15/8/37, p.520 
732
 FRUS, 1937 Vol. IV ‘the Secretary of State (Hull) to the Consul General at Shanghai(Gauss)’ 
Washington, 17 August 1937, 7 pm, p.521 
733
 Chennault, Memoirs, p.51 
734
 A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 
1774 – 1875 Statutes at Large 43
rd
 Congress Ist Session Volume 18 Part 1 Revised Statutes  
Title XLVII Foreign Relations section 4083 p.787 for countries where US law has jurisdiction 
735
 Albert H. Washburn, ‘The American View of Neutrality’ Virginia Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 
(Dec., 1914), pp.166-168 
160 
 
compromise his position with the Chinese.’736 Chennault certainly was not as well 
known to the diplomatic community as the other two foreign air advisers Garnet Malley 
or Silvio Scaroni. For nearly a year, the British air attaché Wing Commander Kerby 
referred to him as ‘Colonel Schnault’ presumably because he never saw his name 
written down.
737
  
 
On 1 September Madame Chiang complained to Ambassador Nelson Johnson that the 
US government had persuaded American instructors to give up their work in China.
738
 
She argued that the US government was being ‘unneutral’ in depriving China of 
instructors to train pilots for American aircraft which made up 90 % of the CAF fleet.
739
 
She pointed out that Italian and German advisers continued their work for the Chinese 
military and that their personnel would not be required to participate in the fighting.
740
 
 
On 7 September Hull issued guidance for Nelson Johnson’s response to Madame 
Chiang: in the view of the American people, any instructor assisting Chinese pilots 
during hostilities was himself in the military service of the Chinese government. The 
attitude of the US government was not ‘arbitrary’ but ‘taken in response to the strong 
beliefs of the American people’ that American citizens should avoid involvement in 
foreign wars, avoid living in or travelling to war zones.
741
  Any American volunteers 
already in China who chose to fight on China’s behalf would be liable to prosecution 
under Section 4090.
 742
   
 
Johnson, however, was reluctant to enforce this obscure statute. On 7 September he 
explained to Hull that having found no precedent for its application in China, he did not 
want to be the first to use it.
743
 A week later, on 15 September Hull conceded the point: 
the government did not want to impose hardship on any aviators or military advisers 
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who had started their employment before hostilities commenced. Nor did the US 
government want to arouse any further bad feeling with a ‘friendly government’ such as 
China which was just trying to ‘go about its legitimate affairs.’744   
 
For Claire Chennault, Bill Pawley, Bruce Leighton and other American aviation experts 
opportunities in wartime China were more promising than the alternatives in the United 
States.  Chennault had grandiose schemes for bombing Japan while Intercontinent’s 
directors hoped to keep business alive by resupplying the depleted CAF fleet. Other 
Americans also made their way to China for adventure, pay and possibly sympathy. In 
the autumn of 1937 Madame Chiang took steps to form an international volunteer 
squadron in which Claire Chennault and Intercontinent became directly involved. 
Aviation experts whose employment with the Nationalists pre-dated the war were also  
allowed to return to China. Ed Wingerter a pilot/mechanic who had served with the 
Jouett Mission came back to China in December 1937.
745
 His journal provides a rare 
insight into Madame’s International Volunteer Squadron in the winter of 1937-1938.746  
 
The First International Volunteer Force 
 
Soon after the Marco Polo Bridge incident, Madame asked Garnet Malley to organize 
the recruitment of foreign pilots for two new bomber squadrons through China’s 
diplomatic network.
747
 On 10 August1937 Wing Commander Kerby reported that 
‘Major Schnault’ would vouch for a pilot named Schmidt to command the foreign 
volunteers: he was one of seven or eight pilots recruited by the Chinese embassy in 
Paris.
 748
  In his memoir, Chennault referred only once to Schmidt as ‘a fellow ... [who] 
claimed to have flown with the Finns.’749 Vincent Schmidt’s obituary in the New York 
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Times revealed that after serving in China he went on to Finland as a volunteer in the 
Winter War early in 1940.
750
 He came to China from Paris after fighting with Haile 
Selassie’s small air force against the Regia Aeronautica in 1936 and for the Loyalists in 
Spain.
751
  
 
In November the Chiangs’ pilot Julius Barr checked out nine volunteers and accepted 
two for immediate military assignments.
752
 There may have been only three recruits 
who had the necessary qualifications for bomber missions while two others were to 
receive more training.
753
   As Wingerter commented on 23 December the Foreign 
Legion was ‘training day and night’ but ‘contrary to all reports’ the pilots had ‘not seen 
much action up to the present time.’754 One of the pilots, Elwyn Gibbon later described 
his experience in Colliers magazine: his fellow volunteers were like ‘firemen’ because 
their chief task was to fly their aircraft to safety at the first sign of a Japanese air raid.
755
  
 
Intercontinent provided Vultee ‘fast attack’ bombers for the international volunteers 
who flew ‘Vultee attack ships for light bombing and Martins for the heavy stuff.’756 In 
1936 the Kwangtung Air Force ordered these ‘fast attack bombers’ which their 
commanders felt should become the backbone of the Cantonese air force.
757
 Before the 
war broke out, CAMCO assembled five but the rest were not built until factory 
operations were restored at Hankow in late November 1937.
758
   
 
On 5 December 1937 Leighton summarised a long conversation with Chennault in a 
letter to Pawley: ‘he’s got nothing to do with the Russian operations or the Chinese just 
now.
 He’s concentrating his attention on building up the American show, and he’s 
                                                     
750
 NYT ‘Vincent Schmidt, Mercenary Flyer’ October 23,1962, p.36 
751
 NYT Schmidt 23/10/62,p.36 
752
 Edward L. Leiser ‘Memoirs of Pilot Elwyn H. Gibbon the Mad Irishman’ JAAHS Spring, 1978  
p.4 
753
 Leiser, Gibbon, p,4 
754
 PC Wingerter Journal, December 23, 1937, p.7 
755
 Elwyn Gibbon, ‘Commuting to War’ Colliers, November 12,1938, p.71 
756
 Gibbon, Commuting, p.71 
757
 NARA, RG 38 Box 96  File A-1-Q Register No. 12592 - C   Folder, Aeronautics in China 
various 1930-1935  Report no. 526 ‘Canton (Kwangtung), Air Force  December 21,1935’ by Lt-
Commander R.A. Ofstie, p.2. 
758
 BGLA, Folder China Misc. Correspondence  ‘Leighton to Carl Dolan’, Hankow, 28 November 
1937, p.2: Intercontinent took over the old Socony candle factory on the dock at Hankow.  
163 
 
counting heavily on the Vultees.’ 759  The following day, Leighton also referred to 
Chennault’s interest in Martin bombers which ‘were likely to be part of his special 
show.’760 The first six Martin bombers had arrived in early March 1937 and were 
assembled by late June 1937.
761
 Leighton noted in September 1937 that they ‘proved to 
be ‘beyond the capacity of existing piloting and ground maintenance facilities: three 
Martins...crashed (not the result of enemy action).’762 On 14 October 1937 Chinese 
pilots attempted to fly two Martins for an attack on the Japanese in Shanghai but they 
crashed soon after take-off: in his diary Chiang noted that the weakness of Chinese 
pilots in managing heavy bombers.
763
  
 
In late November 1937 three more Martin bombers were on their way to China and 
reached Hong Kong in early December.
764
 Chennault’s ‘special show’ probably 
included bombing Japan. In mid-October Ambassador Johnson was aware of such a 
plan and expressed his hope to Chinese authorities that they would not make ‘the 
mistake of using American or other foreign aviators to take large bombing planes to 
Japan for the purpose of demonstrating their ability to bomb Japanese cities.’765  
 
On 31 January 1938 Ed Wingerter wrote in his journal that the oldest of the Martin 
bombers had 10 hours flying time and ‘several were cracked up on the test hop,’ 766 As 
Wingerter commented, ‘since the beginning of the war China has lost many more ships 
[planes] cracked-up by Chinese pilots, than the number shot down by the Japs.’767  The 
Vultees posed as many problems as the Martins: on 22 January 1938 Leighton wrote to 
Pawley, ‘you can curse the pilots and crews, but they on their part have plenty of reason 
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to curse the ships... Out of ten ships, three complete washouts, plus five crack-ups of 
more or less serious nature, all before the first service mission.’768   
 
The international air force may have comprised only five competent fliers, two Martin 
bombers and six Vultees. Evidence is equally thin about the missions which the 
volunteers carried out. Among Gibbon’s papers was a report dated 7 February about a 
raid carried out in six Vultees on Japanese troops at Pengpu, a strategic railway junction 
near the Yellow River.
769
 A detailed British intelligence report in 1938 mentioned at 
least three other missions; on 15 February a squadron of Vultee bombers raided the 
Japanese airfield at Changteh (North Honan) and on 21 February they bombed troops at 
Tsining (Jining, Shandong)  and Fengyang (Anhui province).
770
 On 24 February 
‘probably’ the same Vultee squadron struck at Sinsiang (Xinxiang, Honan).771 Gibbon’s 
papers refer to a fifth mission on 27 February when the International Squadron flew five 
Vultees and one Northrop to attack Japanese targets on the Yellow River, 115 miles east 
of Loyang.
772
  
 
The sixth and final mission was abortive. Gibbon noted that on 15 March Schmidt had 
asked him to organize a bombing mission and the following day, Gibbon, Jim ‘Tex’ 
Allison and their Chinese crews flew two Martin bombers to Chengdu where they 
awaited orders for an unknown assignment.
773
 At the last minute, Chennault asked 
Colonel Hsu to join Gibbon and Allison at Chengdu. Hsu, who reached the airfield 
before the American volunteers, denied them access to the Martin bombers. In a note to 
Gibbon, Hsu let him know that he had taken over the bombers and that the two 
American volunteers should return from Chengdu to Hankow on Eurasia airlines: ‘Now 
your duty here is finished! You have another duty in Hankow, I hope.’774 Hsu then 
assumed command of the 14
th
 Bombing Squadron and on 22 March the International 
14
th
 Squadron was disbanded.
775
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There were conflicting accounts about the collapse of this volunteer group. James 
McHugh understood that there had been friction between the foreign pilots and the 
Chinese about staging a raid over Japan for which the volunteers demanded a bonus of 
US$30,000.
776
 Another version of this story is that nine pilots wanted to be paid CH $3 
million to use nine Northrop bombers to bomb Japan, which the Chinese considered too 
high a price.
777
 It was also reported that the Chinese had rejected the Vultees as ‘no 
good’ but lost face when the volunteers succeeded in using them in several raids.778  
 
In Way of a Fighter Chennault provided his own version of events: Japanese spies in 
Dump Street (the Red Light district of Hankow) overheard the pilots talking about a 
mission; the next morning a Japanese bomber dropped a single one hundred pound 
bomb under a parked bomber’s wing which set fire to the entire row of bombers; ‘what 
was left of the Chinese bombing force vanished in five seconds of fame and dust. With 
it went the jobs of International Squadron pilots.’779 Chennault blamed the foreign 
volunteers for the failure of operations under his command in much the same way as he 
held the Chinese aviators responsible for ‘Bloody Saturday.’  
 
There is no evidence, however, that Vultee bombers or any other aircraft were 
demolished during a morning raid in March 1938. No such incident appears in a British 
intelligence report, ‘Appendix “D” Summary of Japanese Air Raids against Hankow 
1938’ which provided the exact time of Japanese attacks on the airfield, weather 
conditions and damage to Chinese aircraft in 1938.
780
 As the British report revealed, the 
Japanese tended to conduct night raids, usually by moonlight, on Chinese airfields 
whenever the weather was clear. On the night of 14 March the Japanese destroyed 3 
Russian S.B. bombers on the ground and on the night of 15 March (also clear) 
demolished 5 Russian fighters and 1 Martin: there were no raids between 16 and 27 
March because of bad weather.
781
 The worst damage to the Vultees occurred long after 
the disbandment of the volunteer squadron. On 19 May a Japanese raid at 8.30 am 
destroyed one Vultee, two Russian bombers and one Bellanca while damaging two 
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Vultees and a Hawk.
782
 The British also observed that Japanese air intelligence was 
extremely poor and ‘their information concerning aerodromes occupied by the Chinese 
appears to have been strangely amiss.’783  On 20 May1938 Japanese intelligence failed 
to detect a mission involving the two Martin bombers which Chinese crews flew over 
Nagasaki and Osaka to release propaganda leaflets: Ed Wingerter commented in his 
diary ‘incendiary bombs would have been more effective in my opinion.’784 
 
Contrary to Chennault’s account the volunteer squadrons had some limited success 
despite the lack of planes and personnel. They flew at least five missions in February 
1938 mainly against Japanese troop concentrations near railways in Central China. 
Leighton had described the volunteer squadrons as Chennault’s ‘special show’ but Ed 
Wingerter’s journal reveals how little time Chennault actually spent in Hankow with the 
volunteers: repairs to his Hawk 75 (then his personal plane -- a gift from Madame) and 
bad weather kept him in Nanchang for weeks on end in January-February 1938.
785
  
 
Several factors contributed to the demise of the volunteer force. First their patron,  
Madame Chiang resigned as head of the CoAA at the end of February 1938. T.V. Soong 
reluctantly replaced her and delegated authority over all operations to the Soviet Air 
Mission. Finally there was no need to pay these foreign pilots CH $1,000 per month 
when Stalin provided hundreds of aircraft as well as personnel at the same salary as 
Chinese pilots.
786
 With the Soviet Air mission in place, the International Volunteer 
Group became redundant and so did other American aviation interests.  
 
Operation Zet (Z) 1937-1938  
 
The Russian air mission to China has received relatively  little attention in the west but 
as the historian Steven I. Levine has pointed out, in the Soviet Union, it gave rise to a 
kind of ‘heroic legend ...which plays a role much as the legend of Chennault’s 
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American Volunteer Group – the famous Flying Tigers -- ...in the United States’.787 The 
Soviet air programme lasted four years and provided nine times the number of aircraft 
and pilots as the AVG. Like an unseen planet it exerted a gravitational force on the 
politics of airpower in Sino-American relations in 1937-1940. 
 
In April 1937 the Soviet ambassador to China, Dimitri Bogomoloff gave an off the 
record interview to Andrew Billingham, the New York Times correspondent about the 
rapprochement between his government and the Nationalists: he reported that the Soviet 
Union was prepared to support rather than oppose the Nanking regime because Chiang 
had virtually unified China and was the ‘stabilizing and paramount force’ in the 
country.
788
 Billingham inferred from Bogomoloff that the talks were of a ‘politico-
economic military nature’ and might involve relaxation of Soviet control over Sinkiang 
and Outer Mongolia. Sinkiang under its warlord Sheng Shi-cai had been in the Soviet 
sphere of influence since the early 1930s.
789
 
 
From the mid 1930s Chiang wanted to normalise relations with the Soviet Union in the 
hope of obtaining Stalin’s support against Japan in the event of armed conflict.790  After 
the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, Chiang viewed Soviet military assistance as ‘the 
most critical factor’ for waging protracted warfare with Japan.791 Following many 
months of negotiation, on 21 August 1937 Chiang signed a non-aggression pact with the 
Soviet Union, which the Chinese foreign ministry announced on 28 August.
792
   
The Russians referred to the air aid programme as ‘Operation Zet (Z)’.793 The 
agreement provided a credit of CH$100 million (US$30 mn) which was increased to 
US$50 million in May 1938 through the efforts of Sun Fo, Chiang’s principal envoy to 
Stalin.
794
 That month, Yang Jie, a trusted military colleague of Chiang became the 
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Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Yang tended to exaggerate the prospects for 
Soviet entry into the war and progress on assistance. He also became involved in arms 
dealing and other schemes, preferring to spend more time in Paris than Moscow.
795
 In 
the spring of 1939 Sun Fo complained frequently of his unreliability and arrogance but 
Chiang left him in place: he was one of the officers from the Northern Expedition whom 
Chiang treated with blind loyalty.
796
  
 
By October 1938 the Chinese had exhausted the first two loans which had been 
provided at the rate of 3 % p.a., to be repaid over a period of 5-10 years.
797
 Chiang 
instructed Sun Fo to seek a third loan of US$150 million and negotiations started in 
March 1939. In mid May however, Stalin’s Foreign minister Kliment Voroshilov 
suddenly suspended these talks because of allegations coming out of the Chinese 
embassy that the Soviet Union would soon come to China’s rescue.798 The move created 
a crisis for Chiang who almost begged Stalin to resume negotiations: a third agreement 
was eventually signed in June 1939 but took longer to take effect than the first two 
credits. As Chiang openly criticized Stalin over the winter war with Finland, there was a 
parting of the ways and the level of aid to China began to decline during the first half of 
1940.
799
   
 
At the outset, Chiang’s representatives in Moscow had requested 350 planes, 200 tanks, 
and 236 field tanks.
800
 By the end of August 1937 the British air attaché understood that 
the Soviet Union planned to send 200-300 airplanes to China as well as pilots.
801
 In late 
September 1937 the Russians started  to deliver equipment worth CH$485 million 
(US$143 million) including 62 heavy bombers, 62 fighter-bombers and 101 fighters (I-
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15s &I-16s).
802
 By the middle of 1938, the Chinese let it be known that they had 
supplies for another year of war, largely thanks to the USSR.
803
  
 
The Generalissimo resented Stalin’s helping hand but had little choice because of 
China’s mounting debt problems and the collapse of his own air force.804 On 3 
December 1937 Chiang wrote in his diary that Russian deliveries would probably not be 
enough to sustain regular operations. He found the Soviet military officers arrogant: 
‘when we have suffered defeat, we get insulted’ he wrote on 4 December.805 Chiang was 
convinced that the Russian air force personnel were afraid of death and placed a burden 
on the CAF, ‘doing more harm than good.’806 US Naval intelligence also reported that 
the Russians did not seem ‘to readily step forward for combat with the Japanese.’807  In 
early December however, Russian pilots had every reason for ‘going slow.’ They were 
awaiting the outcome of German mediation for a settlement to the war. In this period, 
Chiang also received communications which made him realise that Stalin would never 
commit Russian troops to China.
808
 In his diary on 6 December 1937, he wrote that he 
saw no further hope in Germany or Russia and that China would have to rely on 
herself.
809
  
 
During the first half of 1938, however, the Russians made up for their slow start: in 
January-February alone Russian crews carried out 150 bombing missions.
810
 According 
to British intelligence, Chinese aviators with support from Russian units, put up 
strenuous resistance to Japanese attacks and conducted effective bombing missions 
against enemy positions along the Yangtze River.
 811
 On 23 February Soviet squadrons 
conducted a surprise attack on the main Japanese airbase in Taiwan which the Japanese 
avenged with raids on Chinese airbases in South China the following day: this attack 
was given considerable publicity in the Soviet Union because it fell on the 20
th
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anniversary of the Red Army.
812
  Soviet pilots made up the majority of squadrons that 
defeated the Japanese in the largest air battle of the Sino-Japanese war over Wuhan on 
April 29 1938.
813
  By August 1938, according to a British air attaché report, the 
Russians were ‘taking over complete control of aerial activities on the flank of Yangtze 
and defence of Hankow.’814  
 
The Soviet contribution to China’s war effort in terms of personnel outweighed that of 
any other nationality before Pearl Harbor. The first group of 30-40 aviators arrived in 
Hankow in December 1937.
815
 Over the course of 1937-1940, 2,000 Russian aviators 
served in China and as many as 3,665 military advisers in all (including the pilots).
816
  
In February 1939 a British air attaché R.S. Aitken reported that the Russian pilots 
received CH$500 a month, (approximately US$82) half that of an international 
volunteer and a fraction of the US$15,000 which Claire Chennault received.
817
 Nor was 
Soviet participation in China’s war risk-free. T.V Soong commented to James McHugh 
on the number of Russian pilots who gave their life fighting for China.
818
 An estimated 
200 Russian airmen died in China between 1937 and 1939.
819
  
 
Russians based in China soon became disenchanted with their Chinese counterparts. In 
December 1938 an adviser complained that of the 320 planes provided to the Chinese 
during the war, 200 were ‘completely used or destroyed; he recommended that the 
Soviets should send no more aircraft to the Nationalists’.820 Nonetheless Stalin 
continued to send planes to the Nationalists, in 1937-1941 nearly 900 planes in all, of 
which 80 % were delivered by the end of 1939.  
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T.V.Soong and the Soviet Mission 
 
By February Madame was exhausted as well as disappointed by her failure to reform 
the Air Force and to eliminate corruption. She resigned from the CoAA and Chiang 
asked T.V. Soong to replace her in accordance with her wishes.
821
 At first Soong 
refused and asked Chiang if there was not a military man that he could appoint: Chiang 
replied ‘not one,’ expressing his habitual distrust of air force officers. On 27 February 
1938 Soong accepted the new post of vice-Chairman of the CoAA.
822
    
 
Dr. Kung also receded into the background. In early April 1938 Bruce Leighton wrote 
to Bill Pawley that Kung was ‘relinquishing all initiative in the purchase of aircraft... 
and passing it all over into the hands...of T.V’: with Kung out of the picture, however, 
P.T. Mow would be ‘likely to have more to say in the selection of types than any one 
man short of T.V.’ 823  Mow became the top liaison officer with the Soviet mission 
because he spoke the language and had been trained as an aviator in the Soviet Union.
824
 
On 20 March 1938, Leighton wrote to George Sellett that Mow ‘had a Soviet adviser 
sitting at his elbow in the same office at the CoAA.’825  
 
The Soviet mission redressed the balance of power between the clique of Chinese 
officers at the top of the CoAA and the Chiang/Soong clan. As McHugh noted, in 
previous years, the Chiangs’ foreign advisers had gone over the heads of Chinese 
officers to advice the Chiangs on procurement and tactics.
826
 Soong gave the CoAA 
generals ‘a chance to interpose themselves completely between the source of supply and 
the Generalissimo or Soong, thus leaving the latter dependent upon them for all advise 
as to policy and themselves safe from outside interference’.827  
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On 7 March 1938 McHugh reported to ONI that T.V. Soong planned to delegate 
management of air force operations to the Russians since China was ‘chiefly dependent’ 
upon them for all air force supplies.
828
 In April the British ambassador Sir Archibald 
Clark-Kerr also noted that whereas Madame had ‘resisted the increase of the Soviet 
element,’ T.V. Soong fully accepted Soviet support owing to shortage of funds and 
delivery problems.
829
 In May 1938, Soong told McHugh of his plan to recruit another 
large foreign legion but confessed that for the time being, he would depend on the 
Russians because they provided an ‘unlimited supply’ of planes ‘on credit which China 
sorely needs’ and personnel for fighting as well as training.’ Since most Russian planes 
were equal if not superior to those of other powers, the air force would benefit from 
aircraft standardization ‘the lack of which has heretofore admittedly been a serious 
drawback.’830  By contrast, Soong pointed out that the USA sent nothing but 
‘superseded models’ on a cash basis only.831  
 
Americans and the Russian Mission 
 
In 1938-1939 Americans openly admired the Russians. On 5 March 1938, Ed Wingerter 
wrote in his diary about the discipline of the Russian crews who worked ‘like slaves’: 
they kept to themselves playing cards under the wing of their plane ‘constantly on the 
alert for alarms and in the event the alarm is sounded they work like clockwork, each 
man has his job and in a very few minutes all ships are in the air.’832  Their planes were 
‘extremely fast...300 miles per hour and above all they are very simple in construction. 
The retractable landing gear on their pursuit is so simple a baby could make one.’ 833 
Although Wingerter had limited interaction with the Russians, he made one of the most 
important contributions to their operations in China by singlehandedly fitting two 
synchronised 30 calibre machine guns on most of their pursuit planes from mid 
December 1937 to April 1938.
834
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In Leighton’s view, there was no doubt that even if the Chinese had been reluctant to 
call upon Soviet help, without their planes and pilots, there would be nothing to prevent 
the Japanese bombing where and when they liked.
835
 Like Wingerter he admitted that 
American planes were not as good as Russian: ‘neither the Seversky nor the Hawk 75 
has anything like the manoeuvrability of the lighter ships out here...Further than this, the 
Hawk 75, by comparison with the Russian ships is very complicated and there are those 
who are quite sceptical of the Chinese pilots’ ability to handle it properly.’836  Leighton 
also regarded the Soviet mission as the largest single threat to Intercontinent’s business. 
Since the Russians offered planes ‘at costs that are much lower than anything that we 
can quote’ prospects for sales of American plans were ‘far from brilliant’.837  The slow 
delivery of components also undermined Intercontinent. In late March Leighton could 
not bear to tell either Peter Mow or Chennault that thirty Hawk 75s might not be ready 
before the autumn of 1938.
838
 Hawk III biplanes ordered in August 1937 would not be 
ready until September 1938, by which time it would be considered obsolete.
839
  Since it  
no longer stood up to the performance of the British Gloster Gladiator or the Russian 
biplanes, there would be no further orders of the Hawk which had been the mainstay of 
Intercontinent’s China sales for several years.840 Given the ‘sour’ experience with the 
Vultees and the logistical problems with the Curtiss Hawks, Leighton concluded that 
‘the prestige of American equipment in China has suffered very greatly in the past few 
months.’841  
 
Bill Pawley and Bruce Leighton were not the only Americans who felt a loss of 
influence because of the Russians. Times were equally difficult for Claire Chennault 
and American instructors who used the remaining American aircraft in the CAF fleet to 
train air force cadets. By June 1938 Chennault was so dissatisfied with conditions in the 
CoAA that he was ready to quit. 
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In early April 1938 Leighton noted that Chennault had an office in the CoAA near Peter 
Mow but he did ‘not appear to have nearly as much influence or responsibility today as 
he had when you last saw him’842 Soon after taking charge of the CoAA, Soong had 
wanted to appoint Chennault as head of training in Kunming but Chennault ‘demurred:’ 
William MacDonald went instead to teach primary and advanced training using some 
Douglas and Hawk aircraft.
843
  In April 1938 the Generalissimo restored Chow Chih-jou 
as head of training without consulting T.V. Soong.
844
 Although Chennault 
‘theoretically’ remained in charge of the aviation schools, he had to submit to the 
authority of General Chow.
845
 In June 1938 McHugh reported that the CoAA generals 
obstructed Chennault at every turn and went so far as to replace English language 
instruction with Russian.
846
 Chow even insisted on dropping Morse code in favour of 
another based on Chinese phonetics which the pilots found difficult to master thus 
rendering radios useless.
847
  
 
Worst of all, there were hardly any airplanes for training.  According to McHugh there 
were only 7 airplanes for the advanced classes at Kunming in the autumn of 1938.
848
 
Chennault had the task of training an entire squadron of Chinese pilots on one Hawk 75 
demonstrator.
849
 According to Bruce Leighton, CoAA officers such as P.T. Mow and 
Freddy Wong had hardly ever flown this plane yet it was intended to form the CAF’s 
fastest pursuit squadron. 
850
  
 
In early June 1938 McHugh wrote to his superior officer, Commander John M. 
Creighton that Chennault and his fellow instructors were ready to quit and return to the 
United States. 
 
The boys are on their way out. Ever since Madame resigned they have had no one to stick up for 
them and the Chinese members of the Commission have been obstructing their work at every 
step. The Russians seem to be taking over the show for the present. They are supplying planes 
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on credit, which the Chinese cannot get elsewhere (although the French seem to be making a 
bid) and the Chinese are naturally turning toward them. The airforce leaders have resented the 
Americans having a direct approach to the Generalissimo and are now fixing it so the Russians 
will have to go through them. For the present it looks as though we are out, although I have no 
doubt that they will come back to us eventually if they ever get any money with which to buy 
our stuff.
851
 
 
A few weeks later, the British air attaché Harold Kerby reported that Colonel ‘Schnault’  
had resigned; Donald told him that Malley and the other American instructors would 
also leave ‘unless there is a change in policy regarding Soviet participation.’852 Kerby 
was under the impression that Soong would not reverse his policy of delegating control 
over the air force to the Soviet mission.
853
 
 
When Chennault offered his resignation in June 1938, Soong told McHugh that he 
would investigate his complaints but felt that the blame did not lie entirely on the 
Chinese side. Soong regarded Chennault as ‘primarily a pursuit man... “a fighter”’ but 
what he really needed was an American adviser who was a specialist in general 
administration.’854 Soong had in mind an administrator in the mould of John Jouett who 
had served the regime but displeased Chiang precisely because he was not a fighter.  
 
Soong established his own purchasing committee in April 1938 but made no effort to 
use Chennault as an adviser on procurement: as Leighton noted, P.T. Mow was viewed 
as the top adviser on procurement. Since Soong withheld his patronage and Madame 
could do little to protect him, Chennault was ‘left to the mercy of the Chinese who 
began ‘to whisper around that he really did not understand bombardment or other 
phases of the game.’855  
 
Soong was ‘half-inclined’ to accept Chennault’s resignation. A week later, however, he 
changed his mind. He told McHugh that he had conducted his own investigation into 
training which vindicated Chennault. Therefore Soong refused to accept his 
resignation.
856
 Nevertheless Soong could not devote all his attention to the air force and 
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‘thereby make full use of Col. Chennault as a personal adviser.’857 Soong was tactful 
but firm: Chennault did not pull the same weight with him or the Chinese military as he 
had under Madame’s chairmanship in 1937. 
 
American instructors and Chinese pilot training 
 
From 1938 to 1940 Chennault was primarily involved in training Chinese pilots during 
which time American military officers often assessed relations between the American 
instructors and CAF cadets or officers. By contrast, relatively little is known about 
Soviet training of Chinese pilots.  The few Soviet historians who have written about 
Russian air assistance commented on the bravery of some Chinese pilots in combat and 
their recklessness as students. A Soviet aviation technician, A. K. Korchagin recalled 
that ‘the Chinese... flew much and carefreely... often without observing the rules of 
technical procedures, without the regulation work, without inspection and 
repair.’858  The historian Anatolii Demin in describing the performance of Chinese 
crews in 1940 stated that ‘according to the recollections of our instructors, the Chinese 
crews were weakly prepared.  Systematic combat training practically did not exist, they 
flew little, and had not mastered high altitude flight.’859 These remarks reflected the 
state of training principally by Chinese instructors and the half dozen or so Americans 
employed by the CoAA.  
 
Nearly all American officials who visited Chinese training facilities mentioned three 
major drawbacks: not enough aircraft; not enough instructors; not enough discipline and 
not enough flying hours. In April 1938 Lieutenant Kemp Tolley (USN) interviewed 
three veterans of the International Volunteer Squadron including Elwyn Gibbon: they 
had a strong bias against CAF officers given the circumstances of their dismissal the 
previous month. All were enthusiastic about Madame Chiang (who had hired them) but 
‘had a low opinion of the average Chinese pilot’s ability and sense of cooperation in 
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flight.’860 The former volunteers felt that ‘this lack of coordination and resolve plus 
graft is largely responsible for the conspicuous lack of success which should be 
expected of the Air Force in view of the money expended on it.’861 By contrast, they 
greatly admired the Soviet aviators whose ‘discipline is very high’: the Russians had 
little contact with anyone including the Chinese and never allowed any visitors or 
photographs to be taken of them.’862 At first, the Russians allowed the Chinese pilots to 
fly Russian planes from the border in Northwest China down to south China but after 
they crashed so many planes, Russian aviators took back control over the ferrying 
operations.  
 
Two Naval intelligence reports provided comparable if somewhat thin information 
about the flight schools in Kunming, Yunnan. The first dated 8 June 1938 was based on 
information from the French military attaché, Lt. Colonel Sabattier who visited the 
schools on 21 April 1938.
863
 Lieutenant Commander Smith-Hutton noted that there 
were 500 Chinese students and two Americans at the school– Mr MacDonald and an 
Americanised Swiss.
864
 Basic training was on 30 Douglas planes but Smith-Hutton 
reported that ‘all the training planes are old and unserviceable. They are insufficient in 
number and poorly equipped to train students’.865 Basic to advanced training took 27 
months during which students had 200 hours of flying.  
 
In a second naval intelligence report (6 June -1938) Commander Harvey Overesch 
(McHugh’s superior officer) reported that courses at the schools ‘parallel the instruction 
at US Army Aviation Training Schools as nearly as conditions in China permit.’866 
Nonetheless he emphasised that  ‘the cadets have approximately 200 flying hours after 
their training has been completed which Colonel Chennault said was approximately 
one-fifth of that given to our own cadets.’ Overesch repeated this point: ‘the American 
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instructors admitted that there was a shortage of training planes and materials and that 
the cadets get only one-fifth the flying time that US Army aviation cadets have when 
they complete their course.’867  
 
Overesch met the commander of the Kunming School, Brigadier General Chen and 
Chennault’s colleague William MacDonald, the chief instructor. Overesch understood 
that MacDonald had two assistants Mr. Sutter, a Swiss and Mr. Carney: ‘all three of 
these men are extremely capable instructors with years of flying experience.’868 
Overesch could not discover how many Chinese were serving as instructors: he 
assumed, however, that because MacDonald and his assistants were putting in long 
hours, there were relatively few Chinese instructors.
869
  
 
In February 1939 the British Air attaché based in Shanghai, R.S. Aitken was granted 
permission to inspect the CAF after the British had received a request from the 
Generalissimo for a senior RAF officer to be ‘loaned’ as an air adviser to the 
government. By assessing the CAF’s state of efficiency, Aitken hoped to understand 
Chiang’s motives and suggest an appropriate response.870  With the exception of James 
McHugh, no other western air attaché had such close contact with the Chiangs or 
Chennault in this period. 
 
Aitken began by seeing the ‘power behind the throne’, W.H. Donald who explained that 
the air force was ‘in a hopeless condition, that none of the responsible officers were 
competent’ and that the Generalissimo regarded the British as best able to tackle the 
problem of rebuilding the CAF.
871
 He and the Generalissimo ‘had no idea what the 
Chinese Air Force was up to’ nor did T.V. Soong whom Aitken subsequently met.872 
Donald regarded P.T. Mow as ‘so irresponsible and corrupt’ that he had been 
superseded by General Chen who was honest but dependent on Mow for advice.  
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An interview of three-quarters of an hour followed with the Generalissimo and 
Madame, acting as interpreter. Chiang stated that China would be better without an air 
force altogether: “We have had to do without a Navy, we would be better without a 
rotten Air Force.”’ 873  Chiang stated that he would be willing to give the RAF ‘carte 
blanche’ to ‘effect a complete re-organisation’ and if the British did not agree, they 
would ask the Americans. Madame requested that Aitken keep this proposal secret 
when he met senior Chinese officers on his inspection tour. When Aitken asked about 
the Russian mission, Madame responded that a visit could be ‘arranged but that “the 
Russians looked after themselves”’ intimating that they were entirely separate from the 
CAF. On his tour Aitken came away with the impression that the Russians demanded 
absolute secrecy about their operations in China and would withdraw support if their 
conditions were not met.
874
 300 Russian mechanics were based at a separate camp 
outside Chungking to maintain their own aircraft but there appeared to be no pilots. The 
Russians refused to talk to anyone. Nonetheless they were universally praised for their 
courage and efficiency ‘when they choose to fight’.875  
 
The main preoccupation of the Chinese officers was organisation. General Mow showed 
Aitken, ‘a bewildering document’ which conveyed ‘no organisation at all, ...just a 
heterogeneous collection of terminologies bunched indiscriminately in groups.’876 Chen 
and Mow had come up with a new organisation which Malley and Chennault had 
judged to be no better than the existing one: both advisers felt ‘the whole subject to be 
much beyond their capacity.’877 Chennault, whom Aitken described as ‘very deaf,’ 
agreed that it was hopeless, ‘but his own ideas on the subject, if put into operation, 
would be little better. His thoughts are confused and it is clear that organisation is not 
his forte.’878 Aitken’s comments lend support to Soong’s intimation that Chennault was 
a fighter but not an administrator.  
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Aitken reproduced in his report a questionnaire which Chennault completed for the 
Generalissimo in January 1939.
879
  Chennault was highly critical of most aspects of the 
CoAA which employed ‘more personnel than are required... because of faulty 
organization, insufficient training of employees, and in some cases, because of 
deliberate nepotism.’880 Ignorance and lack of initiative on the part of officers was a key 
problem as well as poor communications and transport for operations. On training he 
observed that half of the aircraft lost in the first six months of the war was due to ‘poor 
pilotage’. Pilots had flown planes which they were not competent to handle. Many had 
refused to accept any further training – ‘this generally occurred when a foreign 
specialist was appointed to give advanced instruction.’881 Most were only qualified to 
fly a basic trainer.  
 
Chennault recommended regulations to prevent insubordination and desertion from 
combat, measures of discipline which he alleged had been instituted in the World 
War.
882
 He wanted a rotation of duties as ‘officers of the higher grades do not engage in 
combat operations and are not subjected to the dangers and strains incidental to such 
operations.’883 He also hoped to remove from flying duty (and flying pay) all pilots who 
had ceased to fly activity and failed to qualify on modern planes.  
 
Chennault planned to resume ‘harassing operations’ and ‘guerrilla air action’ against 
Japanese targets along the Yangtze River. He recommended acquisition of long range 
single seater bombers equipped with heavy weapons (50 calibre or larger guns) because 
these were more accurate within a reasonable range than bombing.
884
 He intended to 
train pilots to fly the small number of Curtiss Hawk 75s which were capable of this sort 
of action as soon as possible. In a separate comment, Aitken disagreed with this idea as 
the Japanese could easily bring these planes down in the present war.  
 
General Mow explained the Chinese approach to air tactics: the policy was ‘only to 
engage the enemy when they consider they have a reasonable chance of success and 
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Squadron Commanders are not allowed to indulge in heroic deeds against impossible 
odds.’885  Hence when Japanese bombers were escorted by a superior number of 
fighters, they avoided battle, and flew out of danger until the raid was over. When 
bombers were escorted by too few fighters, they attempted to draw them off leaving the 
larger portion of Chinese fighters to engage the bombers. If the bombers were 
unaccompanied, they always attacked, preferably bringing down the leader of the 
formation as ‘if he is shot down, it exerts considerable moral effect on the remainder of 
the formation.’ Here were echoes of Sun Tzu’s recommendations on engaging the 
enemy according to his relative size and disposition.
886
  Avoiding the enemy when he 
was strong had been a guiding principle of China’s military aviation since the 1920s: at 
heart the air force of 1939 was not very different from the air bureau of 1929.
887
   
 
Aitken noted that as Chinese pilots had little faith in the efficiency and courage of their 
superior officers, they could not be expected to perform to a high standard. He recorded 
an anecdote by William MacDonald: having trained a group of fighter pilots he led 
them against an equal number of Japanese (nine) but they all deserted him at the 
beginning of the fight.
888
 Although MacDonald denied it, Aitken understood that he had 
flown many missions, receiving large bonuses for every Japanese plane which he shot 
down: ‘he was making so much that the Chinese reduced the payment to $1,000 gold 
when McDonald said that “on those terms they could go and shoot the blankety things 
down themselves.”’ 889 At the end of a lengthy report, Aitken observed that a British 
mission to China would be important from a financial and commercial standpoint but 
could not comment on the political implications as ‘these days the line between direct 
and indirect assistance to a country is very hard to define’ 890  
 
In May 1939, Peter LeToney, a US Army intelligence officer from Army headquarters 
in the Philippines assessed flight training in Yunnan. Chinese were in charge of all 
instruction while American instructors ‘act as check and test pilots and in a general 
advisory capacity. Better results could be obtained if they could personally instruct the 
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cadets but this is impossible because there are not enough Americans.’891 LeToney 
found the Chinese cadets lacked ‘inherent flying ability’ and concluded that ‘unless the 
flying ability of the Chinese pilots improves, it will be impossible for them to fly 
modern high-speed airplanes with tricky landing characteristics without considerable 
damage to the equipment.’892  
 
On 13 May 1939 an Army intelligence officer Henry C Mclean interviewed George R 
Clark, an American instructors who related that ‘all training was under Colonel C. M 
Chenault with some assistance by Chinese instructors’.893 Clark commented on the  
‘great lack of cooperation between the American and Chinese instructors’ : when the 
Chinese student learned to fly under an American instructor, he refused to obey for fear 
of losing face because ‘he feels that he is in his own country and that it is his war, so 
why listen to a foreigner.’894 Clark went even further: ‘the average flying cadet in China 
is not interested in learning to be useful to his country. His sole ambition is to win a pair 
of wings to wear on his dress uniform when he goes on leave into the cities.’895 Of all 
candidates examined, only 4 % were accepted for flight training but ‘none of these 
accepted meet the standards set by the U.S. Army Air Corps.’896 Clark felt that it hardly 
mattered which type of training was on offer, ‘for no amount of instruction or lecturing 
will prevent a Chinese from doing a thing the wrong way.’897 All the good pilots had 
been killed in the first four months of the war and 90% of victories over the Japanese 
attributed to the Chinese were actually gained by Russian pilots.
898
 The average Chinese 
pilot, he remarked, was a ‘swell-headed, loud talking, cowardly egomaniac. He is not 
even a second class pilot, he can’t navigate, he will not take advice and he is afraid of 
getting shot.’899  
 
The final pre-war report preserved in US Navy archives dates from 8 October 1940, 
well after the Soviet Air mission had left and only a few weeks before Claire Chennault 
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departed for the United States. Captain F.J. McQuillen received his briefing primarily 
from Chennault who was ‘…better informed on the subject than almost any other 
foreigner in China.’ as well as three other American instructors at Kunming.900 
McQuillen regarded the CAF as a ‘negligible military factor’ with only 50 combat 
planes left in the fleet.
901
 Although Chinese cadets made good progress initially, they 
were quickly ruined by contact with older Chinese pilots: ‘favouritism, protection of 
“Face”, graft, lack of discipline with consequent failure to heed advice, following 
instructions or obey orders; all militate against China’s building of a satisfactory 
airforce. In short, Chinese characteristics are not adaptable to a modern air force.’ 902 
Reflecting the views of Chennault, McQuillen reported that:  
 
the only solution currently offered for China’s present problem of “How to deal with the 
Japanese Airforce” is for her to turn the whole thing over, lock, stock and barrel, to the nationals 
of some one foreign country. Col. Chennault says that if he were given 100 bombers, 100 long-
range pursuits and 100 interceptors, all of up-to-date design; with 400 foreign pilots, he could 
very nicely organize a force that would protect Free China from Japanese raids and wreck havoc 
on the Japanese forces in China.
903
 
 
The evidence from these military attaché reports contradicts all assertions that 
Chennault and a small group of American instructors managed to train ‘900 excellent 
cadets.’ 904  On the contrary, after 1937 the Chinese resisted American air force 
standards. and Sino-American relations had deteriorated into resentment on one side 
and contempt on the other. With the exception of William MacDonald, Americans took 
no part in combat:  MacDonald received a bonus for each enemy plane shot down until 
the Chinese felt they were paying him too much at which point he stopped.
905
 The 
Russians, however, accounted for most missions against the enemy. While they may 
have succeeded in teaching the Chinese pilots to speak Russian, they failed to turn them 
into a fighting force. 
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American aircraft procurement 
 
In 1938 the Chinese government refrained from buying American aircraft due to lack of 
funds and increasing reliance on Soviet assistance. In the winter of 1938-1939, 
however, Dr. Kung resumed discussions about procurement with Pat Patterson of 
Consolidated Trading and Bill Pawley of Intercontinent. The negotiations were 
tortuous, their purpose obscure and outcome ambiguous. The Patterson Contract, as the 
entire affair became known, marked a final attempt by Chiang’s ‘family circle’ to use 
military aviation for their own political ends.  
 
If Dr. Kung had proceeded immediately to buy planes from both salesmen, he could 
have acquired 277 new combat planes for a combined cost of US$13.2 million delivered 
early in 1940 but not paid for until 1941. In the end, however, Dr. Kung let the 
Patterson contract lapse and bought 78 C-W combat planes from Bill Pawley which 
were never delivered to China. James McHugh who followed the twists and turns of the 
Patterson Contract was bewildered by the entire affair: family infighting was enmeshed 
in high diplomacy.  
 
The negotiations with Pawley and Patterson took place against the backdrop of other 
developments in China’s aviation affairs. At the start of 1939 Sun Fo and Yang Jie 
prepared to renew discussions with their Soviet counterparts about a third loan for 
China linked to deliveries of aircraft and other materiel. On 8 February 1939, K.P. Chen 
also signed the agreement between the US Ex-Im Bank and the Universal Trading 
Corporation (negotiated in December 1938) which provided the latter with US$25 
million credits repayable at 4.5% p.a.
906
 This loan was largely tied to the purchase of 
American trucks and other equipment for use on the Burma Road: trucks would carry 
materiel into China and bring Wood oil out for shipment to the United States.  
 
Dr. Kung and Bill Pawley of Intercontinent also negotiated a new agreement to relocate 
CAMCO to Loiwing on the Yunnan/Burma border. As Leighton wrote to his wife, 
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Pawley was ‘up to his ears’ in building the new factory at Loiwing.907  CAMCO 
remained a joint venture but the Nationalists did not pay its share of the construction 
costs. Pawley invested at least US$250,000 in a project which had ‘untold troubles’ 
according to Intercontinent’s secretary Mamie Porritt: ‘malaria is rampant, labour 
troubles increasing daily, river is rising, they are afraid they will be marooned, all 
supplies have to be brought in, and everything is a mess.’908  Moreover, foreign 
observers in China were probably  unaware that Pawley had become the proprietor of 
Intercontinent. At the end of 1938, he acquired from Sperry Gyroscope its entire 
holding in the firm. 
909
  Therefore Pawley and his employees no longer had a corporate 
safety net provided by Tom Morgan of Sperry Gyroscope. Intercontinent depended 
entirely on sales commissions received from Curtiss-Wright and other manufacturers 
which it represented in China. 
 
Pawley had the advantage over Patterson in many ways: he had the exclusive sales 
agency for Curtiss-Wright; he had capital assets of US$1.8 million and a competent 
factory staff used to managing assembly operations under the most adverse 
conditions.
910
 Furthermore he had always found the means to import demonstrators: in 
January 1939 he brought over a CW-21 interceptor to put through test flights for the 
Commission– it was the first plane assembled at the Loiwing plant in March 1939.911 
Most importantly he understood how to handle Kung and the Chinese government after 
many years of negotiating contracts.  
 
Patterson was a small broker who dealt mainly in spare parts and trainers.
912
 He had 
never imported demonstrators nor operated an assembly plant.
913
  Furthermore he did 
not even have the exclusive sales agency for Seversky or any other aircraft 
manufacturers. He also lacked a lawyer as able as George Sellett, the former US 
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attorney in Shanghai retained by Intercontinent since its entry into China in 1929.  
Patterson, however, had two important advantages over Pawley. As McHugh noted in 
April 1939, Madame and Donald had so ‘hounded’ Dr. Kung about his exclusive 
dealings with Pawley that they pressured him into giving an order to a rival just ‘to say 
to his critics that he was not in Pawley’s clutches.’914 In their efforts to eliminate 
corruption in the CoAA, Madame and Donald had become convinced that Pawley was 
the principal source of ‘squeeze’ and therefore did their utmost to find evidence that he 
had overcharged Dr. Kung or done ‘favours’ for Chinese officers.915  Secondly 
Patterson had the support of Chennault. Dr. Kung brought Chennault from Kunming to 
Chungking to act as his technical adviser to the negotiations: Chennault was particularly 
eager to acquire Seversky pursuit planes which Patterson claimed that he could  
provide. One can infer from Chennault’s correspondence in this period that despite 
setbacks in training Chinese pilots, Chennault still hoped to deploy a new fleet of 
combat planes against Japanese bases along the Yangtze.
916
 American observers such as 
James McHugh and State Department officials also presumed that the regime urgently 
needed and wanted American aircraft for operations against Japan.  
 
In January-March 1939 Dr. Kung established a procurement committee composed of 
CoAA officers who scrutinised the bids received from both salesmen. Chennault 
disparaged the board’s deliberations: ‘almost the entire month was wasted in useless 
haggling over minor details rather than in the preparation of the final contract.’917 
Nonetheless, their tactics produced the desired result: they forced the rivals to undercut 
each other on price.  After two months of hard negotiation, on 25 March 1939, Dr. 
Kung signed a contract with Patterson’s firm Consolidated Trading Company Ltd for 
US$8.831 million to buy 199 planes: 54 Severskys, 25 Vought Dive bombers, 70 Ryan 
trainers and 50 North American trainers.
918
 The CoAA purchasing committee had 
secured value for money and terms far more favourable to the buyer than the seller.
919
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Some months later, McHugh wrote to his friend Tom Reynolds that ‘Patterson in his 
desire to get a contract away from Bill (and also the fact that he and Lewis ... were faced 
with bankruptcy if they did not get a contract) let the Chinese pin all kinds of conditions 
on him during the final day and he ended up by conceding two points which were plain 
damned foolishness’.920  
 
The first concession was embedded in the initial purchasing agreement: Patterson had to 
secure a 100 % performance bond, a common feature of US government contracts. This 
insurance policy covered the value of the entire contract and required a sizeable 
premium which Patterson could not afford. He also accepted another stringent demand:  
even after signature, the Chinese had the right to investigate his prices and if they turned 
out to be higher than those paid by the US government, Patterson would have to refund 
the difference.
921
  If that were the case, the Chinese would allow him a commission of 
one % and expenses equivalent to three % of the contract’s revised value.922 Chennault 
wrote to Dr. Kung that no other sales representative had ever been asked to make such a 
concession: he reasoned that since US government prices were confidential, it would be 
difficult to calculate US government prices in an equitable fashion.
923
  
 
Patterson also had been forced to swear in writing that he would not give any 
commission or compensation to anyone ‘for the purpose of obtaining this business.’924 It 
appears, however, that he had already done so. In June 1939, McHugh found out that 
Patterson had admitted to ‘paying squeeze but claimed after the signing of the contract 
that he had informed Gen Huang Kuang-jui [K.Y. Freddy Wong] that he had had his 
profits trimmed so low that there could not even be small presents. He stated that 
“Freddy” had good naturedly agreed and had said that all he wanted to see was for 
Pawley to be beaten.’925 According to McHugh’s informant, Freddy Wong had a 
vendetta against Pawley dating back to a 1936 contract in Canton involving Pawley’s 
former employee Lou Dooley: ‘Pawley either cut out or rejected completely the squeeze 
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which Dooley was committed to pay General Huang Kuang-jui of the Cantonese air 
force and that the latter has had it in for Pawley every since... He obviously is not 
friendly with Pawley.’926  
 
According to Mamie Porritt, when Pawley heard about Patterson’s contract, he was 
‘about to have forty fits.  He is working on a seven million order and hopes to get it 
through soon.  If he doesn’t I think he will die.’927  In a report dated 10 April 1939  
James McHugh described Pawley as ‘rabid against Col. Chennault, stating that he was 
going to fight the situation and write a letter of complaint to the War Department’.928 In 
Hong Kong, Pawley tactlessly repeated to business acquaintances allegations that 
Chennault received squeeze from Patterson on the deal: McHugh observed that Pawley 
spoke of Chennault ‘with such venom’ that there could be no doubt that Pawley 
believed the rumours.
929
  
 
Dr. Kung, however, did not leave Intercontinent in limbo for long. As Leighton 
described to his wife, on 20 April Kung called together ‘all the brass hats’ to go over 
specifications and signed an undertaking with Bill Pawley to purchase up to US$12 
million of which Leighton expected orders worth US$7 million.
930
  On 19 May Arthur 
Young looked over the draft contract with Intercontinent. He noted in a memo that it 
contained none of the conditions required of Patterson: no performance bond; no 
guarantee that prices would not exceed those paid by the US government and no 
limitation on profits.
931
  Young, however, was not aware that the CoAA committee 
subjected Intercontinent to the same treatment as Patterson about prices even if it did 
not require Pawley to provide a performance bond.  
 
On 24 June, in a letter to his wife, Leighton mentioned the clause about price 
investigations: the Chinese had a right to cancel the agreement at any time within thirty 
days after signature if they were not satisfied about the prices. Since UTC had 
investigated Intercontinent’s prices and deemed them too high, ‘they had decided to 
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make an issue and put on the screws good and proper.’ 932  It was standard practice, he 
noted, for the Chinese to assert that prices paid by customers in the US were far lower 
than those quoted by aircraft salesmen in China. Leighton accepted that the Chinese 
played one salesman off against another in order to ‘squeeze the best possible prices and 
terms: the more discouraged the salesman, the better the buyer likes it.’933  Moreover, 
the Chinese knew that Intercontinent was right in the middle of building the factory at 
Loiwing: ‘these guys here figured that we were in a position where we had to have this 
business or be in a rather bad way – which happens to be the truth. So they put down an 
ultimatum, finally – take it or leave it – either accept a reduction in prices amounting to 
about $300,000.00 (about 7%) or cancel the entire contract, and reduce the amount to 
the bare limits of $1,000,000.00.’934    
 
Having yielded to Dr. Kung’s terms, Intercontinent ended up with a contract of US$4.4 
million to build 125 planes including 49 Hawk 75s (P36A), 29 C- 21 Interceptors, 30 
Hawk IIIs from a previous contract and some trainers.
935
 Leighton did not expect much 
profit, just enough to maintain the office in Chungking, but the contract established a 
production schedule for the new Loiwing plant and the prospect for future contracts of 
up to US$8 million.
936
  
 
Kung and the CoAA drove hard bargains with both salesmen. Nevertheless Patterson 
had the additional burden of the performance bond: his difficulty in obtaining one 
provided Dr. Kung with a pretext to postpone completion until he did. Kung was a 
master of dragging his feet if he so wished as the Italians had discovered in 1934 when 
he did his best to delay the arrival of the air mission. By contrast, he was quick to act 
when the Generalissimo had genuine demands, as had been the case with the Northrop 
bombers in December 1933. On this occasion, however, Kung took his time presumably 
because the Generalissimo told him to adopt delaying tactics.  
 
 
 
                                                     
932
 BGLA, Folder EML, Leighton to his wife Chungking, 24 June 1939, p.1 
933
 BGLA, ‘Leighton to Carl Dolan’ 1 March 39, pp.1-2 
934
 BGLA, Folder EML, ‘Leighton to his wife’, 24/6/39, p.1 
935
 CUL, McHugh, Box 4 Folder 4 handwritten update to 10/4/39 Aircraft  Industry Report, p. 10 
936
 BGLA, Folder EML, ‘Leighton to his wife’ 24/6/39, p.1 
190 
 
State Department Intervention 
 
In May 1939 Patterson was in New York trying without success to arrange the 
performance with his four suppliers before HSBC cancelled his line of credit.
937
 Kung 
had called into question his prices as well as his ability to secure the bond.  Patterson 
enlisted John Jouett, who had become head of the American Aeronautical Chamber of 
Commerce in Washington, to put his problems before State Department officials. On 19 
May 1939 Jouett contacted Joseph Green and requested that the Department intervene 
with the Chinese government about honouring Patterson’s contract.938 Almost 
immediately after Jouett’s appointment, a cable in Hull’s name instructed Nelson 
Johnson in Chungking that the Department had ‘a considerable amount of information’ 
to the effect that ‘Pawley interests are endeavouring to prevent the carrying out of this 
contract’ and that the Department was concerned about ‘the possible loss of business to 
the American industry and exporting interest in general.’939 Hull insisted that the 
Department was impartial but would ‘afford...appropriate assistance’ to the party with 
the contract.
940
 Therefore Johnson was to request that Dr. Kung remove all delays and 
‘facilitate performance of the Patterson contract.’941 Hull emphasised that the US 
government was expressing its goodwill in wanting to see the Chinese government 
obtain badly needed equipment and avoid the bad impression which the Chinese would 
create upon American aviation interests if the contract was not fulfilled.
942
 
 
This was a remarkable break with the past. McHugh, who saw all of the embassy’s 
communications about the contract, later wrote to Tom Reynolds that this was ‘the first 
time in history’ that the Department had intervened to promote a specific American 
aircraft contract: ‘apparently some of Pat’s people barged down there and convinced 
them that undue obstacles were being placed in the road of fulfilling the contract and 
that Bill was behind it.’943  
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Over the course of the next month Willys Peck, the US consul in Chungking as well as 
Joseph Green and Stanley Hornbeck at the State Department interviewed various parties 
in search of evidence that Pawley  had interfered in the completion of Patterson’s 
contract. They had no legal authority to do anything about it if they proved his guilt 
except to prejudice the US government and possibly the Chinese government against 
him. By mid-June Pawley had become incensed by the accusations levelled against him. 
On 12 June 1939 he wrote to Leighton that before leaving Chungking he had seen 
Willys Peck who had told him of ‘information from Washington’ that Pawley had tried 
to block the competitor’s deal. Pawley replied that ‘if the deal did not go through, it 
would be the result of the contract ...rather than any action by me...’944 In his letter to 
Leighton, he suggested that Leighton also see Peck and Johnson to tell them that  
 
we are being seriously discriminated against by a combined group of officials and would-be 
officials and that if these tactics are continued it will put us out of business as Kung will hesitate 
to deal with a firm whose name is questioned by the American official colony in the Chinese 
capital. You might say, if you care to, that you know I am not going to take this “lying down” – 
I am not going to lose one-half million dollars through unjust and biased statements made by 
these people. 
945
  
 
Pawley understood that McHugh had reported to ONI about the entire affair and that it 
would not do them any good.
946
 He suggested that Bruce write to his brother Frank – 
also a naval officer who had once served in ONI – and give him their side of the 
story.
947
 George Sellett planned to see both Joseph Green and Stanley Hornbeck to lay 
bare the tactics of all the ‘opposition.’948 
 
On 28 June Peck interviewed Leighton.
949
 Leighton expressed surprise that the 
Department had intervened especially as his firm had never approached the embassy for 
help because ‘it understood that the Embassy did not wish to become implicated in 
transactions of this nature.’950 Nonetheless Leighton hoped to set the record straight by 
pointing out how Intercontinent had ‘contributed more to bring about the possession of 
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an air force by the Chinese Government and to the sale of American manufactures in 
China than had any competing firm.’ Nelson Johnson noted in his summary of the 
interview that Pawley’s interests had also blocked the sale of any other type of 
American aircraft to China during the past six years. 
951
 
 
By the end of July Peck had completed his investigation and Nelson Johnson requested 
that the Department ‘let the matter drop.’952 He concluded in somewhat  that the ‘whole 
matter of airplanes sales with China…has been fraught with acrimony and assumption 
by buyers as well as sellers, of practices and intrigues which I have felt from the 
beginning the Embassy should remain aloof from.’953  Soon thereafter McHugh 
revealed to Tom Reynolds that Ambassador Johnson was ‘sore as hell’ at the 
Department for ever becoming involved in the contract: ‘after washing their hands for 
years of all this business and having no background information to speak of on file, they 
jump[ed] into the mess feet first.’954   
 
Claire Chennault also felt deeply aggrieved by the fiasco which frustrated his ambitions 
to acquire the planes which he recommended for reviving the CAF. On 4 August he 
gave his side of story in a long letter to McHugh.
955
 Everyone had wasted an enormous 
amount of time on minor details in order to wear down Patterson and get lower prices 
without paying sufficient detail to contractual clauses.  He grudgingly accepted that 
Pawley would continue to sell the bulk of planes in China as long as he served as the 
‘confidential adviser to the procuring authority, the Minister of Finance.’956 Chennault 
felt that he had been ‘used to obtain objectives that he had never planned:’ now that 
China had failed to procure the planes which she needed, his ‘plans for training and for 
tactical operations in the future are completely disrupted by this development. I would 
resign immediately were it not for the fact that Pawley would appreciate nothing more 
than my resignation.’957  
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McHugh in turn wrote to Paul Meyer the US consul in Kunming where Chennault was 
based much of the time. McHugh felt that Chennault had ‘made some serious mistakes 
which a man of his experience should have been able to avoid.’ McHugh had ‘no brief’ 
for Pawley 
 
but when compared with the opposition that he is up against, he stands out like a lighthouse in a 
fog. His competitors are amateurs and cheap small-fry compared with him. He hires competent, 
shrewd, capable assistants like Leighton, Walsh and Sellett whereas Patterson uses an 
ingratiating, cringing little Greek bastard like Vlachos...I have backed the Colonel through 
out...but if he is going to stay in China he will have to accept the fact that Pawley is going to sell 
the airplanes. If the Colonel cannot stomach this and get along with Bill then he would be well 
advised to go home.
958
 
 
McHugh commented that Chennault had often been ‘cagey’ with him treating him as if 
he were a newspaper man.
959
 Chennault had often received offers from Chiang to take 
complete charge of the air force and  
 
to dictate the removal and appointment of such people as he knows are delinquent. But he has 
always side-stepped such situations...My main criticism is that when he knows something is 
going wrong he ought not to tolerate it... He ought to walk into CKS with his resignation in one 
hand and force action on the question or tell them to go to Hell. They will never have an air 
force in this country until someone cracks the whip over them. The way they are fooling around 
up here now is enough to make you sick at your stomach.
960
  
 
The report by the British air attaché R.S. Aitken corroborated McHugh’s point that 
Chennault was not up to the task of forcing Chiang’s hand or taking charge of air force 
reorganisation. Moreover, as his biographer Martha Byrd has observed, Chennault was 
frequently ill, depressed or drunk during 1939.
961
  His correspondence with McHugh 
and family friends was infused with frustration at the impossibility of transforming the 
CAF into a force of which he could take command to resist the Japanese. 
 
In May-June1939 the repercussions of the Patterson affair started to ripple through the 
CoAA and Chiang’s family circle. On 2 June 1939 McHugh wrote to Overesch that 
Chiang had arrested T.C. Chien and reappointed General Chow as head of the CoAA. 
Madame refused to resume her former job as Secretary General of the CoAA but said 
that she would stay in the background to help Chennault while Donald decided to take a 
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trip to New Zealand for his health.
 962
 On 6 June McHugh wrote to Cyril Rogers that Dr. 
Kung seemed very pleased with himself that the aircraft contract signed three months 
before had failed to become operative because of various clauses which the seller could 
not fulfil.
963
 In a letter to the Australian journalist Harold Timperley, McHugh revealed 
that before leaving China, Donald had been displeased with Dr. Kung about the delays 
to Patterson’s contract: ‘I know that Don and M.L. [Madame Chiang] practically shoved  
 
H H into signing that American aviation contract and that ever since H.H. has been 
trying to load the responsibility off on someone else. All manner of technical flaws were 
picked in the contract and H H, is trying to get K.P. Chen and K.C. Li to adjust them, 
and at the same time, automatically to assume responsibility for them, which neither 
they nor any other Chinese will do.’964   
 
On 13 July 1939 Dr. Kung signed two more contracts with Intercontinent, the most 
important of which was an agreement to build Cyclone engines under license in 
China.
965
 The exact amount is unknown but Leighton intimated to his wife on 24 June 
that there were two other contracts in the offing which together came to US$2.4 
million.
966
 George Sellett and Bruce Leighton spent that morning with Dr. Kung at his 
bath house enjoying the hot springs and were invited to make themselves at home at his 
house up in the hills where they had dinner with his secretaries – Leighton assured his 
wife that ‘contracts aren’t always done that way in China...and the occasion was much 
enjoyed.’967 
 
On 26 July McHugh wrote to Paul Meyer that it was unlikely that Madame would 
interfere again in Kung’s relations with Pawley:  
 
her tendency to stand up for Kung will undoubtedly overshadow any further desire she might 
have to buck Pawley. He (Kung) now stands vindicated on all counts of his past relations with 
Pawley, for there is nothing on the record to show that any such trouble ever arose with Bill nor 
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did the US Govt ever get into the mess before. We look like a bunch of suckers, I can assure 
you. 
968
 
 
As astonishing was McHugh’s conclusion about Bill Pawley: ‘whatever Bill may have 
done in the past, he is on solid ground now. This Patterson affair has put him right out 
in the clear for every feature of it rebounds to his credit.’969 
 
The Patterson contract was a storm in a tea cup. State Department officials wasted 
months trying to get to the bottom of it and in the end had to admit defeat and regret that 
they had ever intervened.  Those absorbed in the fiasco seemed oblivious to events 
beyond the bubble of their own lives. It is possible, however, that Sino-Soviet relations 
had more to do with the contract than any foreign observers detected at the time.  
In October 1939 McHugh discovered that during the spring and summer of 1939 Yang 
Jie, the Chinese ambassador in Moscow had misled Chiang about a delivery of some 
700 Russian airplanes.
970
 McHugh had an anonymous source ‘EW’ about Yang’s 
actions:  ‘CKS and others here went on the assumption all summer that these planes 
were coming, only to discover that the negotiations had never been opened. EW said 
this was the real reason the Consolidated deal had been blocked’.971  
 
This odd piece of intelligence may explain some of the intrigue which enveloped the 
Patterson contract.  As John Garver has demonstrated in his work on Sino-Soviet 
relations, in 1937-1940 nothing was more important to Chiang than to maintain the flow 
of Russian aid to China. Whenever possible, as Bruce Leighton noted, the Chinese liked 
to play off one supplier against another – one nationality against another or one 
American against another. Chiang wanted to redress the inferiority of his position vis-a-
vis Stalin by showing that the United States was increasingly interested in helping 
China: the Tung Oil loan had been followed immediately by discussions on procuring 
American planes.  Here was proof that the Roosevelt administration at last was openly 
siding with China against Japan.  By stringing out the aircraft negotiations through the 
spring and summer of 1939, Dr. Kung perpetuated the image of Americans competing 
to supply China. When the State Department became concerned about the execution of 
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the Patterson contract, there was an unexpected bonus: the Department stated explicitly 
that it cared about supplying China with airplanes. This was an excellent outcome from 
the Chinese point of view. Whether the planes were ever paid for and delivered was not 
nearly as important as the propaganda value of this change in US policy towards China. 
  
Chiang’s regime signed a third US$150 million loan with the Soviet Union on 14 June 
1939.  Through the spring and summer, Dr. Kung strung along Pawley as well as 
Patterson while waiting to see whether or not Soviet planes materialised and on what 
terms. As long as Chiang and Kung believed that the Soviet Union would send 700 
planes within the next year, Kung did not have to press for the immediate execution of 
the Patterson contract. The complexity of the performance bond provided an excuse to 
let the contract lapse when and if Kung decided that it was no longer needed. The 
Patterson contract was expendable because the Chinese still believed that a large 
consignment of planes in support of the Soviet mission was on its way.  
 
In the autumn, however, Chiang and Kung may have been surprised to learn that they 
were not going to receive as many Russian planes as expected. Consequently Dr. Kung 
signed a further contract with Bill Pawley for US$7.5 million in October 1939.
972
 On 21 
October Bruce Leighton also noted amongst ‘projects pending’ that CAMCO was to 
assemble a hundred Russian combat planes (50 E-15s and 50 E-16s). 
973
 
Intercontinent/CAMCO was beginning to evolve into a general military contractor and 
abandon the old business model which tied it exclusively to providing American aircraft 
for its Chinese client. 
 
With the backing of Chiang, Dr. Kung played his hand well. He was fully vindicated for 
his past dealings with Bill Pawley and allowed to resume full control over procurement. 
From this point onwards, Madame withdrew from aviation affairs. The CoAA also had 
been put in its place, because its purchasing committee had proved incompetent to 
handle the legal complexities of the Patterson contract. In the politics of airpower, a new 
set of priorities had emerged, infighting first, then external resistance.  
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Conclusions 
 
In China and the Helping Hand Arthur Young introduced the notion that before the war 
China received ‘nongovernmental’ assistance in civil and military aviation.974 He 
highlighted the role of Claire Chennault as one of ‘a number of Americans in China 
helping to develop military aviation.’ Although Young rightly praised the importance of 
the Soviet air mission to China’s war effort, he laid the foundation for subsequent 
historians to exaggerate the pre-war contribution of American experts and 
entrepreneurs. The evidence introduced in this chapter lays to rest the myth that a few 
Americans managed to train hundreds of Chinese aviators to an American standard 
before World War II. Russian airpower prevailed over American airpower.  In 1938-
1939 China had Stalin to thank for the hundreds of Russian aviators who did more than 
any other foreign air mission before World War II to fight China’s war of resistance.  
 
In March 1938 when Soong assumed the chairmanship of the CoAA, he accepted Soviet 
occupation of the Chinese Air Force.  Thereafter Russian airpower marginalised 
American airpower. Stalin offered planes and personnel on generous terms because it 
was in his interest for China to resist Japan and keep it from causing trouble in Russia’s 
Far East borderlands. By providing tangible aid, the Soviet mission eclipsed what little 
authority Chiang and his extended family exerted over the air administration. The 
Russians tipped the balance of power in favour of the CoAA officers and against the 
Chiangs as well as their American adviser and his small group of instructors.  
 
In his memoir Claire Chennault expressed his admiration of Russian pilots. In 1938-
1940, however, the Soviet Air mission was one of the principal reasons for Chennault’s 
increasing frustration and their influence over the Chinese in the CoAA was a cause of 
ill will between American instructors and the Chinese. Deprived of aircraft, the 
Americans lacked the tools and the prestige to impose their standards on the CoAA 
clique and cadets. As Captain McQuillen reported, by October 1940 Chennault felt that 
the only solution for the Chinese Air Force was to turn it over ‘lock stock and barrel’ to 
a foreign mission. Chiang had come to the same conclusion about his ‘rotten’ air force.  
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Although Chiang resented the Russians, he preferred to rely entirely upon Stalin’s 
helping hand than to waste any more resources on the air force. Chiang had lost his faith 
in his air force but not in airpower. In the event that Stalin withdrew his help, he would 
turn to the British or Americans for official assistance. The Chinese never saw any 
contradiction in cultivating several foreign partners simultaneously. In 1932 Soong kept 
both Italians and Americans in play to maximise his financial options; in 1939 Chiang 
saw the wisdom of gradually building a new relationship with the United States while 
still relying on the Soviet Union for the lion’s share of military aid.  
 
The Patterson contract left Chennault feeling bitter about being “used” to attain 
objectives which he never planned.  Donald and Madame may have genuinely believed 
that Chennault might be given the opportunity to create an air guerrilla corps based on a 
new air fleet. Chennault, however, came to the view fairly early on that Dr. Kung was 
not serious about buying airplanes to revive the CAF. Kung was only interested in 
serving Chiang and saving face. He created a procurement process which gave himself 
and Chiang a range of options to respond to changes in the level of Russian aid. They 
also had induced the US government to make explicit the subtle change of policy which 
had taken place during 1938-1939: Roosevelt had embarked on a policy of promoting 
airplane sales to France and Britain to help them build up their fleets and thus redress 
the balance of power with the German Luftwaffe. The State Department revealed that 
this policy in a reduced form also applied to China: the Department presumed that 
China needed and wanted planes for resisting Japan and it was willing to help the 
Chinese secure them.. McHugh was right to note that the Patterson Contract marked a 
new departure for the US government. When and if the Soviet air mission finally 
withdrew from China, Chiang and Kung had laid the groundwork to turn to the United 
States and Britain for massive air assistance to replace the Russians.     
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Chapter V The Flying Tigers 
 
In January 1941 Intercontinent became involved in the formation of a mercenary air 
force, the American Volunteer Group (AVG), better known as the Flying Tigers after 
Pearl Harbor. Since 1942 the ‘Tigers’ have been the subject of numerous books which 
pay tribute to the pilots’ exemplary combat record against the Japanese in the first six 
month of war in the CBI.
975
 These accounts, however, have paid scant attention to the 
origins of the group. Most historians have referred to its formation in terms which echo 
an article ‘Tigers over Burma’ in Time Magazine (February 1942): ‘to no one man 
belongs credit for organizing and recruiting the A.V.G. But A.V.G’s spark plug from 
the start, its commander in Burma now, is a famous U.S. flyer: lean dark Brigadier 
General Claire L. Chennault of Water Proof, La.’976   
 
Military and academic historians have emphasised the link between AVG operations 
and subsequent developments: the American airpower strategy for the CBI, US political 
support for the Nationalists during the Pacific war and the AVG’s links to post-war 
covert operations in Southeast Asia. As noted in the literature review, Michael Schaller 
asserted that the AVG was a clandestine organisation which foreshadowed ‘the style, if 
not substance, of future policies in Asia.’977 Few have examined the AVG in the context 
of US foreign relations in the years before Pearl Harbor or its connection to American 
aviation interests in China during the previous decade.  
 
This chapter brings a new perspective to the historical significance of the AVG by 
assessing the motives and conduct of the organisers from the autumn of 1940 to the 
early summer of 1941. Air assistance for China in 1940-1941 was a commercial, 
diplomatic and military initiative involving four participants: the Roosevelt 
administration, Intercontinent, Chiang’s representatives in Washington and the British 
government. Each had different reasons to promote a volunteer air force for China and 
had different expectations of it. Two interrelated propositions are explored to answer the 
question of how and why the AVG came about:  first, air aid for China evolved in a 
piecemeal fashion which reflected Roosevelt’s priorities and decision-making style. 
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Second, the AVG was as closely connected to air aid for Britain as it was for China and 
it would be a distortion of the record to omit British interests in assessing the place of 
the AVG in the politics of airpower in Sino-American relations.  
 
 ‘Plane aid’ for Britain dominated Roosevelt’s foreign policy agenda from 1938 to 
1940.
 978
  In formulating this policy of air assistance for Britain and initially France, 
Roosevelt conceived of the United States as the supplier of arms and aircraft which 
could supplement their own production in boosting the size of their air fleets. He had no 
intention of sending US military advisers or personnel to take part in military planning 
or operations. It seems likely that Roosevelt never even contemplated making 
recommendations to the British about the use of American equipment. Nor would he 
have dared to do so: after two years of war, the British had a far greater competence and 
experience of war than Roosevelt, his cabinet or the American military chiefs of staff.  
 
The situation in the Far East was utterly different. Without the help of a foreign air 
mission, Chiang did not have an air arm competent enough to deploy whatever foreign 
aircraft Dr. Kung managed to acquire. It is not known whether Roosevelt and his 
cabinet read intelligence reports about the state of the CAF in 1939-1940. Sources such 
as the secret diary of Harold Ickes and the Morgenthau diaries suggest that the president 
may not have grasped initially the difference between the sale of a few planes to Chiang 
and the sale of a large quantity of planes to Churchill.  
 
In early October 1940, Roosevelt and his cabinet first approached the question of air aid 
to China as if it were a scaled-down version of ‘plane aid’ for Britain: by selling a few 
planes to Chiang, they wanted to make a gesture of support, nothing more. Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull instructed his staff to make available to China ‘as promptly as 
possible a few planes – within limits, the more the better.’979  That contradictory set of 
qualifiers characterised the early approach to air aid for China. Roosevelt and members 
of his cabinet associated airplanes with quick solutions expecting aircraft to be built, 
delivered and deployed at a faster rate than could be achieved under current economic 
conditions. They treated planes as a commodity to suit different ends: in small 
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quantities they were a quick morale booster for weak allies such as China or Greece, in 
large quantities, they contributed to Britain’s war effort. In October 1940 a ‘few planes 
within limits’ were to encourage China to resist Japan and thus keep the enemy bogged 
down instead of pursuing its plan for expansion across Southeast Asia. 
 
In 1940-1941 Roosevelt’s diplomacy of deterrence towards Japan ‘fell between the 
equally dangerous extremes of appeasement and provocation’ as the American historian 
Robert Divine has observed. 
980
 After the Netherlands and France fell to Germany in 
May 1940 the Japanese announced their intention to diplomats in Tokyo to take French 
Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, British Far East territories or ‘all of them’.981  The 
Japanese admitted that plans to move southward were the ‘greatest source of friction’ 
between their country and the United States in the winter of 1940-1941.
982
 Herbert Feis 
who worked at the State Department in this period has described how in November-
December 1940, the administration re-examined its three major options to counter the 
Japanese threat to the Far East colonies of European allies: deprive it of strategic 
resources for waging war; send ships and planes to threatened regions; help China ‘to be 
a continued worry and drain.’983 Of these the preferred course was to curtail American 
exports of strategic materials to Japan.  
 
Thus from the start, air aid for China was the odd option out. It marked a radical break 
from the rational cautious Far East policy of the interwar period which had been based 
on a steady escalation of economic sanctions, each more stringent than the last. China 
had been at war since 1937 but to appease Japan, the US government had scrupulously 
refused to offer Chiang any material help, to facilitate the sale of planes or the service of 
Americans in the CAF lest Japan treat such support as a casus belli.  In December1940, 
however, the President and his colleagues contemplated how to stage a bombing 
offensive against Japan from China even though, within the framework of interwar 
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foreign policy, the dispatch of a few American bombers and crews to China was more 
likely to trigger a confrontation with Japan than to prevent one.
 984
  
 
For the Administration to consider such a mission was also a deviation from its highly 
publicised role as the Arsenal of Democracy which Roosevelt announced in a fireside 
chat on 29 December 1940. Through this famous speech, Roosevelt portrayed the 
United States as the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons needed by American 
allies to fight the dictators. The Arsenal of Democracy confirmed a policy which had 
been in place since 1938, that the United States bolstered Britain’s war effort with 
equipment not manpower, planes not an air force. The speech prepared the ground for a 
bill to go before the Congress in the New Year: Lend lease was the most important 
piece of legislation of Roosevelt’s third term in office and on a par with the New Deal 
legislation of his first term.  
 
Behind the scenes, Roosevelt and his cabinet experimented with a different role as arm-
chair generals, talking through their first ever military plan for the Far East. Within the 
space of a few months, they had swung from appeasement to provocation of Japan, 
from using the sale of a few planes as a morale booster for Chiang Kai-shek to the other 
extreme, selling Chiang bombers to rain fire on Japanese cities. The secondary literature 
does not account for the sudden reversal of previous Far East policy. None adequately 
explain the link between the plan to bomb Japan from an airbase in China and the 
project to send a hundred fighter planes and men to the Far East which eventually 
turned into the AVG.   
 
Claire Chennault portrayed the formation of the volunteer squadrons as a carefully 
crafted programme undertaken by himself and T.V. Soong in consultation with a few 
key members of the administration. He claimed that his ‘strategic concept of China as a 
platform of air attack on Japan offered little attraction to the military planners of 
1941.’985 A review of archival material and published memoirs indicates that, on the 
contrary, in December 1940- January 1941 Roosevelt, Morgenthau and other members 
of the cabinet were eager to use China as a base for bombing Japan. When deprived of 
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bombers, they came up with another scheme: to provide Chiang with some fighter 
planes (C-W P-40s) to stage an air diversion over the Burma Road which might distract 
and delay Japan from its relentless advance on the European colonies of Southeast Asia. 
 
Herein lies the historical significance of air aid for China in the winter of 1940-1941: it 
was the Roosevelt Administration’s first experiment in military planning and revealed 
the limitations of the president, his cabinet and military advisers as strategic thinkers. 
They accepted the threat perception of an imminent Japanese attack on Singapore and 
believed that airpower could provide a quick fix to prevent it.  The AVG set the 
administration on a steep learning curve. The President had given himself the powers of 
a Commander in Chief but had no idea how to use them in an operational sense, as the 
entire AVG episode demonstrated. 
 
Dan Ford, the authority on the Flying Tigers, Martha Byrd the biographer of Chennault 
and a few other historians have acknowledged that Bruce Leighton presented the earliest 
concept of a ‘guerrilla air corps’ for China in January 1940.986 Lauchlin Currie, whom 
Roosevelt appointed to look after the AVG, also commented some years later that, ‘it 
appears very probable that the whole concept started with William Pawley, President of 
the Intercontinental Corporation.’987 Therefore in examining the origins of the AVG, it 
is logical to start with Intercontinent’s government relations in 1939-1940.  
 
Pawley and the State Department, September 1939 
 
In August 1939, the Department continued its efforts to persuade Dr. Kung to allow the 
Patterson contract to be fulfilled but Ambassador Johnson advised his colleagues in 
Washington that further interference would only provide Kung and Pawley with 
‘specious talking points for charges that the Embassy was intervening in an 
unreasonable and partisan manner on behalf of Patterson.’988  
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At the same time Bill Pawley went to Britain to hold talks with different government 
ministries about ferrying operations and assembly plants in Hong Kong or Burma.
 989
  
His discussions with British authorities were ill-timed: the outbreak of war in Europe 
raised anxiety about Hong Kong’s vulnerability to Japanese attack. On 7 September, 
1939 the Foreign Office decided that it would be too dangerous to allow Intercontinent 
to fly transport planes out of Hong Kong to Loiwing: the Japanese might try to intercept 
the plane and create an incident that the government was ‘at present more than ever 
anxious to avoid’.990   Its veto was finally communicated to the Governor of Hong Kong 
on 7 November, 1939.
991
 
  
In the first week of September 1939 Bill Pawley returned to the United States from 
Britain.
992
 He and his lawyer George Sellett still felt aggrieved by the State 
Department’s intervention on behalf of Pat Patterson. Before travelling back to the Far 
East later that month, they wanted to tell their side of the story to the officials most 
involved in aircraft trade with China.
993
 After seeing Joseph Green of the Arms Control 
Division, they arranged meetings with Stanley Hornbeck, Head of the Far East division 
on 26 September, 1939. 
 
 Pawley reproached the Department for its interference in the contract. He pointed out 
that for years the Ambassador in China, Nelson Johnson had told him that he and the 
Department wanted to be ‘as far removed as possible from any contact with or action 
regarding the activities of the competing American aircraft firms in China’994 Hornbeck 
replied that until problems arose with the Patterson contract, there had been no need for 
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intervention. He alleged that the Department based its actions on a considerable body of 
testimony and that its conduct had been entirely appropriate. In fact the Department also 
bore a grievance. Hornbeck felt that Sellett had not been ‘helpful to his country or to 
American business interests in general’ by voicing his resentment of the Department’s 
conduct in the Patterson affair.
995
 Government officials like businessmen were only 
human: Sellett and Pawley had not helped to create an ‘atmosphere of reciprocal 
friendliness’ nor a ‘favorable attitude’ on the part of the State Department towards 
them.
996
  
 
In the afternoon Sellett made an extraordinary admission. In his opinion the Chinese 
were wasting money on the purchase of aircraft: they would never be able to attain air 
superiority over the Japanese and had achieved very little through the possession of 
airplanes. Sellett had often told Dr. Kung that the Chinese could spend their money to 
greater advantage, with which Pawley nodded in agreement.
997
 Neither Pawley nor 
Sellett seemed aware of the impact which such a remark might have on officials who 
already believed that the ‘Pawley interests’ had not served the best interests of China. 
Furthermore arranging sales of aircraft had become a major instrument of foreign 
policy. Pawley and Sellett flew in the face of President Roosevelt’s conviction that the 
possession of large air fleets by France and England could act as a deterrent against 
Hitler. It was a kind of heresy – although entirely true-- to suggest that China’s 
acquisition of airplanes had been a waste of time and done nothing to deter Japan. 
 
On his own with Hornbeck, Pawley dwelled on the Department’s prejudice against him. 
He wanted the ‘confidence of his government’ and would welcome any suggestions 
from State as to how he could attain it. He felt that his sales to China, amounting to 
US$31 million, were a credit to his country. Pawley had new plans to extend operations 
into Latin America. When Hornbeck asked why the China market was not large enough, 
Pawley replied ‘no one could say what might happen to his business there if the 
Japanese have greater successes.’998  He repeated that the Chinese did not need planes 
and could spend their money to better advantage. Hornbeck suggested that ‘as a friend 
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of China’ Pawley should sell them something which they needed and Pawley replied 
that he planned to do just that:  he had arranged for permission to export certain 
commodities through Burma to China: he added somewhat cryptically ‘it was very 
gratifying to have that matter settled in that way.’  
 
Hornbeck regarded these conversations although ‘argumentative... as perfectly 
amicable’.999  Nonetheless this frank exchange with State Department officials revealed 
how ill at ease Pawley felt with his own government. Neither he nor Sellett overcame 
the poor impression which the Department had formed of them during the Patterson 
affair. Their encounter with State Department officials is all the more interesting when 
contrasted with Leighton’s successful lobbying of the Department of the Navy three 
months later. 
 
Bruce Leighton and the US Navy  
 
The idea of a mercenary air force for China harked back to 1939 when Dr. Kung had 
asked Intercontinent’s directors to seek planes and men for China. Bill Pawley, Bruce 
Leighton and C.T. Chien, head of the CoAA technical division, took part in this 
conversation with Dr. Kung: Chien in his memoir also referred to this discussion as the 
origin of the AVG.
1000
  
 
Several letters by Leighton to Pawley or C.T. Chien expand on the meeting with Dr. 
Kung. On 10 February 1943, he recalled Dr. Kung’s suggestion that, ‘the greatest 
service you could do for China would be to get some experienced American pilots to fly 
defence airplanes etc.’1001  In September 1944 Leighton also described this conversation 
in detail to Chien (then based in Washington) who hoped to write a history of the AVG 
for the Chinese government.
1002
 As Leighton recalled, after discussing business, the 
group turned to the problem of stopping Japanese bombardment. Bill Pawley asked how 
‘he and his organisation might be of service,’ to which Dr. Kung replied:  
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the greatest service which you can do to China – and to your own country if you but 
knew it, for your country cannot avoid war with Japan, if Japan’s present designs in 
China are permitted to succeed – is to convince your government that a free China is 
essential to the interest of the United States, that China must be permitted to obtain 
modern aircraft, and a nucleus of pilots and mechanics familiar with their operations, as 
the basis for developing a Chinese air force capable of coping with the Japanese. 
1003
 
 
Kung saw the mercenary air group based in China as a business venture for 
Intercontinent and a tactical operation for the Chinese government. According to 
Leighton, Kung hoped that the US government would allow CAMCO to employ 
American pilots in a training centre for the CAF in Western China, ‘as a continuation 
and extension of its long established commercial dealings with the Chinese 
government.’1004  
 
At the end of 1939 both Pawley and Leighton were in the United States. In a letter of 
February 1943, Leighton reminded Pawley that early in 1940, they had discussed how 
they would handle talks with the administration about this new proposal: they had ‘felt 
that at that stage of the matter it would be better that you [Pawley] not enter the 
discussion at the Navy Department.’1005  This was not entirely surprising in light of 
Pawley’s unsatisfactory relations with the State Department and Leighton’s close 
contacts with Navy colleagues.  
 
In China, Leighton had been Boswell to Pawley’s Johnson, but in Washington D.C., it 
was the reverse. Leighton was well connected there because of his exemplary 
government service. A graduate of the Naval Academy (1913), he was one of the 
earliest Naval pilots receiving his wings in 1915, as Aviator no.40. Thereafter he flew 
observation missions in World War I. He went on to work for fifteen years as a pilot, 
engineer and aide to the first Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, Edward P. 
Warner. In 1928 Leighton joined Wright Aeronautical as its first vice president for 
marketing, but never lost touch with the Navy. In his memoir, C.T. Chien commented 
not only on Leighton’s technical and tactical expertise but his ‘strong social ability’ and 
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capacity to get things done.
1006
  In Washington Leighton was the acceptable face of 
Intercontinent, particularly at the Navy Department. 
 
 In January 1940 Leighton paid his first call to Admiral Walter Stratton Anderson, the 
recently appointed Director of ONI.
1007
 Leighton discussed the situation in China with 
Anderson and two officers from the Far East section, Commander John M. Creighton 
and Danny Boone (Major Rodney A. Boone USMC).
1008
 Boone had been the regimental 
intelligence officer on the USS Augusta through much of the Shanghai Offensive.
1009
 He 
and Creighton corresponded frequently with James McHugh in 1938-1939. After his 
meeting with Anderson on 16 January 1940, Leighton prepared a memorandum which 
Anderson forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Harold R. 
Stark.
1010
 Boone also wrote up a report about the conversation with Leighton on 17 
January 1940 which provided more detail of Intercontinent’s activities than Leighton’s 
brief memorandum.
1011
  
 
According to Boone, Leighton described the capacity of the CAMCO plant at Loiwing 
factory as 200 planes per year. CAMCO was assembling 30 Hawk IIIs (under the 
August 1937 contract) and also had an order for 75 single-engine Vultee bombers, 50 P-
36s (Hawk-75-L) and 30 CW-21 Interceptors. Intercontinent also had ordered materials 
from the United States to build 60 Russian planes at a government factory at 
Chungking. Because of other commitments, however, its suppliers – principally Curtiss-
Wright -- could not provide parts to fill the China orders for at least 15 months: he was 
alluding to large French orders placed in 1939.
1012
 In the meantime the Loiwing factory 
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handled maintenance and repairs, there being some 450 engines in need of total 
overhaul. He admitted problems with transport: cargo came by river steamer on the 
Irrawaddy to Bhamo and then was transferred to a ‘rather poor’ 75 mile long road from 
there to Loiwing.  
 
At that time, the CAF fleet consisted of 100-200 pursuits and 50-100 bombers including 
Russian planes. Leighton suggested to Admiral Anderson that his company could base a 
separate air force at Loiwing: 160 planes consisting of 50 dive bombers, 50 twin engine 
bombers, 50 pursuits and ten transports. Intercontinent could ‘furnish, equip, maintain 
and supply with personnel this number of planes without any direct participation by the 
United States Government.’ Development of this ‘guerrilla air corps’ was just a matter 
of adding to existing personnel. Nonetheless it was critical for the US government to 
facilitate finance, procurement and recruitment. Thereafter it would be possible to 
maintain the air force for US$5 million a year. 
 
Leighton submitted a one-page memorandum for Admiral Stark which emphasised the 
strategic objective of his proposal – to organize a mobile air force for operations against 
Japanese waterborne supply lines.
1013
 In this respect, he reflected the cherished 
objectives of the Generalissimo as well as his air adviser Claire Chennault. Leighton 
suggested an air force of 210 planes – 100 pursuits, 100 bombers and ten transports. A 
staff could be organized and trained along western lines with a ‘fair proportion of 
Western-trained pilots in lead positions, say, 50 U.S. pilots’. American banks might 
finance credits of up to US$25 million for the project if US government agencies were 
willing to cooperate. Intercontinent could take care of all other arrangements under 
commercial contracts with the Chinese government ‘without any direct participation by 
the U.S. government.’ 
 
Having sketched out his programme for ONI, a week later Leighton presented it to the 
Navy General Board, an advisory group of senior officers, which had no authority over 
operations. As Leighton recollected in February 1943 the Board’s members expressed 
their ‘personal concurrence’ with his ideas: its secretary Captain Oscar Badger pointed 
out that several Naval officers who had served in the Pacific recommended that the US 
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make loans to China to help their development and keep China ‘as a friendly 
springboard for American activities in the event of trouble; none felt, however, that 
anything constructive could be done because of national policies.’1014 In a letter to 
Leighton dated 29 January 1940 the Board’s chairman Admiral Ernest King stated that 
‘we much enjoyed what you had to tell us of your background as to conditions in China 
when you were here some days ago.’1015   
 
In mid-February1940, Captain Robert Moulton – another old friend-- discussed 
Leighton’s ideas with Admiral Ghormley, the assistant CNO with whom Leighton later 
spent an hour or so giving him ‘both barrels’.1016 Ghormley in turn arranged for 
Leighton to see Admiral Stark.
1017
 Leighton had known ‘Betty’ Stark (his Naval 
Academy nickname) for years because they came from the same part of Pennsylvania: 
he had not ‘wangled an interview’ as Dan Ford has written; the door to the CNO was 
opened by Admiral Ghormley.
1018
  
 
Leighton had expected to see Stark alone, but on arrival found a gathering of some 
twenty officers.
1019
 Stark gave Leighton the floor to make roughly the same presentation 
as he had to the General Board.
1020
 At the end, Stark turned to Dan Callahan, 
Roosevelt’s Naval aide and suggested that he take the President a brief memorandum 
prepared by Leighton about his China proposal.
1021
 On a subsequent visit to 
Washington, Leighton saw Callahan who explained that he had done nothing about the 
China proposal but would keep him posted.
1022
 It is worth noting that in the first half of 
1940 the Secretary of the Navy was an interim appointee, Charles Edison, the son of 
Thomas Edison. Morton L. Deyo, a close friend of Leighton, was the aide to both 
Edison and his successor Colonel Frank Knox who took over in July 1940.
1023
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On 6 May1940 Leighton wrote a final memo for Oscar Badger, secretary of the Navy 
General Board. He described the groundwork for the special air unit which 
Intercontinent had already laid; it was shipping some 270 planes to China and could 
handle two to three times as many dismantled planes in the same manner.
1024
 His firm 
already had the means through existing personnel and facilities to receive a visiting 
force. All that was required were credits from private banks to allow a continuous 
program on a ‘purely spontaneous commercial basis, without direct formalised plans on 
the part of our government.’ 1025  
 
After these last submissions to friends in the Navy in May 1940, Leighton recalled that 
nothing much happened about the project until the autumn: he was involved in running 
a new Intercontinent assembly plant near Miami; Pawley left for China on 12 March 
1940 and returned on 22 July.
1026
  Foreign Office records in the National Archive reveal 
the most likely reasons why the trail went cold: the CAMCO plant at Loiwing posed 
mounting financial, logistical and strategic difficulties for Intercontinent. Pawley spent 
much of the spring and early summer of 1940 trying to find solutions to the problems 
with British authorities in Hong Kong, Rangoon and Delhi.  
 
 Pawley, Burma and India 1940 
 
Pawley became a familiar figure to British officials in Hong Kong and Whitehall during 
the course of 1937-1939 through a series of proposals to assemble or build aircraft in 
Hong Kong. In 1937-1938, the Cabinet Office withheld permission for any such 
operations in Hong Kong to avoid an adverse reaction from Japan. 
1027
 It had no 
objection, however, to a plant in Burma and hoped that eventually Pawley could be 
induced to establish one.
1028
 Nonetheless in 1939 the Prime Minister Neville 
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Chamberlain also imposed a ban on erecting military aircraft in Burma for export to 
China to avert Japanese displeasure.
 1029
 
 
At the end of May 1940 Pawley approached Sir Archibald Cochrane, Governor of 
Burma about diverting to Allied use 50 of the 77 Vultee long-range bombers which he 
had sold to Dr. Kung in October 1939.
1030
  Furthermore, if the British were interested in 
this initial order, he asserted that the Chinese government would be willing to share the 
Loiwing plant with the Burma government and possibly extend its capacity.
1031
  The 
Colonial Secretary asked Cochrane to pursue the matter with Pawley. Given the 
shortage of military aircraft in the Far East, the offer could not be turned down; the Air 
Ministry did not particularly like the Vultee bomber but suggested that it might be 
suitable for India.
1032
  
 
Pawley subsequently assured Cochrane that he was acting on behalf of the Chinese 
government to sell 50-100 Vultee bombers: the materials for the first fifty Vultees were 
already in transit. 
1033
 These could be manufactured at Loiwing and then delivered from 
mid-July 1941 onwards up to March 1942.
1034
 Pawley might also be able to offer 150-
200 fighters if the British Purchasing Mission in Washington could secure release of 
extra planes from their current orders. 
 
Pawley then made a second suggestion. An entirely new factory in Burma dedicated to 
British requirements in the Far East would be preferable to extending capacity at 
Loiwing: he considered labour conditions in Burma were ‘favourable for manufacture 
of aeroplanes.’1035 His proposal suited the Foreign Office which for some time had 
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wanted to exploit Rangoon as an alternative to Hong Kong for aviation facilities.
1036
 
Recent events had heightened anxiety about air defence in the Far East. Pre-occupied by 
the threat of Japanese aggression, officials appear not to have probed the reasons for this 
unexpected offer from the Chinese government. They may have been aware that Chiang 
had given up on his own air force: in February 1939 R.S. Aitken, the British air attaché 
had reported a remark by Chiang: ‘we have had to do without a Navy, we would be 
better without a rotten Air Force.’1037  In offering planes which had only just been 
ordered, the Chinese government reflected this loss of confidence in the CAF. 
Numerous military attaché reports in this period confirmed the abysmal state of the air 
force in 1937-1940. 
 
When Pawley offered Vultees to the governor of Burma in June 1940 the British 
government had already come under pressure from Japan to suspend all arms shipments 
to China via rail, river or road from Hong Kong and Rangoon: all modes of delivering 
materiel into China were collectively known as the Burma Road. Unable to fight a war 
on two fronts, Churchill complied with the Japanese demand and closed the Burma 
Road from 18 July to 18 October 1940.  The suspension of deliveries could not have 
come at a worse time for Intercontinent as it would delay output at Loiwing by at least 
three months. Furthermore if or when the Burma Road reopened, the Japanese almost 
certainly would bomb the factory.
1038
 In late September D.T. Monteath of the Burma 
Office in Whitehall regarded Loiwing as a ‘moribund concern.’1039 
 
An indication of Pawley’s anxiety about Loiwing was the pursuit of new business in 
India. In July 1940 he and Sellett flew to Delhi to discuss a joint venture proposed the 
previous year by Walchand Hirachand: Walchand and Pawley had met by chance on the 
China clipper from California to Hong Kong: by the end of the trip they allegedly had 
drafted an agreement for an aircraft factory in India.
 1040
  When Pawley returned to the 
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United States in mid-July1940, Sellett pursued the negotiations, shuttling back and forth 
between Delhi and Loiwing until the end of the year.
1041
   
 
On 21 August 1940 the newly appointed Secretary of State for India, Leo Amery 
presented to the British War Cabinet full details of the Pawley -Walchand factory 
scheme.
1042
 The Government of India had been ‘impressed by Mr. Pawley’s 
enterprise… and by his achievements at Loiwing under conditions of far greater 
difficulty than exist in India.’1043 If restrictions on delivery of military supplies to China 
remained in force, then Mr Pawley ‘may well be obliged to transfer his energies 
elsewhere; and it is considered that his ability and experience would be a great asset to 
India and to the Empire as a whole.’1044 The contrast between Pawley’s standing with 
British authorities and his own government could not have been more sharply drawn. 
 
On 4 September the War Cabinet decided to withhold approval for the India factory. 
Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Aircraft Production (M.A.P) commented that the British 
government had contracted for every available engine which it could obtain from the 
United States: if the project for India went through, it would absorb engines needed for 
air frames already on order. Ministers agreed, however, to reconsider the Walchand-
Pawley proposal in two months’ time.1045  
 
On 22 September 1940 the government of India discovered more about the Walchand-
Pawley scheme: Pawley planned to supply it with half of the 300 planes ordered 
recently for the Chinese government: 60 CW Hawk-75s; 70 CW 21 interceptors; 110 
Vultee ‘12D’ bombers; 60 Harlow trainers.1046 Officials also discovered why the 
Chinese government was willing to sell planes to India through Pawley:  the Chinese 
government had ‘failed to meet their cash obligations towards Mr. Pawley and ..for that 
reason Mr Pawley ...has been able to persuade the Chinese to forgo to a considerable 
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extent their claims upon him’.1047  Nonetheless the British government were uneasy 
about depriving the Chinese of planes for resisting Japan.
1048
 Rather than approach the 
Chinese government directly, they preferred to ask Pawley for verification, as he had 
conducted the negotiations in the first place.
1049
 
 
Loiwing was a white elephant, unsatisfactory as a production facility and a drain on the 
resources of Pawley and the Chinese government. In mid October 1940 its vulnerability 
to Japanese attack was also confirmed. As soon as the Burma Road reopened on 18 
October Japanese bombers flew over Loiwing and a week later returned in an attempt to 
destroy it.
1050
 Mamie Porritt wrote to her husband that on 26 October 35 Japanese 
airplanes dropped 150 bombs on the complex.
1051
 Fortunately the main factory building 
was left untouched although several workshops and 120 houses for the Chinese workers 
were demolished.
1052
 Therefore, as Bruce Leighton wrote to his brother Delmar on 21 
December 1940, factory operations continued in spite of the visit by Japanese 
bombers.
1053
 Since the machine tools were undamaged, the factory could be recreated 
elsewhere. 
 
The bombing of CAMCO solved problems for Chiang’s regime, the British government 
and Intercontinent. Up to that point the British government had adhered to the 
prohibition on assembling planes in British territory and flying them into China; they 
also had been in two minds about Pawley’s proposed sale of Chinese planes to the 
government of India. Because of the Japanese attack on CAMCO, however, the Foreign 
office had sound reasons to seek repeal of the Cabinet Office restriction on erecting 
military planes in British territory and ferrying them to China.
1054
 The Foreign Office 
now saw an opportunity to gain credit with the Chinese by helping them out with 
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assembly operations. Finally the Government of India had less trouble persuading the 
War Cabinet to approve the Pawley-Walchand scheme for its own aircraft supply: air 
defence had become vital to Far East security:  the new Indian Air Force needed planes 
which Pawley could supply without depriving other theatres of combat planes. The 
Vultees were considered suitable for India – better than nothing at all.  
 
On 20 November the government of India ordered 24 Vultees and 30 Harlow trainers 
for the Walchand-Pawley plant: it would ‘welcome transfer of whole or part of Loiwing 
plant to India’.1055 At the very end of December 1940 the Government of Burma also 
gave Intercontinent permission to erect seventy-two planes at the Mingaladon airfield 
next to Rangoon for the CAF (six Condors for air freight between Kunming and Lashio, 
the rest trainers).
1056
 On 4 January 1941 British authorities formally sanctioned the 
removal of the machinery from CAMCO at Loiwing to India and granted permission for 
Chinese pilots to ferry planes back to China.
1057
  Pawley, who had cultivated British 
officials for several years, had built a solid foundation for future relations with colonial 
authorities as well as departments in Whitehall. 
 
British diplomats informed State Department officials about the transfer of the Loiwing 
plant to Bangalore on 24 December 1940, expressing confidence that the Americans 
would welcome these decisions.
1058
 There is no evidence that the State Department had 
followed Pawley’s negotiations about the two factory projects during 1940. Nor did 
anyone at the time comment on the inherent contradiction in Chinese conduct: on the 
one hand Dr. Kung hoped to sell off up to half of the 300 planes which he had recently 
ordered from Intercontinent while at the same time the Roosevelt Administration sought 
to sell the Chinese a comparable number of combat planes.  
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Chinese and American approaches to air aid 
 
In the autumn of 1940 it became evident that Chiang no longer wanted to build up and 
maintain his own air force. The small mobile air unit which Leighton discussed with the 
Navy was also not exactly what the Generalissimo had in mind. He sought massive 
official air assistance from the United States and the United Kingdom to replace Russian 
air assistance which Stalin was gradually withdrawing from China. In numerous 
memoranda submitted to the State Department in November –December 1940, Chiang 
called for a ‘special air unit’ manned by British and American pilots and comprising at 
least 500 planes which could help to check the Japanese southward advance on the Far 
East colonies of Britain, France and the Netherlands.
1059
 ‘This striking force…which 
could be based near the coast would, by its threat to Japan proper, Formosa and their 
newly acquired base in Hainan, act as a most effective deterrent to Japanese designs on 
Singapore and Dutch East Indies.’1060 Chiang stressed the impact which the bombing of 
Japan proper would have on ‘Japanese psychology’ given the strain and privation 
experienced by its people who had been promised that the ‘Chinese adventure’ would 
only last a few months.  
 
Chiang suggested that American and British planes could be assembled in Rangoon or 
India -- a reflection of recent agreements secured by Bill Pawley with the British 
government. From Burma or India, planes could be flown to airbases in China or 
transported from Rangoon by water to the Chinese border and assembled there. The 
Generalissimo appealed to both the British and American governments for immediate 
action to create these squadrons in time to fend off a Japanese advance on Singapore in 
the spring of 1941. Through November and December 1940 Soong pressed State 
Department officials as well as British diplomats in Washington for a response to 
Chiang’s demands for a triple alliance and massive air assistance. He described the air 
assistance plan as ‘a British-American air force to operate in China in the interest of the 
Chungking Government.’1061   
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The Roosevelt Administration had no intention of complying with Chiang’s grandiose 
plan for international air aid but there were elements of Chiang’s thinking that struck 
home.  Roosevelt very likely read Chiang’s memorandum that day for he called 
Morgenthau to express his concern about China – the deterioration of the political 
situation as well as its currency.
1062
 The President wanted the RFC to organize within 
twenty-four hours a stabilisation loan of US$100 million. 
1063
 
 
In a Cabinet meeting on Friday 29 November Roosevelt and his colleagues discussed 
the proposed Stabilisation Loan as well as the possible use of airplanes by China against 
Japan. In his diary, Harold Ickes echoed the words of the memo submitted by Soong.
1064
  
With airplanes, the Chinese could inflict great damage on Japan: they had airfields 
within striking range of Japan; if Japan experienced ‘incendiary bombs rained’ on cities 
built of wood, its people would know what war meant in a manner that nothing else 
could do.
1065
 The fantasy of raining fire on Japan’s cities from mainland China went 
back many years to a proposal for T.V. Soong by George Westervelt in March 1932.
1066
  
In his memoir, Chennault also mentioned his plan for ‘fire-bomb attacks on the teeming 
bamboo ant heaps of Honshu and Kyushu.’1067   
 
Cabinet members betrayed ill-founded prejudices in promoting a plan to bomb Japan 
from the Chinese mainland. As Ickes pointed out, they presumed without question that 
the Japanese were ‘naturally poor air men’:  
 
They cannot cope with the fliers of other nations, and the opinion was that China could get all of 
the American fliers it could use.  In connection with this, and the talk of credits of $100 million 
to China, one member of the Cabinet said that Great Britain was willing to advance $60 million 
to China. It looks as if we were getting around to the point of really helping China and perhaps 
even supplying it with some bombers.
1068
 
 
If Cabinet members had ever read intelligence reports about the state of the CAF or its 
airfields, they ignored them: they wanted to believe that China could become the base 
for a limited strategic offensive against Japan to keep it from attacks on Singapore and 
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the Dutch East Indies. In December1940 the projection of airpower into China became 
part of Roosevelt’s strategy of deterrence towards Japan. 
 
As arm-chair strategists, Roosevelt and his colleagues had not given much thought to 
execution. They conceived of air aid to China, strictly in terms of airplane sales. Since 
there was a shortage of planes to serve everyone’s requirements, it was far from clear 
how planes for China would be sourced, manned and deployed. When the 
administration sold equipment to Britain there was no question that the RAF could fly 
and maintain American planes.  Neither Roosevelt nor his Cabinet members with the 
exception of Navy Secretary Frank Knox took fully into account the current state of 
Chiang’s air force. They assumed that the CAF would be able to handle whatever planes 
were on offer with some help from American advisers. Finally, in contemplating the 
sale of some bombers or combat planes to China, the administration did not take into 
consideration the impact which the diversion of aircraft to China might have on 
America’s principal ally, Great Britain.  
 
Roosevelt and Plane Aid to Britain 
 
In describing Roosevelt as Commander in Chief, the historian William Emerson 
commented, ‘from the Munich crisis onwards, Roosevelt pursued a diplomacy of 
deterrence in which military appearances, including aid to allies, were no less important, 
in many respects were more important, than military realities.’1069  In the aftermath of 
the Munich crisis, faith in a show of force rather than the use of force informed 
Roosevelt’s concept of airpower. Roosevelt came to the view that air superiority gave 
Hitler both a psychological and strategic advantage over his European neighbours: if the 
allies had air fleets to match the Luftwaffe, they would impress and deter Hitler.
1070
  
Equipped with American arms and aircraft, they might even fight as ‘America’s proxy’ 
against Nazi Germany.
1071
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Roosevelt regarded airplane sales as the principal contribution of the United States to 
Britain’s war effort. Furthermore, aircraft exports to allies could subsidize the expansion 
of the US aircraft industry at no extra cost to taxpayers.
1072
 Finally sales to allies were to 
take precedence over US military procurement because Britain and France were 
America’s first line of defence.1073  As the historian Mark Watson has pointed out, ‘the 
President’s whole emphasis was upon airplanes. There was none whatever on an air 
force…the airplanes were, in his mind, principally destined not for the US Army Air 
Corps (USAAC) but for direct purchase by the air forces of Great Britain and 
France.’1074 When military planners showed the President a chart revealing the impact 
of air aid to Britain on the USAAC, he waved them aside with a brusque ‘Don’t let me 
see that again.’1075  
 
In foreign and military policy, Roosevelt tended to dispense with the details. As George 
Marshall noted, the president was easily bored: all data had to be put on one piece of 
paper with ‘a few pungent sentences of description.’ Once his interest was intrigued, 
however, there was no limit to his interest as Marshall observed.
1076
  Roosevelt was also 
fully capable of hiding his convictions while maintaining another stance in public. He 
delegated project management to others, particularly Henry Morgenthau Jr, whom he 
described as his right hand – although apparently he stated that he ‘kept his left hand 
under the table.’1077 
 
In 1938 Morgenthau began to liaise with French and British purchasing agents on an ad 
hoc basis. Through an executive order, Roosevelt discreetly allowed them access to the 
latest combat planes including the C-W P-40, thus circumventing objections from the 
USAAC and the isolationist Secretary of War Harry Woodring about releasing anything 
but obsolete planes for export.
1078
 In July 1939 Roosevelt extended his authority as 
Commander in Chief by invoking a little known presidential power, the Military Order, 
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which allowed him to extend his control over aircraft procurement and production 
policy.
 1079
 In January 1940 he set up the President’s Liaison Committee headed by 
Philip Young to work with Morgenthau on the coordination of production and sales of 
planes to France and Britain.
1080
  
 
After the Fall of France, the principle was established that Britain and the United States 
would share American aircraft output, although in practice priority was given to Britain. 
In July 1940 The New York Times succinctly referred to the entire policy of air 
assistance for Britain as ‘plane aid’.1081  
 
In July 1940 passage of the National  Defense Act provided the means to expand US 
procurement in earnest. It also enabled the President’s Liaison Committee to suspend or 
divert any British orders for American defence if the President deemed it necessary.
1082
 
Armed with this new power to interfere in established contracts, Roosevelt and his 
cabinet began to manipulate aircraft sales for different objectives.  In particular, he and 
Hull wanted to use small aircraft sales to show moral support for weaker allies such as 
China and Greece.  There was a shortage, however, of planes to serve the needs of all 
allies as well as the US military:  up to the autumn of 1940 the USAAC on average had 
received only one plane for every two sent to Britain.
1083
  The American military had 
started to resent the priority which Britain was awarded on scarce supplies of modern 
combat planes and was unwilling to give up any planes to ‘lesser’ allies such as China 
or Greece. Therefore ‘plane aid’ became a zero sum game: to pay Chiang or Metaxas, 
Roosevelt had to rob from Churchill, that is, to take planes from British allocations. 
 
British P-40s for Greece and China 
 
Historians have tended to presume that the British agreed to divert a hundred P-40s to 
China because they recognised the urgency of getting planes to China. In his memoirs, 
Claire Chennault asserted, that Britain was ‘glad to exchange the P-40B for a model 
                                                     
1079
 Emerson, ‘Roosevelt’, p.183 
1080
 H.Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London,19455), p.83 
1081
 NYT ‘Morgenthau hails British Plane Aid’ 26/7/40  
1082
 Hall, Supply, p.165 
1083
 My estimate based on figures provided by Holley, Buying Aircraft p.555 and LOC, 
Morgenthau Reel 27, Book 324, ‘Summary of Orders of the British Empire, October 12, 1940’,  
p.180 
222 
 
more suitable for combat’ at a later date. 1084 The notion that the British were willing to 
give up planes for China, however, does not stand up to scrutiny:  in the winter of 1940-
1941, the British urgently needed every plane available for spring campaigns in the 
eastern Mediterranean. British archives reveal the indignation of British officials who 
came under pressure from Morgenthau and Philip Young to give up planes.
1085
 Months 
later, the  British were still incensed by the diversion of planes to China and looked for 
a way to regain access to them. In February 1941 they found the solution: British and 
Chinese officials decided that the P-40 squadrons would be based in Burma rather than 
Yunnan and unofficially incorporated into the colony’s air defence.  
 
To meet the President’s demands for aircraft sales to Greece and China, Morgenthau 
and Young asked representatives of the British Air Commission (BAC) to release 
planes from deliveries in the near term while promising them compensation from future 
production for which the British also had to pay immediately. As the British needed 
every plane possible, they felt that they had no option but to comply. 
  
Whenever Curtiss-Wright alerted the government to an increase in output, Young and 
Morgenthau wanted orders to be placed as quickly as possible to allow manufacturers 
adequate lead time to secure materials for production.  As soon as Young informed 
British officials of additional output, they booked the P-40s. In mid-November 1940 
Philip Young learned that CW could produce an additional hundred P-40s starting in 
mid-1941. The BAC hoped to acquire the entire lot but Young asked officials to take 
only fifty on the understanding that the administration would distribute the rest to South 
American countries for ‘political reasons.’1086 On 21 November Curtiss-Wright let it be 
known that it could raise P-40 production to 194 in the following summer. Young then 
applied pressure to secure planes for Greece: if the BAC would agree to release to the 
Greeks 30 to 50 P-40s from current shipments, the administration would increase the 
British allocation of P-40s in the summer of 1941 from 50 to 80.
1087
  The Greeks 
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lobbied daily for airplanes and on 20 November Roosevelt promised to offer them up to 
60 P-40s which they were to obtain through the BAC.
1088
  
 
At the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) Lord Beaverbrook declared that ‘tactical 
considerations’ would not allow the diversion of P-40s to Greece.1089 Young, however, 
countered that up to 23 November 1940 Britain had received 296 P-40s whereas the 
Army Air Corps had received only seven. The State Department became thoroughly 
‘annoyed’ by Britain’s unwillingness to cooperate, reminding British diplomats in 
Washington that it was ‘the President’s most positive desire that these thirty planes be 
released to the Greek Government.’1090  
 
The BAC gave MAP the gist of how the US government hoped to embarrass the British 
into handing over the planes for Greece: 
Everyone in the Administration is doing all possible to help the British and will continue to do 
so despite the various legal and other difficulties, and they all feel that in this small way, the 
British should be willing to cooperate in supporting the American foreign policy. The President 
and the State Department have apparently great belief in the moral and psychological effect that 
could be obtained from a statement that the United States and Great Britain were assisting 
Greece by a release of aircraft production capacity by the former, and a deferment of immediate 
deliveries by the latter. 
1091
 
 
The British hoped that some ‘alternative gesture of support’ could be worked out, 
proposing at one point that thirty Defiant planes already in the Middle East might be 
sent to Greece even though, as they pointed out, thirty would not form even one 
squadron.
1092
 The deadlock over Greek planes continued into January1941. Within 
weeks, however, the administration used similar tactics to induce the British to release 
P-40s to China, giving rise to another test of the special relationship. By 3 December 
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Philip Young had offered the Chinese Delegation up to 50 C-W P-40s which 
unbeknownst to the British would have to come from their orders.
1093
   
 
Bombers or fighters for China 
 
The United States was in no position to offer Chiang  the 500-1000 planes which he 
claimed were essential for deterring Japan from attacks on European colonies in 
Southeast Asia. On 8 December Morgenthau told Soong that asking for 500 planes was 
like asking for 500 stars.
1094
  Nonetheless he thought it might be possible to sell China 
three or four long-range bombers and train crews in the United States so that the 
Chinese could use them ‘to bomb Tokio and other big cities.’1095 Morgenthau believed 
that he could hire a crew within a month or so to fly the bombers; he had the backing of 
the president and fellow cabinet members for this plan. Hull also turned out to be an 
advocate although he wondered how the bombs would reach China in time. Morgenthau 
saw no problem in having the planes flown to China via Hawaii and the Philippines.
1096
 
He  had no idea that the Flying Fortress had not yet made this trip of nearly 10,000 
miles: the Army did not attempt a test flight between San Francisco and Honolulu until 
May 1941 and from there to Manila only in the following September.
1097
 
 
Morgenthau passed on Chiang’s various memoranda to the President, who was ‘simply 
delighted, particularly with the one about the bombers.’1098 On 18 December Roosevelt 
stated that he had been dreaming about this for years and proposed that ‘the four of you 
work out a program,’ referring to Morgenthau, Hull, Knox and Stimson.1099 Roosevelt 
turned to Knox and asked ‘how about that long distance bomber that you have? How 
about the Admiral of the Fleet? He has a four-engine bomber. Does he need that?’1100  
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Morgenthau mentioned his idea to the British Ambassador Lord Lothian, who initially 
expressed some enthusiasm. After consulting the Foreign office, however, Lothian 
considered such a scheme impracticable and likely to provoke strong Japanese 
retaliation.
1101
 Roosevelt and his Cabinet colleagues for some reason had never 
considered the possibility of a strong Japanese reaction if the Chinese attempted to 
bomb the homeland with Flying Fortresses.
1102
 The only inference to be drawn is that 
they were convinced that Japan would capitulate if heavily bombed – just as Chiang had 
suggested in his memo of 28 November. 
 
Distracted by his ‘hush-hush thing’ to secure bombers for China, Morgenthau let other 
matters slip.
1103
 On 12 December Curtiss-Wright had informed Philip Young that it 
could now raise estimated output for summer 1941 from 194 to 300 P-40s.
1104
 On 14 
December BAC representatives expressed their interest in acquiring all 300 planes for 
US$14 million although they would have preferred the US Army to place the order 
because their cash reserves were starting to run low.
1105
  
 
On Friday 20 December Morgenthau discussed the distribution of this new capacity 
with Frank Knox. On hearing that there were now 300 P-40s, Knox exclaimed: ‘Well, 
by God, we ought to grab some of those for the Chinese.’ Morgenthau pointed out that 
Britain had enough engines for all 300 planes – owing to the cancellation of a contract 
with Lockheed, but there were other suitors from Latin America, China and Greece 
whose claim to P-40s had yet to be settled.
1106
  
 
Stimson was considerably more cautious about sending bombers to China than 
Morgenthau: he regarded such a plan as typical of Chinese strategy rather than ‘well-
thought-out American strategy.’1107 In order to ‘get some mature brains into it’ Stimson 
invited the Army chief of staff General George Marshall to a meeting with Morgenthau 
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and Knox:  they met at Stimson’s house on Sunday 22 December. Marshall was 
opposed to the release of any bombers which he felt could be put to better use by the 
British. He reasoned that it would make more sense for the British to give up some of 
their pursuit ships to the Chinese than to forgo bombers. Thereafter Morgenthau agreed 
to work on airpower plans for China with Marshall.
1108
  
 
On the morning of 23 December Hull held a meeting with Knox, Morgenthau, Stimson 
and their chiefs of staff to discuss the future allocation of the 300 P-40s. Hull proposed 
that the Greeks should eventually receive 30, South American countries 120 while the 
Chinese would take 150. South America was quickly dismissed as of low priority since 
the war was in Europe and the Far East. General Marshall felt that the planes should be 
allocated in such a way ‘as to do the most good psychologically.’1109 There was a 
consensus that the Chinese should receive pursuit ships before bombers. All agreed that 
the 300 P-40s ought to be equally divided between the Chinese and British but the 
Chinese should take immediate delivery of their share. As delivery to China would have 
to be done at the expense of Britain, they agreed that the British should give up a 
hundred planes due to be shipped over the course of January to March 1941 and 
compensated with the full 300 planes due to be manufactured in the summer of 
1941.
1110
 
 
Later that day, Morgenthau met with Sir Henry Self, head of the BAC. According to 
Self’s report to MAP, Morgenthau made ‘strong representations’ to the effect that the 
British should immediately place orders for all 300 Hawks because the US government 
did not have the means to finance the contract for the Army Air Corps.
1111
  Worse was 
to come. In a second meeting that day with Morgenthau, Stimson, Knox and Hull, Self 
learned that ‘the request for immediate diversion to China is a condition of the release 
of the order for the 300 aircraft.’ 1112 Morgenthau wanted the British to give up 100 P-
40s to China from current deliveries at the rate of 50 in January 25 in February and 25 
in March. The bargain demanded by Morgenthau was the same as that involved in 
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diverting British planes to Greece the month before: if the British wanted a monopoly 
on future output of P-40s, then they had to fall in line with the President’s foreign policy 
objectives. The British would lose planes scheduled for delivery within a few weeks’ 
time and would be of pocket for planes which were not to be shipped for at least another 
7-8 months.  
 
At a final meeting with Self on 23 December Morgenthau stated that the President gave 
his blessing to the diversion of a hundred planes for China in January-March 1941. He 
and Philip Young portrayed the arrangement as beneficial to Britain which it patently 
was not.
1113
 Young stated that in the long run, the British would receive ‘2 planes for 
every one that you give up’ to which Self replied ‘that is a very welcome statement.’1114 
Self wanted it to go on the record, however, that authorisation was required from 
London, that Morgenthau acknowledged the need for London’s approval and that he 
had asked for this arrangement on behalf of the Chinese government. If officials in 
London did not give their permission, Morgenthau would have to reconsider the 
ultimate destiny of these planes. Morgenthau’s response to this suggestion is scrambled 
in the transcript.
1115
  
 
The British cabinet did not immediately give its approval for the release of the planes. 
From late December 1940 to early January the Foreign Office and other ministries 
resisted pressure to sacrifice the P-40s.  On 3 January Arthur Purvis and Morris Wilson 
strongly urged Morgenthau to withdraw his request but the latter was adamant: he, the 
President, Hull and Secretary of War Henry Stimson had promised a hundred P-40s to 
the Chinese and ‘the commitment had to be honoured.’1116  The President had also 
pledged sixty P-60s to Greece: Purvis and Wilson emphasised that it would be ‘very 
disturbing’ if the administration looked to the British for help in settling this 
commitment as well.  
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Purvis explained ‘really off the record’ how the British were building up supplies of P-
40s for squadrons to be used in the Middle East and North Africa: fifty planes were 
already being shipped to Takoradi (Western Ghana) where they would be assembled 
and flown to Khartoum.
1117
 By drawing Morgenthau into his confidence, Purvis hoped 
to make him understand that the British were ‘coming into an active campaign. They are 
genuinely worried about loss of planes in the very critical three months that we talked 
about,’ referring to the diversion of P-40s in January-March 1941.  
 
Morgenthau reminded Purvis that the Administration regarded the ‘Far East thing’ as 
critical by which he meant a threat to Singapore. Hence he was ‘very anxious’ to give a 
hundred P-40s to the Chinese.
1118
 On the face of it, this connection between planes for 
China and Japan’s imminent attack on Singapore may not have seemed entirely logical 
to Purvis and Wilson. Morgenthau insisted, however, that he had to get something to the 
Chinese immediately. It is important to understand what Morgenthau had in mind when 
he made the case for diverting British planes to deal a crisis in the Far East.  
 
The threat to Singapore and air aid for China 
 
Ever since the Japanese had joined the Axis pact and encroached on northern Indochina, 
there had been speculation that they would move against Singapore with the blessing if 
not the direct support of Germany.
1119
  As Herbert Feis describes, the warnings came 
from all angles, from the Chinese as well as the British who were sending all their ships 
and planes to the Middle East and had nothing to spare for the Far East: Churchill and 
Eden were anxious for Roosevelt to express his ‘will to deter Japan.’1120  
 
In the second half of 1940 Chiang or T.V. Soong issued frequent warnings about the 
Japanese threat to Singapore and other European colonies.
1121
 Chiang associated the 
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need for air assistance closely with the objective of distracting and deterring Japan from 
its southward advance. On 12 December he wrote to Roosevelt and reminded him of the 
‘proposals for an air force for China to prevent the spreading of the war to Southern 
Asia’ and in view of the urgency of the situation, asked the President for a response as 
soon as possible.
1122
 On 16 December he followed up with a letter directly to 
Morgenthau stressing that ‘to cope with the threat on Singapore it is necessary for us to 
carry the war into Japan proper’, for which Chiang wanted the latest Flying 
Fortresses.
1123
 
 
In the winter of 1940-1941, American officials also received reports about a planned 
Japanese attack on Singapore from the US Ambassador in Thailand, Hugh Grant.  If the 
Japanese had free access to Thailand, then its troops could walk into Malaysia. Grant 
suggested that Thailand had already fallen under the Japanese sphere of influence since 
Japan had assisted the Thai government in its border dispute with Indochina. Through 
the winter of 1940-1941 Grant fed the State Department strong warnings about Thai-
Japanese cooperation including massive air assistance by Japan: on 28 November1940  
he had heard from a reliable source about a secret Thai-Japan military alliance in line 
with ‘the New Order in East Asia’; on 1 December thirteen Japanese bombers arrived in 
Bangkok to replace the dive bombers which the US government had retained for its own 
use in the Philippines; on 13 December a Thai-Japanese pact was signed. 
1124
  
 
Roosevelt was sufficiently exercised over the Japanese menace to Southeast Asia that 
on 31 December 1940 he told his special envoy to Japan, Francis B. Sayre, ‘if Japan, 
moving further southward, should gain possession of the region of the Netherlands East 
Indies and the Malay Peninsula, would not the chances of Germany’s defeating Great 
Britain be increased...? Would we be rendering every assistance possible to Great 
Britain were we to give our attention wholly and exclusively to the problems of the 
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immediate defence of the British Isles and of Britain’s control of the Atlantic?’ 1125 The 
answer was no, but Roosevelt was cautious about openly confirming his commitment to 
protect British interests in the Far East if attacked by Japan. In London the new British 
Foreign Minister Antony Eden pressed Harry Hopkins repeatedly about what the United 
States would do if Japan attacked Singapore or the Dutch East Indies, as ‘it was 
essential to their policy to know.’1126 No clear statement was forthcoming from the 
White House or the State Department. 
 
For months Chiang repeated the message: bombers were needed to divert the Japanese 
from their planned attack on Singapore. He had two possible motives: either he had 
genuine intelligence about an imminent Japanese assault on Malaya or he believed that 
the President would give him a large air force if he was persuaded that in the near term a 
threat to Singapore existed. The latter seems most likely in light of a key factor in 
Anglo-American relations. As the historian Frederick Marks has explored in some 
depth, Roosevelt is alleged to have extended a strategic guarantee to Churchill against 
Japan as early as the spring of 1940:  if Japan threatened Britain’s Far East possessions, 
the United States would provide military support to defend them.
1127
 Marks found 
evidence that this American pledge of assistance was a prerequisite for Churchill’s 
decision to re-open the Burma Road.
1128
   
 
In the New Year, the repeated warnings from Chiang and from Hugh Grant took hold:  
Roosevelt seemed to be convinced that the Japanese would soon attack Singapore and 
the British would expect the United States to come to their defence in the Far East. This 
was a commitment which Roosevelt wanted to avoid at all costs, while he tried to nurse 
the Lendlease Act through Congress. Isolationists were convinced that Roosevelt sought 
such legislation in order to take the country to war on behalf of his allies. Faced with the 
political threat to Lendlease and the strategic threat to Singapore, he and his cabinet 
wanted to use China to create a diversion that might throw Japan off track from 
advancing upon Malaya.  
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Stimson and General Marshall prevailed over Morgenthau to oppose the release of 
bombers to China, but recommended instead the release of P-40s from the British 
allocation for Chiang. Once bombers were ruled out, the Cabinet and their military 
advisers came up with the idea to which Morgenthau alluded in his meeting with Purvis 
and Wilson on 3 January 1941. Morgenthau stated that ‘this whole thing started with the 
President’ and other members of the Cabinet and their staff came in on the decision 
which was not a ‘thing lightly arrived at’: ‘The President is determined that China get 
something at this time and he has the full backing of his military advisers.’1129  
 
Gradually the rationale for Morgenthau’s demands began to emerge. The Chinese 
needed pursuit planes ‘to keep that Road open and keep the [Japanese] fellows 
occupied’: Hong Kong and Singapore, he insisted, were at stake. He continued: ‘this 
isn’t an idle gesture. It means a diversion as far as the Japanese are concerned. I can’t 
weigh the military thing, but I know that after very very careful consideration, this is 
what Mr. Roosevelt wants, with the complete backing of the Secretary of State and the 
Army and Navy’.1130  
 
In these snatches of conversation, Morgenthau provided an insight into the strategic 
thinking of the President and his cabinet:  they wanted to use the CAF to patrol the 
Burma Road, not so much to protect it but to attract Japanese squadrons to attack the 
CAF: in their view a display of airpower over the Burma Road would divert these 
Japanese ‘fellows’ and delay their plans to advance on Singapore. Having presumed that 
the Japanese were ‘not naturally airmen’ they may have believed that the CAF equipped 
with modern planes and trained by American instructors would have more than a 
fighting chance to match if not overwhelm the enemy and discourage the Japanese from 
heading south.  
 
In response, Purvis and Wilson could not provide an opinion ‘from the supply level’ 
about the risk of a Japanese attack on Hong Kong or Singapore. As they did not have an 
appreciation from the British General Staff and had to rely on Morgenthau’s conviction 
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about the threat level, they felt unable to assess the seriousness of the situation for 
which Morgenthau so urgently required the planes.  
 
The urgency with which Morgenthau pressed the British to release the P-40s was so at 
odds with the government’s traditional policy of withholding military aid for China that 
something fairly momentous must have accounted for it. On 16 December Chiang had 
written directly to Morgenthau about the intelligence which the Chinese had gathered 
about a synchronised attempt by the Axis powers on Gibraltar, Suez and Singapore in 
the spring of 1941: this provided the geopolitical argument for his airpower 
demands.
1131
  On 4 January 1941 Hugh Grant reported that even though definite proof 
was lacking, there were indications of steady infiltration by Japanese troops who were 
paving the way for eventually controlling Thailand and using it as a base of operations 
against Singapore. Japan and Thailand had also closed a barter deal involving 400 
Japanese planes and 300 advisers in return for Thai strategic supplies.
1132
   Grant’s 
reports from Thailand may well have influenced Hull, Morgenthau and other Cabinet 
members to believe that Japan was on the verge of moving into Thailand and heading 
for Singapore. Therefore  Morgenthau and his cabinet colleagues came up with the idea 
of manoeuvring the Chinese into creating a distraction over the Burma Road. In theory 
the presence of squadrons formed of American fighter planes would baffle and distract 
Japan. If China could throw Japan off track from its southern course, the diversion 
would help Roosevelt to avoid the commitment which he had made to Churchill, that is, 
to send the US Navy to the rescue of Singapore if the Japanese threatened an offensive 
against it. 
 
Through this period, there were discreet Anglo-American staff talks taking place in 
Washington in preparation for more formal secret discussions between the United 
States, Britain and Canada about American cooperation in the event of US entry into the 
war. With ‘Plan Dog’, Admiral Stark had already established that the Navy should be 
deployed to the Atlantic to protect British shipping. The problem of the US Navy’s role 
in the Pacific and specifically its deployment to Singapore remained unresolved and 
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was the subject of considerable discussion: the British hoped that the US would still be 
willing to station some portion of the fleet at Singapore to help deter Japan.  
 
US Navy delegates expressed reluctance to defend Singapore or other British Far East 
territories because there was nothing to be gained strategically or politically with the US 
Congress or the electorate. 
1133
  The introduction of Lendlease legislation to the 
Congress on 10 January 1941 also made the Administration extremely cautious about 
giving any impression of a secret alliance with Britain. In the first two months of 1941 
any rumour or incident involving American foreign assistance might block passage of 
the bill on the grounds that it was simply giving the President a licence to take the 
country to war.
1134
  
 
At about this time Air Vice-Marshal Robert Brook-Pop ham, the Commander in Chief 
for the Far East, expressed his appreciation of the security situation at Singapore: in the 
event of war with Japan, Singapore would have five days warning and the Japanese 
would face tough opposition before the security of Singapore would be seriously 
jeopardised.
1135
 The British were not particularly worried about the threat to the Far 
East in the winter of 1940-1941: they were preoccupied with obtaining planes for the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
 
Focussed on their own ambitions, Soong, Mow and Chennault may not have fully 
appreciated what the administration had in mind by offering them a hundred P-40s 
which did not meet their objectives: the fighter planes were ‘second best’ compared to 
the bombers which they had hoped to secure. For the Generalissimo, defence of the 
Burma Road was important but not a strategic necessity compared to the counterattack 
on Japanese positions along the Yangtze River or bombing Japan itself. Chinese 
archives might reveal if they had understood fully that the administration wanted them 
to become a decoy for Japan.  
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Thus in January 1941 the Roosevelt administration concocted a form of air assistance 
which did not really match either Chinese or British interests but it was determined for 
its own reasons to organize the mission as quickly as possible.  This was the state of 
play when Intercontinent became involved in plane aid for China. Two separate issues 
then became intertwined: the firm’s long standing agency for Curtiss-Wright on sales to 
China and the role of its directors in recruiting personnel to accompany the P-40s to 
China.  
 
Intercontinent and plane aid for China  
 
In October 1940 Bill Pawley discussed Bruce Leighton’s proposal for a guerrilla air 
corps with Frank Knox before flying to Latin America on a sales mission for Vultee. 
Sometime thereafter, as Leighton recalled in 1942, Mort Deyo, the assistant to Frank 
Knox, wired Leighton about a meeting with the Secretary.
1136
 Knox told Leighton, ‘I 
have arranged a $100,000,000 loan and got something started on getting planes out 
there.’ He asked Leighton if it was possible to make planes at Loiwing to which 
Leighton replied ‘no can do, must take ’em from production line.’1137 Knox asked him 
to contact T.V. Soong and in the same period Leighton talked with Chennault ‘at 
length’.1138  
 
On 1 January 1941 Pawley returned to the United States and immediately became 
involved in the negotiations over air aid to China. His New York lawyers advised him 
that recruiting military personnel for a foreign government in the United States was 
illegal.
1139
 Pawley’s counsel met with representatives from the Justice Department who 
stated that they were about to take action against those who recruited volunteers for 
Canada. On behalf of Pawley, Frank Knox drafted a paragraph to amend the law which 
he presented to the President. Roosevelt, however, was afraid of jeopardising the 
passage of Lendlease but told Knox to ‘tell Pauley to go ahead; that there would not be 
any prosecutions.’1140 Pawley, however, nearly pulled out because his legal advisers 
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could not guarantee protection against Acts of Congress. A possible alternative was for 
Pan Am to fly prospective recruits to Cuba where they could be signed up.  
 
This sequence of events may explain the reason for a call by Mort Deyo to Bruce 
Leighton on 16 January 1941. Deyo indicated the ‘go-ahead’ from Knox for the full air 
program ‘as discussed’.1141 This included the private employment of personnel and 
shipments of material from current production. Resignation of instructors, presumably 
from the US military would be accepted. Deyo, however, emphasised that the Secretary 
wanted Leighton to ‘personally handle personnel selection’ and asked him to come to 
Washington as soon as possible to discuss the details. 
 
In the meantime the BAC had been advised by US Treasury officials to seek 
reimbursement for the hundred P-40s directly from Curtiss-Wright on the understanding 
that the manufacturer would resell the planes to an American corporation  purchasing on 
behalf of the Chinese government.
1142
  On 10 January, however, Philip Young 
discovered that if C-W sold these planes to the Universal Trading Corporation (UTC), 
the purchasing agent for the Chinese government, it would have to honour its long- 
standing agreement with Intercontinent which in principle was due a 10 % commission 
on the sale of any aircraft to the Chinese government.
1143
 Young took the view that 
since Intercontinent was the only organisation which could handle all the operations 
associated with the delivery of the planes to China, it deserved a service fee but not a 
sales commission.
1144
 On 16 January C-W sent a letter to Intercontinent which 
confirmed its obligation to pay the firm a 10 % commission on the purchase price of the 
planes. Pawley’s lawyers pointed out that the administration was objecting to a 
commission to Pawley but not to the profit which the manufacturer made on sales.
1145
   
 
Young was sufficiently confident that a settlement of Pawley’s claim could be reached 
that he asked C-W to begin shipping the planes ‘regardless of whether or not 
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satisfactory negotiations had been completed.’1146 On 15 January Stanley Hornbeck at 
the State Department noted that it was ‘especially important’ that the plan for the British 
to deliver 100 planes from their January February and March deliveries not to be upset 
or delayed.
1147
 Hornbeck confirmed the administration’s sense of urgency about an 
imminent Japanese advance on Singapore: the President and his cabinet persisted in the 
belief that they could organize an air mission at very short notice. 
 
Soon thereafter, to the surprise of British officials, the US Treasury claimed that there 
were ‘governmental technical difficulties’ involved in this procedure and requested that 
the British sell the planes to UTC. This, however, did not suit British interests as a 
direct transaction might provoke a reaction from Japan.
1148
 Officials at the Air Ministry 
found it incomprehensible that the Administration could ‘not solve their own 
administrative difficulties in view of their insistence on this transfer of aircraft to the 
Chinese to fulfil their own public policy’.1149 They pointed out that the contract for 
resale had already been concluded yet the Treasury ‘assumed we could undo what has 
been done.’ 
 
Foreign Office officials found it ‘all very tiresome of the Americans and slightly 
mysterious,’ there being no indication of what ‘the government technical difficulties’ 
were.
1150
 Ashley Clarke minuted that as long as the British received some credit from 
the Chinese for the sacrifice of planes, there could be no great objection to cancelling 
the resale contract to Curtiss-Wright and selling directly to the Chinese purchasing 
agent. Antony Eden disagreed: ‘We are now made to appear to be selling aeroplanes to 
the Chinese government which in fact the US govt insist upon supplying to that govt to 
our detriment. Why? Because the US govt do not want to appear in the picture in that 
guise? But do we? If we had our way, we would buy these aeroplanes ourselves, I can 
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see no reason why we should camouflage this extraordinary operation for the US 
govt.’1151  
 
US Treasury officials never admitted to the British their reason for wanting to undo the 
resale to Curtiss-Wright: they wanted to avoid problems with the Chinese legation over 
paying a commission to Intercontinent. On 18 January Deyo telephoned Leighton about 
the objections of Knox and the Chinese delegation. Initially everyone had recognised 
the principle of a commission to Intercontinent but Knox had felt that 10 % was 
‘exorbitant’ and then Soong had not been willing to concede even the principle of a 
commission. Leighton replied that he and Pawley would be willing to discuss the 
amount if officials agreed to the principle that the company was owed a sales 
commission. To avert a dispute with the Chinese and Knox, Treasury officials had 
hoped that the British would sell the planes directly to the Chinese but were unaware 
that such a decision would require UK cabinet level consultation.  
 
The Chinese delegation not only hoped to get around Intercontinent’s commission but 
also the firm’s involvement in recruiting personnel to go to China with the P-40s.  Deyo 
had telephoned Leighton about personally handling the hiring of pilots. It is possible 
that when Knox heard how reluctant Pawley was to have his company involved in a 
potentially illegal activity, he thought of hiring Leighton to do the job on his own. He 
also may have promised him some sort of immunity to prosecution. Leighton discussed 
the matter further with Deyo and that evening, wrote a lengthy rejoinder.  
 
Leighton had inferred from their conversation that it was in the vital interests of the US 
government for China to have an effective air force but because present conditions 
prohibited direct government participation, the Administration wanted to handle it 
through ‘commercial channels.’1152 He understood that Soong had requested that 
Leighton ‘as an individual’ should hire the volunteers, that Soong did not want to use 
Intercontinent’s organisation or services and that the Chinese did not want to pay any 
commissions on the airplanes.  
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Leighton was flattered by Soong’s confidence in his abilities but emphasised that no 
single individual could undertake such a task. The ‘very sour episode’ of the last 
‘American pilot’ squadron formed in China in 1937-1938 was vivid testimony of the 
unsatisfactory results obtained without adequate administration. Leighton had witnessed 
how the Chinese Air Force had tried and failed repeatedly to manage the volunteer force 
and comparable projects. The current initiative required an organisation with the 
necessary experience and facilities to take care not only of logistics and transport but 
personnel: salaries, insurance, ‘inquiries from anxious relatives.’ Intercontinent and 
CAMCO were unique in China in providing service for the CAF thanks to the 
‘outstanding organizing and administrative ability of W.D. Pawley’ who had sustained 
the enterprise despite heavy financial risks and other handicaps. Overhead costs had to 
be paid from the only revenue available, that is, commissions and once these ceased, so 
would his firm’s services for lack of funds.1153   
 
Leighton felt that Soong’s offer of separate employment was an effort to ‘belittle the 
value’ of Intercontinent in the hope that the government would set aside the long 
established business relationship between Curtiss-Wright and his firm, thus denying its 
right to a sales commission. He argued that the cost of doing without Intercontinent’s 
services would outweigh the cost of the commission: if delegated to a single individual, 
the project would be doomed to failure. Leighton refused to take part in the venture as 
an individual under such conditions.
1154
 
 
Leighton’s objections apparently had an effect. Within a week the Chinese delegation 
became reconciled to using Intercontinent/CAMCO as the project manager. On 25 
January T.V. Soong sent a telegram to the Generalissimo seeking his approval for the 
following proposals: CAMCO would engage the volunteers with a contract similar to 
that for its own employees; Chennault was to serve as their ‘commanding officer’ 
through whom the units would be directly responsible to Chiang Kai-shek personally; 
they would only receive instructions from Chiang through Chennault because ‘there 
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must be no division of command or tactical responsibility and authority.’1155 The CoAA 
and all other Chinese military were to cooperate fully with the American group who in 
turn would train the Chinese so that they could take an increasing part in operations.  
 
Chennault had his own plans for whatever planes and men were made available to him: 
his focus remained on bombing Japanese targets in the occupied zone of China. It is 
unknown whether Soong or anyone else disclosed to him the Administration’s original 
idea of using Chinese P-40 squadrons as a decoy to draw the Japanese to the Burma 
Road. 
 
With the question of Intercontinent’s commission settled, Pawley began to work 
directly with the Chinese delegation on the project. On 3 February 1941 he and 
Chennault briefed Mort Deyo in the Secretary of the Navy’s office about their 
agreement and the cooperation required from the US government. The State Department 
already had indicated willingness to issue passports to all the men as bona fide 
employees of CAMCO but had not secured authorisation for recruitment from the 
services: Secretary Stimson had not even informed the Army Air Corps about the 
project and it was known that Admiral Tower, head of Naval aviation, was ‘not very 
enthusiastic about the idea.’1156   
 
Since Young and Morgenthau had left British officials in the dark about ‘government 
technical difficulties’ the Foreign Office continued for weeks to discuss the iniquity of 
Morgenthau’s demand that the British government should sell the P-40s directly to 
UTC. It was an issue which particularly irritated Antony Eden. On 27 January he 
submitted a paper to the War Cabinet which summarised all the objections to the way in 
which the Americans had handled the airplane deal for China.
1157
 Eden emphasised that 
the attitude of the administration had been extraordinary; that it had set out to fulfil its 
promise to China from the allocation to Britain fully aware of Britain’s urgent needs 
and China’s incompetence in military aviation. The latest request for Britain to sell the 
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planes to China could only be explained by the administration’s fear of the effect on 
public opinion or the risk of war with Japan, which they now asked Britain to assume: 
 
Before decision is made we should at least represent to United States Government 
difficulty into which they have progressively pushed us and stipulate that, if transaction 
is carried out as they propose and is discovered by Japanese, we should wish it to be 
made clear that we acted at the request of the US government: ‘I cannot believe that 
President Roosevelt or Secretary of State would approve way in which matter has been 
handled if facts were put to either of them squarely. Unless you see objection, I should 
be glad if you would take this course.’1158  
 
On 29 January the Cabinet agreed that Lord Halifax should make representations to the 
US government. On the same day, however, Philip Young held a day-long meeting with 
Pawley to work out a compromise on Intercontinent’s commission: instead of 
US$450,000 in commission, Intercontinent was to receive a fee of US$250,000 for the 
various services which it would perform in connection with the P-40 sale to China.
1159
 
UTC bought the hundred P-40s for US$4.5 million using funds made available from the 
US$100 million loan secured the previous December.  
 
Such was Eden’s irritation that he had advised Halifax to make representations despite 
the risk of upsetting the administration while Lend lease legislation was going through 
Congress. On 5 February however, Morris Wilson advised Lord Halifax that there was 
no longer any point to do so as the matter was settled:  the British heard nothing more 
about it.
1160
 It would appear that the British never learned the real cause of ‘government 
technical difficulties’ --  the desire of the Chinese delegation to avoid paying Bill 
Pawley a commission. Had they done so, it would have been embarrassing for 
Morgenthau and Philip Young. This did not mark the end of British involvement in 
American assistance to China: officials in the Air Ministry as well as the Foreign Office 
were determined to exert some hold over the P-40s and found a willing ally in T.V. 
Soong. 
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The International Air Force 
 
Chennault and Leighton presumed that they were dealing with a strictly Sino-American 
venture staffed by American volunteers, directly accountable to Chiang Kai-shek and 
based in Yunnan, possibly at Loiwing or Kunming. T.V. Soong, however, continued to 
bear in mind the Generalissimo’s original idea of an international or Anglo-American 
air force as proposed in mid-December 1940.
1161
 This scenario foresaw a British as well 
as American volunteer group.  Soong may also have been as concerned as Bruce 
Leighton about Chinese mismanagement of an international airpower project based on 
its previous record with the first International volunteer group in 1937-1938: Chinese 
officers had a reputation for meddling in operations and misappropriating equipment or 
materiel.     
 
Soong very likely discussed the programme with an old friend who was also based in 
Washington at that time. The French banker, Jean Monnet had originally come to 
Washington to buy planes for the French but after the fall of France had been appointed 
to the British Air Commission. Monnet and Soong had worked together on economic 
aid to China in the early 1930s.
1162
  The BAC had a direct relationship with British 
officers who in the first three months of 1941 took part  in the America Britain Canada 
about the possible participation of the United States in the European war. The British 
military delegates were to wear civilian clothing and pretend to be BAC advisers.
1163
   
 
One of the leading figures in the British delegation was the Director of plans at the Air 
Ministry Air Commodore John Slessor.  Monnet took it upon himself to introduce 
Slessor to T.V. Soong and on 11 February Slessor reported to the Air Ministry the 
results of their conversation. Soong outlined for Slessor the Generalissimo’s urgent 
demand for a five hundred plane: not only did he need an international air force to 
support the Chinese army to ‘mop up’ Japanese forces in China but ‘above all, if 
Japanese attack Singapore, the Chinese could attack Japanese cities in Japan proper and 
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thus create an important diversion and beset aircraft in north’ .1164 Soong regarded a 
Japanese attack on Singapore as ‘fatal’ for China as it would pave the way for the 
capitulation of neighbouring British and Dutch colonies to Japan. 
1165
 As Slessor related 
to the Air Ministry, Soong had submitted this plan two months earlier to James Buckley 
of the President’s Liaison Committee. At that time, Slessor had advised Buckley that the 
Chinese plan was impractical but since then it had become more practical: Soong had 
recognised that there was no hope of obtaining any bombers but he could start with a 
fighter force formed from the hundred ‘Tomahawks’ (the British name for the C-W P-
40) allotted to the Chinese. Furthermore Soong had already secured ‘enthusiastic 
support’ from the administration to release USAAC reserve officers for the programme.    
 
Soong wanted to make a ‘real international force’ and would welcome British 
participation which Slessor regarded as unlikely for two reasons: the difficulties in the 
lines of communication from Burma to China as well as the unavailability of British 
servicemen because of the war against Germany.  Nonetheless the British delegation in 
Washington considered Soong’s plan as ‘strategically very important’ especially in 
view of the fact that the Americans had stated that they had no intention of reinforcing 
the British in the Far East in the event of war with Japan ‘even if they are doing this for 
Chinese.’1166 Although Roosevelt may well have given Churchill a guarantee of support 
in the Far East in the event of a Japanese attack, this had not been communicated to 
either Eden or the delegates in Washington. 
 
To show goodwill, Slessor suggested sending a few pilots to take part in the force and 
releasing to China the 144 Vultee fighters which the BAC had acquired from the 
Swedish Purchasing Commission in August 1940.
1167
 In ending his report, Slessor 
commented ‘fact that United States Administration are watching is [a] special secret.’  
While awaiting instructions from London, Slessor followed up his conversation with 
Soong by meeting Bill Pawley, who struck him as ‘an able and sensible person with 
great experience of China:’ having built the Loiwing factory, he was now building one 
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in Bangalore.
1168
  His ideas on organising the force struck Slessor as ‘conservative and 
sound.’  Pawley overcame  Slessor’s reservations about the problems of 
communications from Burma to China because Intercontinent had proved that it could 
be managed as long as supervision was in the hands of foreigners, not Chinese. Despite 
the bombing of Loiwing, Pawley claimed that transport of materials had continued to 
reach the factory. Pawley hoped that the British could provide some pilots with war 
experience to join the personnel who would be taking over the P-40s once they were 
assembled at Rangoon. Slessor considered it important that the American volunteers 
should be given training as units before going to China. As he understood that the 
Mingaladon airfield next to Rangoon had been enlarged and could be suitable for 
training, Slessor wondered if the Commander-in-Chief Far East, Air Vice Marshal 
Robert Brooke-Popham, could arrange this and make contact with Bill Pawley’s 
brother, Edward Pawley who was based in Chungking.
1169
  
 
Slessor’s proposals for cooperation in an International Air Force (IAF) suited the plans 
of Robert Brooke-Popham who was already developing air support for the military 
mission to China led by General Lancelot Dennys: his ‘204 mission’ was tasked with 
training Chinese in guerrilla warfare.
1170
  In Brooke-Popham’s view, the purpose of the 
Dennys Mission was ‘to stiffen Chinese’ in order to keep the Japanese from 
withdrawing large forces for use against the British elsewhere.
1171
 For Dennys and 
Brooke-Popham, the immediate task was to improve the organisation of Burma Road 
traffic and protect it against Japanese attack.
1172
 Brooke-Popham had started to consult 
with the government of Burma about air support (CHIBASE) for the Dennys mission at 
Rangoon, Lashio and Maymyo (the latter was not far from Loiwing):  in the event of 
war it was presumed that some British squadrons already based in Burma would start to 
operate from Chinese bases in Yunnan.
1173
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On hearing of Slessor’s discussions with Soong about the IAF, Brooke-Popham 
immediately saw the benefit of this force being ‘coordinated with our organisation in 
China’ and sought ‘some central authority to ensure cooperation between the R.A.F and 
the IAF’.1174 Although all the material and personnel might be American, the term 
‘international’ would be useful for propaganda reasons: it indicated that operational 
control was in ‘English or American hands and not Chinese’.  Experience had shown 
that the Chinese would not make effective use of aircraft if they only had advisers. For 
sake of prestige, they should have ‘nominal command’ but the ‘real control must be in 
the hands of some non-Chinese.’ Brooke-Popham preferred to see an R.A.F officer in 
charge of the IAF. 
1175
 
 
The Air Ministry reminded Brooke-Popham that the basis of Far East policy was still 
avoidance of war with Japan. Therefore it vetoed the appointment of a British senior 
officer to control the IAF and did not want British forces to be identified with support 
for it in Burma. It was also anxious that the IAF should not bomb any objectives in 
Japan without its knowledge. The ministry advised, for the time being, ‘unobtrusive 
help’ in Burma for the IAF.1176 Lord Halifax would undertake to consult with the US 
government about the project in order to examine the scheme thoroughly. In the 
meantime, testing of aircraft after assembly would be allowed but the IAF should 
conduct training in the United States not in Burma.  Nonetheless Brooke-Popham was 
advised that ‘effective liaison should be maintained and planning proceed for closest 
coordination in event of war’. 1177  On 6 March 1941 Beaverbrook and Portal also 
authorised the release of 144 Vultee fighters to the IAF. 
1178
 The Vultee was one aircraft 
which the British as well as the Chinese seemed happy to pass on to others. 
 
It was not entirely surprising that the British wanted to exert some control over the 
volunteer group because they continued to receive requests from Americans and 
Chinese to perform various favours to do with it. In mid-February T.V. Soong became 
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concerned about the shipment of the first 36 planes aboard a Norwegian freighter 
because the Japanese knew about the arrangements and might try to sabotage the ship. 
He asked if the British might consign these aircraft as their own to the RAF in 
Singapore or Rangoon, surmising that the Japanese would not dare to intercept supplies 
which they believed to be British.
1179
  Lord Halifax replied that the British having 
already given up the planes were now being asked to assume the extra risk of 
transporting them: the Japanese might regard it as a provocation if they knew the British 
were directly shipping them to one of their ports in the Far East.
1180
   
 
Soong’s request revived British irritation about the diversion of the planes. Berkeley 
Gage minuted, ‘in view of the fact that we consider it an absurd waste of good material 
to send these ultra-modern machines to the Chinese, who are unlikely to have pilots 
trained to fly them, I think it a lot to ask us to use the subterfuge suggested by Mr. 
Soong to protect them on their way, especially as the Japanese know all about the 
transaction.  I think we should refuse to do so.’ 1181 ‘There is something to be said for 
our taking over the aircraft in spite of the exasperating features of this whole matter,’ 
minuted Ashley Clarke.  
 
The second and crucial favour demanded of the British was to provide the guns for the 
Chinese P-40s. On 10 March Sir Arthur Blackburn cabled the Foreign Office to alert 
them to the lack of armament for the planes which had been shipped directly from 
Curtiss-Wright. The Chinese claimed that they were unable to purchase the right guns in 
the United States and therefore were asking the BAC to authorise the release of machine 
guns for the planes.
1182
 Once again the British ‘reluctantly agreed’ to cooperate with the 
Administration ‘despite the extreme urgency’ of their own needs.’1183 
 
By April 1941 the British had complied with most of the US government’s requests for 
cooperation with air aid for China and offered more: it had diverted 100 P-40s to China 
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and promised to supply the armaments; it was ready to divert a 144 fighter planes; it 
offered ‘unobtrusive help’ for the volunteer group:  owing to the understanding between 
Slessor and Soong, the way was paved for American squadrons to be based on airfields 
in Burma although Soong maintained the pretence that the destination was still Yunnan. 
The British became involved with the AVG/IAF because they wanted to keep the 
squadrons in Burma and integrate them into the under-resourced Imperial air defence 
for the Far East. 
 
In April 1941 Roosevelt appointed Lauchlin Currie who had just returned from two 
months in China as the President’s personal envoy to coordinate the efforts of Soong’s 
new procurement firm, China Defense Supplies (CDS) and the recruiter, Intercontinent 
with the US military.  Through Currie Roosevelt gave verbal consent for Intercontinent 
to hire volunteers from US military bases although some recruitment was already under 
way.
1184
 By April the original rationale for the AVG had long since evaporated: for the 
time being the Japanese appeared to take seriously a warning delivered by American 
diplomats in Tokyo that if they moved against American allies in Asia they risked a 
‘serious situation’ with the United States.1185  
 
In April 1941 James McHugh wrote to Lauchlin Currie about the question of aid to 
China which McHugh regarded as far more psychological than physical: ‘if you could 
dump a hundred planes and the fifty million dollars in their laps tomorrow, it would 
come far closer to serving our own ends through the boost in their morale...than to work 
out a carefully established scheme and send out a well trained force to fly their 
planes..We ought to give them planes to crack up immediately, ask no questions and 
merely say, “we are with you to the bitter end, go to it”.’1186  McHugh believed in the 
old psychological rationale for air aid to China which was the position which Cordell 
Hull had originally adopted when he called for air aid to China as a morale booster not a 
tactical air unit.  
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In 1941 the Administration, however, could no longer afford to throw away good planes 
to lift China’s spirits; there were calls on scarce aircraft from all quarters. Precisely for 
that reason, General Marshall had entered into the planning of air assistance in 
December 1940 to ensure that there was a plan for using the planes and that they would 
not be wasted by Chiang’s air force: Marshall very likely had a direct hand in 
conceiving of the tactical diversion over the Burma Road for which the idea of an AVG 
was originally proposed.  With the formation of the AVG, the administration had moved 
away from the psychological to the physical and from the moral to the tactical approach 
to airpower: if the administration was going to sell decent fighter planes to the Chinese, 
then there had to be a clear objective and plan for their deployment. In the spring of 
1941 Currie and Chennault wanted to make the force effective for protecting the Burma 
Road. Furthermore Chennault, like Slessor and Brooke-Popham, felt that the volunteers 
should complete training on British bases in Burma before they were transferred to 
Yunnan.
1187
  
 
Nonetheless as far as the Administration was concerned, the AVG had virtually 
disappeared not only from the public arena but internal communications. On 5 May the 
British Air attaché in Washington reported that ‘the U.S. Admin have no official 
knowledge of force, which is expected to reach Rangoon about mid-July.’1188 He also 
stressed to the Air Ministry that the ‘Volunteer Air Force had no connection to Pawley’ 
but was under the command of Claire Chennault.
1189
 What little information British 
officials had about the IAF circulated like Chinese whispers across the Empire: on 13 
May the Secretary of State for Burma informed the Governor of Burma that : ‘U.S. 
Administration disclaim official knowledge of Force which is under command of Col. 
C.L. Chennault who will operate directly under Chiang Kiashek.’1190   
 
That Roosevelt was ambivalent about any further air aid for China is made clear in one 
of those rare documents, a short memo to Lauchlin Currie written on 15 May 1941 and 
signed by the President. Roosevelt told Currie that he could negotiate about ‘the air 
program or any other thing that the Chinese request but I don’t want to imply that I am 
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at this time in favor of any of the proposals’: any Chinese proposals could ‘only be 
finally worked out in relationship to our whole military problem and the needs of 
ourselves and the British.’1191 The implication was that China’s air demands had slipped 
down the scale of priorities well behind those of the United States and Britain.  
 
On 20 May 1941  the British Chiefs of Staff sent the head of ONI, Admiral Allen Kirk a 
summary of  British progress on aid for China: guerrilla training and ‘unobtrusive 
support’ for the IAF. They asked for more information from their American 
counterparts about the IAF because ‘the position as regards the development of the 
scheme is obscure.’ The memorandum stressed that the British Chiefs of Staff would 
‘welcome energetic action by the United States to further it’ as long as it did not detract 
from the main theatre.
1192
    
 
In considering how to respond to the British demand for information about the US 
government’s role in the IAF,   Kirk wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations that ‘in 
view of the Navy’s lack of information on this subject, it would not be profitable to 
enter into a discussion with the British until after a preliminary discussion was had with 
the office of Mr. Currie’.1193 His assistant, Lt. Commander Arthur H. McCollum 
characterised US aid for China as ‘largely talk, with very little concrete help having 
been given other than the lending of money on rather favourable terms.’  They could not 
discuss aid for China with the British ‘as we do not know what the extent of our own 
actions are.’1194 For McCollum, as head of the Far Eastern Division of ONI,  to make 
such an admission reflects how little those in the US government knew about the air 
programme for China and how far the administration had distanced itself from the 
volunteer group by the summer of 1941.
1195
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In May, 1941 the British also tried to keep track of the air mission to China despite the 
fact that all information about US government support for the ‘IAF’ was ‘meagre and 
disjointed’.1196 In June, 1941 Foreign Office officials observed that the US government 
did not wish to be ‘publicly associated with the scheme’ but were giving ‘active 
assistance’ through the President’s adviser, Lauchlin Currie: Intercontinent was making 
all arrangements for transport of planes to Burma while the ‘Central Aircraft Company’ 
( CAMCO) managed the personnel for the IAF.
1197
  Brooke-Popham who had been 
tasked with maintaining effective liaison with the IAF found it difficult to do so 
especially as he had no information on the whereabouts of Chennault.  As the 
administration maintained the pretence of knowing nothing about the volunteer group, 
the British decided that they must follow the American example and also ‘disassociate 
themselves publicly from this force.’1198  Nonetheless the War Cabinet had abandoned 
longstanding policies in order to accommodate the AVG in Burma.
1199
 Brooke-Popham 
consistently endeavoured to help Chennault and the AVG as did the military attaché in 
Chungking who pressed home to Lord Halifax the need for intervention to obtain 
ammunition from the US army.  
 
Before leaving Washington in late June 1941 Chennault disclosed to the British air 
attaché that instead of proceeding to China as soon as the planes were assembled and 
tested, some 200-300 volunteers were to remain at Rangoon ‘until everything was ready 
for them to go into action in China. Previous intention had been to send them into China 
immediately they were erected and tested.’ The reason for this change of plan, he 
alleged, was Japanese intelligence about the formation of ‘the international air 
force.’1200 In his memoirs, Chennault provided yet another explanation for the decision 
to remain in Burma : it was due to the delay in shipping planes from New York which 
meant that they could not arrive in China before the monsoon: ‘Pawley assisted me in 
obtaining the loan of a paved Royal Air Force field in Burma – our only hope of 
training during the monsoon.’1201 Chennault never wanted to admit that anyone other 
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than himself had been in charge of the decision to base the volunteer group in Burma 
rather than China and that the British in fact were as much in charge of its fate as he 
was.   
 
Chennault’s published account disregards the lengthy consultation which the British 
government undertook in order to decide imperial policies generally and aviation affairs 
in Burma specifically.  On 19 July 1941 before Chennault paid a call on Reginald 
Dorman-Smith, the Governor of Burma, the Secretary of State for Burma wrote to 
Dorman-Smith about the options to be laid before the Cabinet concerning his 
cooperation with the IAF. The Cabinet had agreed that the Governor should have 
discretion to allow the aircraft to be fitted with armament before starting their flight 
from Burma to China and to permit instruction in the use and maintenance of the 
aircraft while in Burma. The Governor was to decide these points with the C-in-C 
Brooke-Popham after ascertaining Chennault’s views but to avoid giving any final 
instructions to Intercontinent.
1202
 
 
On 26 July Dorman-Smith reported that after meeting with Chennault, he had agreed 
that the Tomahawks should be fully equipped with arms and ammunition in Burma and 
that the pilots could carry out ‘necessary low altitude firing practice’ as Chennault had 
stated that the pilots would not yet be accustomed to the type of weapon being fitted. 
Chennault would be allowed to take over Magwe aerodrome as well as accommodation 
at Toungoo: Chennault stated specifically that he wanted to be allowed to train the 
pilots in Burma so that they could function as squadrons when they reached Yunnan. 
Dorman-Smith was ‘anxious to meet his wishes in this respect and anticipated no 
opposition from my Ministers.’1203  Dorman-Smith, however, had slightly overstepped 
the mark by implying to Chennault that he could start full training on armaments. 
Brooke-Popham made it clear to Chennault in his meeting on 28 July that he could not 
carry out operational training in Burma due to orders from London.
1204
 He suggested 
that the ban could be lifted if the Japanese attacked the Burma Road. By 22 August 
however, the War Cabinet had reviewed its previous policy and decided to allow the 
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IAF in Burma to undertake full training as long as they did not operate against the 
Japanese from a Burmese aerodrome.
1205
 
 
Meanwhile, Intercontinent/CAMCO carried on recruiting personnel which became one 
of its principal tasks, the other being the assembly and maintenance of the P-40s in 
Rangoon. They engaged a Curtiss-Wright test pilot Byron Glover to direct the assembly 
of the planes by CAMCO staff at Mingaladon airfield just outside Rangoon.
1206
   Soong 
working through CDS as well as UTC was tasked with buying all necessary material for 
the squadrons: Chennault generated long lists of equipment to be procured and the ideal 
quantity and qualities of volunteers to be hired.
1207
 The papers of Lauchlin Currie, the 
Administration’s only coordinator for the AVG,  reveal that he became mired in the 
problems which Intercontinent/CAMCO encountered in hiring personnel to go to China 
or once there, the difficulties of retaining them.  
 
Chennault had emphasised the need for pilots who already had experience flying the P-
40 but at the end of March 1941 the USAAC Chief of Staff, General Henry H. ‘Hap’ 
Arnold expressed his doubts that men with this qualification could be found.
1208
  
Disappointment with the calibre as well as the maturity of recruits quickly set in. On the 
way to China, the young men were less than discreet about their mission. As Admiral 
Harold Stark wrote to Lauchlin Currie, ‘in Singapore those flyers registered at the 
principal hotels as American aviators, openly talked about going over to Chungking, 
etc., so the secrecy about the matter discontinued sometime ago. ’1209  It was fortunate, 
he remarked, that the Japanese had not sunk the ship. After the first round of 
recruitment, the US military expressed little enthusiasm for another and Currie had to 
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obtain a second directive from the President to overcome the resistance of the services’ 
personnel departments.
1210
   
 
In November Chennault complained bitterly to Intercontinent/CAMCO and Currie 
about the inadequate selection process which had lowered the AVG’s combat efficiency 
and wasted equipment.
1211
  In a long report on the AVG dated October 1941 James 
McHugh emphasised that ‘the worst of the AVG’s many deficiencies was in the realm 
of personnel, particularly the lack of any trained staff officers.’1212 McHugh and 
Chennault blamed Intercontinent for this failure, when the real responsibility rested 
entirely with the Administration which did not wish to deprive the Army Air Corps and 
the Navy of senior officers for a mission to China.  
 
The volunteers started training in earnest during the autumn of 1941 on an airfield in 
Toungoo, Burma. After Pearl Harbor when the AVG finally began combat against the 
Japanese the group’s work exceeded all expectations. 1213 There were those, however, 
who belonged to the old school of Far East policy from the interwar years. Clarence 
Gauss who replaced Nelson Johnson as the US Ambassador in China still wanted to 
prosecute American volunteers who served the Chinese military just as he had tried to 
do in 1937 during the Battle of Shanghai. At that time he had threatened to strip 
Chennault or any other volunteer flying with the CAF of his American citizenship. 
When McHugh reported the success of the AVG to Gauss in January 1942, the 
Ambassador remarked ‘with obvious venom’ that he would get his hands on a copy of 
the U.S. statues and ‘prove that the A.V.G. boys had lost their citizenship!.’1214 
 
Conclusions 
 
In January 1940 Bruce Leighton’s proposed a ‘guerrilla air corps’ designed to extend 
Intercontinent’s operations in China by providing an additional service: a small mobile 
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air force staffed largely by Americans which could supplement but not entirely replace 
CAF operations. For the Chinese, Leighton’s concept was better than nothing but it was 
not the air assistance which Chiang desired. By the autumn of 1940 Chiang had 
virtually given up on the CAF. He sought a large official US air mission not only to 
replace the Russian mission but to replace the CAF itself. This was neither feasible nor 
desirable for the Roosevelt administration.  
 
Having provided ‘plane aid’ to Britain since 1938, Roosevelt felt that some form of 
‘plane aid’ was also warranted for Chiang in October 1940. For Roosevelt and Hull 
psychological factors initially were uppermost. They embarked on plane aid for China 
out of an impulse ‘to do something’ as a response to Chiang’s appeals for help. In the 
winter of 1940-1941 the administration’s airpower programme for China took shape 
through the sort of informal consultation and ad hoc measures which were typical of 
Roosevelt’s ‘government on the jump,’ to quote Henry Stimson.1215  Roosevelt launched 
ideas and left it to others to figure out a detailed plan for execution. If this informal 
approach had its strengths, it also had weaknesses and these were evident in the 
handling of aircraft sales to China in 1940-1941.  
 
By offering a few planes to Chiang in October 1940 Roosevelt and Hull hoped to salve 
their conscience about having withheld material aid to China since 1937. Chiang, 
however, was not looking for moral support but a strategic offensive. In the winter of 
1940- 1941 he had a single clear cut objective, to persuade the administration to give 
him an American bomber command to strike at Japanese targets in China and Japan 
itself. Chiang’s ambition to bomb Japan was a key concept which ran through the 
interwar period – after the Shanghai war of 1932, through the debate about slowing 
Japan’s southward advance across Asia in the winter of 1940-1941 and after Pearl 
Harbor when Roosevelt finally gave the Generalissimo what he wanted, an American 
air mission to bomb Japan from airbases in China.  
 
Henry Morgenthau took hold of Hull’s modest proposal and propelled it further than 
Hull or Stimson imagined. More than anyone else, Morgenthau decided that the 
airpower programme for China should be defined as a deterrent to Japanese expansion 
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across Asia rather than Japanese attacks on Chinese cities. The sensible plan from the 
outset would have been to recognise the need in the long run for air defence over the 
supply routes into China. Morgenthau, however, saw multiple threats hovering over the 
president: that Japan might attack Singapore; that Roosevelt might be forced to deploy 
the US Navy to defend British interests because of a secret assurance to Churchill about 
support in the Far East; that sending the US fleet to Singapore might have no deterrent 
effect on Japan; that deployment of the Navy to defend British imperial interests might 
imperil the passage of Lend lease.
1216
  To alleviate pressure on the entire Singapore 
issue, Morgenthau looked to airpower for a quick fix.  
 
One of the major misconceptions which shaped the administration’s thinking about air 
assistance for China was the belief that an air operation could be organized in a 
relatively short time: Morgenthau presumed that he could deliver a bombing mission to 
China within the space of a month to prevent any possible Japanese attack on 
Singapore. Another was the belief that bombers alone could have a major impact on the 
course of the Far East conflict. If the Chinese bombed Japan, Morgenthau was 
‘convinced that overnight it would change the whole picture in the Far East.’1217 He 
responded to Chiang’s appeal for a bomber offensive by offering a few long-range 
bombers, thus maximising the impact that could be derived from the limited number of 
planes which might be available.  
 
Morgenthau was not alone in believing that a bombing offensive against Japan would be 
a marvellous way of deterring Japan from an attack on Singapore: the President and 
Hull were ‘delighted’ by the idea. The discussions about bombing Japan revealed how 
bereft Roosevelt, Hull and Morgenthau were of common sense and competence in 
military aviation, not to mention the wider strategic implications of a Japanese counter 
attack or the impact on Britain of diverting its planes to China. 
 
In thinking about airpower for the Far East, the administration also came up against a 
situation which had never occurred in plane aid for France or Britain. The British were 
fully competent to handle American planes, the Chinese were not. This fundamental 
difference forced the administration to take more responsibility for the logistics and 
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organisation of air aid to China than had ever been required in selling planes to Britain. 
Nor did it have the experience or means to handle the operations which it proposed. 
 
Aircraft was scarce in 1940-1941 and the US military had been on strict rations in order 
to free up planes for the British war effort. If Roosevelt and Morgenthau planned to sell 
planes to China through indirect commercial channels they could not allow them to be 
wrecked by Chinese pilots:  the USAAC had received only a few P-40s in 1940 
compared to 296 for Britain, but the administration planned to divert a 100 to China.   
 
In late December 1940 Stimson brought General Marshall into the discussion about the 
air programme for China. He exercised caution and pulled the cabinet back from the 
brink of a disastrous provocation of Japan which Morgenthau’s bombing plan would 
have entailed. Nonetheless Marshall must have been one of the advisers who came up 
with the alternative of forming squadrons from the P-40s to create an ‘air diversion’ for 
Japan over the Burma Road. Cabinet members continued to believe that fighter planes 
and pilots could be dispatched as quickly as the abandoned bombing project. They 
rushed to dispatch the planes to China despite obstacles involving the British 
government and Intercontinent. Because of the urgency, Knox turned to Intercontinent 
in mid-January 1941 to get recruitment under way as quickly as possible.  
 
Roosevelt was not averse to trying out different initiatives and seeing if they worked, 
but his experiment in airpower fell well short of the mark. Everything took longer than 
expected: planes and men did not reach China in time to counter the alleged Japanese 
spring offensive against Singapore; the US military resented the release of equipment 
and personnel; and it was nearly impossible to keep the operation secret.  Most 
importantly the armchair warriors had based the operation on inadequate intelligence: 
the Japanese attack on Singapore never materialised either because it was never planned 
or diplomatic representations made in February 1941 had helped to dissuade the 
Japanese from carrying out such a plan. 
 
Roosevelt had accorded himself enormous powers as Commander-in-Chief which gave 
him and his right hand Morgenthau nearly complete control over the coordination of 
military supplies. When it came to an actual military operation such as that envisioned 
for China in January 1941, the emperor had no clothes. For the first time, Roosevelt and 
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his men had been forced to think about the details of carrying out an air mission – its 
logistics, its manpower and its purpose. Their approach to the problem was revealed to 
be naive, cynical, violent and blinkered. In devising the mission which eventually 
became the AVG , the Administration teetered on the edge between being the neutral 
commercial supplier of the interwar period and the unneutral participant in allied 
military operations which it became after Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt pulled back from the 
brink and resumed the diplomacy of deterrence based on economic sanctions and 
dialogue with Japan. The AVG showed that the Commander-in-Chief was ill prepared 
for war and should stay away from it for as long as possible. 
 
Of the four participants involved in organising the AVG, the US government derived 
the least benefit from air aid to China until after Pearl Harbor, when the President and 
the cabinet could bask in the glory of the Flying Tigers’ unexpected victories over the 
Japanese. In the short run, the principal beneficiary of the project was Intercontinent. 
For Bill Pawley, the AVG marked the culmination of his company’s business activities 
in the Far East and his elevation to a semi-diplomatic status. Pawley exploited 
Intercontinent’s unique logistical network across the Far East to manage a range of 
services for the AVG as well as the governments of India, Burma and China: the rapport 
which Pawley established with British officials in 1938-1940 enhanced the 
effectiveness of the liaison work which he undertook with them in 1940-1942.  
 
Bill Pawley along with Chennault became a point of contact for each of the three 
governments who never together held any formal consultation about air aid for China. 
British officials such as the governor of Burma Sir Archibald Cochrane or the C-in-C 
Far East, Robert Brooke-Popham turned to Pawley or Chennault rather than any 
counterpart in the US government when they needed to consult about the IAF/AVG. For 
example, a letter from Pawley to Leighton in November 1941 reveals that Brooke-
Popham contacted Pawley to organize a British volunteer unit after the Generalissimo 
appealed to Churchill for air assistance.
1218
 For the Generalissimo an international air 
force, not a strictly American volunteer group, remained the objective in 1941. Had 
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Pearl Harbor not taken place when it did, British volunteers might have been established 
in Burma to work alongside the American squadrons. 
 
The AVG was a compromise which proved to be more of a commitment than Roosevelt 
had foreseen, and fell well short of Chiang’s dream of a strategic bomber command. 
The Generalissimo had hoped that by playing up the threat to Singapore, the US 
government would feel panicked into organising massive air assistance for China. The 
mission of a hundred P-40 fighter planes accompanied by some 300 American 
personnel based in Burma was not the international air force composed of American as 
well as British units which Chiang had sought to replace the nearly defunct CAF and the 
Russian air mission.  
 
Like Roosevelt, the Chiangs began to take credit for the AVG after Pearl Harbor and 
erroneously believed that the pursuit squadrons had demonstrated the case for airpower 
over ground forces as the key to overwhelming the enemy. This exaggerated perception 
of airpower’s impact reinforced Chiang’s pre-war faith in airpower and encouraged him 
and Chennault to insist on the airpower strategy which Roosevelt eventually authorised 
for the CBI. 
 
As the US government distanced itself from the AVG in the spring of 1941, the British 
government became more involved in it. As records in the National Archives reveal, in 
early February 1941 British officials in Washington recognised that the volunteer air 
force might be of considerable utility for imperial air defence. The British in effect 
adopted the AVG. In early February 1941 Air Commodore John Slessor, the Air 
Ministry’s representative to the ABC talks in Washington, explored cooperation with 
T.V. Soong for developing the IAF/AVG. Over the next few months the British ensured 
that the units remained in Burma and became informally associated with the Imperial air 
defence plan for Burma. In 1941 Britain benefitted as much if not more than Chiang’s 
regime from the AVG.  
 
The irony was that once the Pacific war began, Americans began to pillory the British 
about the misuse of the AVG and the inadequate defence of Burma. In June 1942 James 
McHugh set the tone for future reproach by writing to Frank Knox about British failure 
in Burma. He contended that Britain had never intended to hold Burma and pointed to 
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the experience of Chennault in dealing with the British to get the AVG organized and 
trained: ‘he was continually blocked and baffled at every turn...and when he overcame 
these objections, he was pinned to a promise that his force would defend Burma first in 
the event of war.’1219   Not only does the archival record contradict McHugh’s charges 
but so did Claire Chennault. In his memoirs, he wrote:  ‘once the A.V.G. arrived in 
Burma, the British authorities were extraordinarily helpful and stretched their policy to 
its limits to provide the A.V.G. with what it needed. Without British help during this 
pre-war period, it would have been almost impossible to get the A.V.G. into fighting 
condition.’1220 
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Conclusions 
 
For most of the interwar years, the Sino-American relationship in aviation was a 
negotiation between a small ‘aviation fraternity’ and an equally small Chinese elite 
composed of Chiang’s close relations or a few officers in the CoAA. Both were on the 
fringe of the ‘ancient garment’ which enveloped China’s vast and largely impoverished  
agricultural economy. In comparison with the political and military turmoil which 
overwhelmed China from 1937 onwards, the intrigues surrounding aircraft procurement 
were a storm in a tea cup. Nonetheless the politics of airpower in US-China relations 
produced diplomatic impacts which went beyond the scope of contract negotiations.  
 
Chiang’s inner circle adopted one set of attitudes when dealing with Americans engaged 
China’s aviation and another towards the US government. The Chiangs and the  CoAA 
clique undervalued the few competent Americans who worked for them. Ed Wingerter 
for example provided outstanding service, by fitting synchronised guns on most of the 
Soviet fighter planes. Yet he had to badger the regime for pay which was overdue by at 
least three months: having arrived in December he complained on 23 February that he 
did not have enough cash to pay his hotel bill. 
1221
  William MacDonald was the only 
American who, according to contemporary observers, regularly flew combat missions 
against the Japanese on a bonus basis. When he brought down too many Japanese 
planes, he allegedly stopped flying because the Chinese did not want to pay him all the  
bonuses which he was due to receive.  
 
John Jouett brought some discipline to Chinese military training, but in 1934 Chiang 
undermined him by naming Roberto Lordi as official air adviser. Through the 
promotion of Jouett’s rival, Chiang sent a clear message to Chinese officers and cadets 
that they could resist American instruction with impunity: military attaché reports from 
1935-1940 reveal Sino-American tensions over discipline, aircraft maintenance and 
fundamentally different ideas about combat: General P.T. Mow’s comments to Wing 
Commander R.S. Aitken indicated that heroism was to be avoided : the air force only 
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attacked when confident of a clear advantage over the enemy. In the view of CoAA 
generals, military aviation should never be more dangerous than civil aviation.  
 
The Chiangs may have had a ‘soft spot’ for Claire Chennault and paid him more 
consistently than other Americans but his status in China steadily declined after 1938.  
Chennault distinguished himself from his fellow countrymen in China not by his 
competence ( Wingerter, Pawley and Leighton were all more effective in their own 
way) but his passion for airpower doctrine to which most of the aviation fraternity were 
indifferent. In August 1937, his ambition to test ideas and his personal devotion to 
Madame Chiang undermined any sense of proportion in planning the disastrous air 
offensive at Shanghai. Madame gave Chennault a leading role in the first volunteer air 
group during 1937-1938, but as Ed Wingerter’s diary reveals, Chennault was absent 
much of the time while the volunteer pilots in theory trained in Hankow. Remarks by 
Wing Commander R.S. Aitken, James McHugh and T.V. Soong also indicate that 
Chennault had little talent or appetite for air force organisation. As T.V. Soong 
commented, Chennault was a fighter but what the Chinese Air Force needed was a 
competent administrator – a herdsman not a maverick.  
 
Although diplomats and military attaches admired the work of the Jouett Mission, they 
had relatively little praise for the cadets and officers whom American instructors 
trained. Once Jouett left, relations deteriorated altogether and by 1940 as numerous 
military attaché reports reveal, Americans who dealt directly with CAF personnel could 
barely contain their contempt for them, often betraying a certain degree of racial 
prejudice or stereotyping comparable to remarks which Americans made about the 
inherent inability of the Japanese to fly a plane. They were not alone, however, in 
denigrating the CAF. From at least 1936 onwards, Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang 
and T.V. Soong made derogatory comments about the air organisation to foreign 
diplomats. Such was their arrogance, however, that they used the air force for 
propaganda purposes with the Chinese people, extracting contributions for airplanes out 
of low paid civil servants as well as business associations. ‘National Salvation through 
Aviation’ was a sham on the eve of the Sino-Japanese war. 
 
Without exception Americans in China found it impossible to take the CAF seriously as 
a fighting force. Nonetheless, they rarely if ever aired their scepticism in the US press or 
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any other public forum lest it be interpreted as unhelpful criticism of the Nationalists. 
Since official US military records containing such comments were closed for decades, 
these negative impressions did not surface in the post-war era. Popular historians who 
sympathised with the Nationalists created a narrative about pre-war Sino-American 
cooperation in aviation which appeared to be  authentic because it was based largely on 
the first hand recollections of Claire Chennault, Arthur Young and AVG pilots who 
knew as little about the interwar period as they did about the founding of their own 
squadrons in 1940-1941.  
 
Whereas Chiang’s inner circle treated individual Americans as servants, Chiang, Soong 
and Kung approached the US government with a mixture of caution and cunning. The 
Nationalists used all forms of foreign relations to enhance their status as the legitimate 
representative of a united China.  They also saw an advantage in making foreign powers 
wary of each other and unsure of Chinese intentions. In the field of aviation, this 
approach translated into entertaining as many offers as possible from foreign suppliers 
and encouraging competition amongst them. The objectives were not only financial but 
political. Chiang wished to avoid dependence on any single foreign state out of fear that 
China’s weakness might be exploited and concessions extracted which would humiliate 
his regime and the nation.   
 
For these reasons, the Sino-American relationship in aviation was always ‘a bit 
crowded’.  In 1932 T.V. Soong had no qualms about leading Americans to believe that 
they had carte blanche in revamping Chinese military aviation while secretly entering in 
to an agreement with the Italians. In 1937-1940 Chiang depended almost entirely on the 
Soviet Union for air assistance but he and Dr. Kung kept American interest alive in case 
the Russians withdrew their mission. Finally in 1940-1941, Chiang appealed for a 
British as well as an American air mission. In each case, Chiang used foreign 
partnerships to enhance the prestige of China and the image of the KMT regime as 
seeking the ‘best’ from western technology and military standards. 
 
In practice, however, Chiang either did not want to or did not know how to integrate 
foreign and Chinese air organisations. In 1933-1936 competition between Italians and 
Americans undermined the effectiveness of both. The lines of  responsibility between 
the Soviet air mission and the Chinese air organisations were never clearly drawn. As a 
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result, the Soviet advisers took over all air operations but at the same time most of their 
personnel remained segregated from Chinese counterparts. Equally ambiguous was the 
chain of command which linked the CAF, the CoAA and the Generalissimo. Regional 
CAF units in theory were autonomous to defend themselves yet subject to Chiang’s 
authority. Since initiatives might be countermanded by the Generalissimo, there was 
little incentive for individual officers to take defensive or offensive action : the air force 
was not interested in heroics as P.T. Mow made clear to R.S. Aitken in February, 1939. 
  
The US State Department turned a blind eye to the activities of Americans in China and 
the state of the Chinese Air Force in order to preserve a barrier between commercial 
interest and foreign policy objectives.  In 1928-1937 the Department went to some 
lengths to demonstrate its disinterest in Chinese military aviation to prevent any 
impression of official US government support for it. Under Cordell Hull, Far East 
policy was oriented towards appeasing Japan and avoiding entanglement with China. 
During the first year of the Sino-Japanese war, the Roosevelt Administration showed no 
sympathy for China as a victim of aggression. Only when war with Germany began to 
threaten European allies did the Administration begin  to change its Far East policy.  
 
The prospect of Japan taking advantage of a European war to seize colonies in the Far 
East induced Roosevelt and Hull to relax their hard line on China . In their eyes, it 
became an essential buffer, a vast territory in which the Japanese had to stay ‘bogged 
down.’ The Administration introduced measures which were designed to bolster 
Chiang’s morale without losing sight of national interest. A Tung oil loan of US$25 
million towards the end of 1938 benefitted the American motor vehicle industry :  the 
Chinese were obliged to buy American trucks to haul goods over the Burma Road into 
China and Tung oil out of Yunnan to fulfil the terms of the agreement. In May 1939 the 
decision by the State Department to intervene in the Patterson contract and thus promote 
aircraft sales to China reflected a desire to protect the interests of US manufacturers. At 
the same time, however, Hull and Hornbeck believed that they were helping Chiang to 
secure the planes which they believed he both needed and wanted.  Hence, just before 
the outbreak of war in Europe, the Administration established the principle of ‘plane 
aid’ for China although not in the quantity which it provided to France and Britain. 
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Terms such as plane aid or ‘all aid short of war’ were misleading. Roosevelt’s policy 
amounted to nothing more than offering certain allies priority to acquire aircraft ahead 
of the US military. Furthermore France and Britain had to pay hard cash. Therefore, by 
the end of 1940 ‘plane aid’ had nearly bankrupted Britain. Nonetheless the 
Administration and its allies considered this entirely commercial arrangement as a form 
of assistance and a powerful political gesture. Through sales of aircraft,  Roosevelt 
expressed support for Europeans and opposition to Germany.  
 
Early in 1939, the Nationalists appear to have reached the conclusion that aircraft 
procurement could provide visible evidence of US support for China. American 
willingness to sell planes to China sent a message not only to Japan but the Soviet 
Union. As Chiang’s diary and other sources reveal, he found the Russians difficult and 
their arrogance towards the Chinese humiliating.
1222
  Chiang did not want Stalin to 
believe that his regime was entirely dependent on his helping hand. Despite statements 
to the contrary, Chiang feared that Stalin might try to exact political or territorial 
concessions which would undermine the Nationalist regime and Chinese sovereignty.  
 
There was a link between the Patterson Contract and China’s relations with the Soviet 
Union. In the first half of 1939, Chiang’s representatives faced tough negotiations for a 
third large credit with the Soviet Union. To enhance their bargaining position and avoid 
being viewed as ‘beggars’ the Chinese pretended that they had the means to buy as 
many planes from the United States as they expected to receive later that year from the 
Soviet Union. Towards the end of 1938 Chiang and Dr. Kung exploited the political 
momentum provided by the Tung Oil loan ( the first US loan since the Cotton and 
Wheat loan of 1933) and revived negotiations with American aircraft brokers – shunned 
during the previous year when Russian planes and personnel flowed into the country. 
Through this ruse, they hoped to create the impression that the United States was 
rapidly moving towards greater support for China than was actually the case and that 
Roosevelt might assist Chiang in the same way as he assisted Britain or France – 
through sales of aircraft and materiel.  
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Unlike Britain or France, however, Chiang did not have the funds to pay for American 
aircraft nor did he wish to pour any more resources into his ‘rotten’ air force. If Chiang 
had wanted planes, Dr. Kung would have bought them straight away from both Pat 
Patterson and Bill Pawley  But Chiang had no need for equipment because he had 
already given up on the CAF and intended to rely on foreign assistance – Russian while 
it lasted and American or British thereafter. At the same time, however, he hoped to 
improve the standing of China in Stalin’s eyes : the negotiations with Pawley and 
Patterson for nearly 300 American airplanes were proof that the US government and US 
aircraft firms accorded China the same status as European allies. There was an 
unexpected bonus when the US State Department intervened in the Patterson contract, 
thus making even more explicit the evidence of American goodwill.  
 
The main reason which Hull and Hornbeck offered for meddling in the Patterson 
contract was the need to protect American aircraft manufacturing interests but they also 
presumed that the Nationalists needed and wanted planes for the war with Japan.  
They never considered the possibility that Chiang no longer wanted to spend money on 
the air force or that contract negotiations might have another purpose than the 
procurement of much needed planes. In September 1939 Bill Pawley told Hornbeck in 
so many words that there was no point in selling planes to China because they would be 
wasted. He also hinted that his own business in China was coming to an end. In the 
winter of 1939-1940 Pawley was looking for a way out of China. His cultivation of the 
British eventually paid off when he and Walchand established assembly operations in 
India. His interaction with British authorities also inspired their trust in his capabilities 
which became an asset for Pawley once the AVG project began to progress in the 
summer of 1941. 
 
The proposals which Bruce Leighton submitted to the US Navy in the first half of 1940 
also represented an effort to salvage Intercontinent’s China business. His idea (inspired 
in part by Dr. Kung) was to use the Loiwing factory as the hub for a air guerrilla corps 
to be employed by China as well as her neighbours – the Dutch East Indies, British 
Burma and Singapore. Like George Westervelt in 1932, Leighton formulated a 
commercial strategy in the language of military strategy which appealed to the US 
Navy. Leighton’s close relations with senior Naval officers was instrumental in 
counteracting the somewhat wary attitude which US government officials and the 
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Chinese delegation displayed towards Bill Pawley. In mid-January 1941 Frank Knox 
turned to Leighton to handle recruitment and logistics. With considerable tact and 
firmness, Leighton countered that the airpower programme for China could not be 
managed by one man : the organisers either had to accept Intercontinent or abandon the 
project. 
 
In the winter of 1940-1941 President Roosevelt and his advisers decided to use airpower 
to deter Japan on the basis of a threat perception. They had no understanding of military 
aviation. There is little evidence that they consulted their own military experts apart 
from General Marshall who was no better informed about the complexity of air 
operations than civilian leaders. Morgenthau appears to have accepted Soong and 
Chiang’s assurance that China had the necessary airfields to accommodate the largest 
American heavy bomber available, the Flying Fortress. They all underestimated ( as 
Clement Keys had years before)  the problems of projecting American airpower into 
China. Morgenthau believed that he could organize a bombing mission within a month 
and that it might so stun the Japanese people that their government would capitulate 
rather than retaliate. When Stimson and Marshall pointed out the risks of his proposal, 
Morgenthau continued to believe that three fighter squadrons could be organized almost 
as rapidly as a small bombing unit to distract Japan from its alleged spring advance on 
Singapore.  
 
The absurdity of the entire concept was further underlined by the fact that the British 
did not perceive the threat to Singapore which so alarmed Roosevelt. When the threat 
perception evaporated in February 1941 after Eugene Dooman’s surprisingly effective 
warning to the Japanese Foreign minister, the original rationale for the AVG collapsed. 
The Administration, however, remained saddled with a small mercenary air force  
which Roosevelt treated it as an unwanted child. As a note to Lauchlin Currie in May 
1941 illustrated,  the President became highly ambivalent about air aid for Chiang: 
China had surfaced as a priority in January 1941 but when the temporary crisis was 
resolved, it slipped back down the scale behind Britain and the US military. It was only 
after Pearl Harbor, when the volunteer pilots made their mark in combat, that the 
Roosevelt administration acknowledged the AVG and took credit for its victories. 
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In the interwar period, Americans and Chinese were often at odds over issues which had 
an aviation dimension, particularly US government restrictions on American personnel 
working in China and the provision of any direct military assistance. There were two 
occasions, however, when American and Chinese interests fully coincided: in the spring 
of 1932, Soong and American aviation interests shared a common desire to create an air 
defence force for resisting ( and possibly bombing) Japan; in December 1941 Chiang 
and Roosevelt embraced the idea of a direct aerial attack on Japan.  
 
Westervelt had a vision of firebombing Japanese cities as retaliation for the Japanese 
bombardment of Shanghai in 1932. In 1934 Chiang acquired Northrop bombers and 
also ordered Martin twin engine bombers with the capability to reach Taiwan and 
Japanese territories in the South China. His air adviser Claire Chennault was equally 
obsessed with bombing Japan as had been his idol Colonel Billy Mitchell. When Chiang 
appealed for air assistance in the winter of 1940-1941, he stressed the urgency of aerial 
attacks on Japan from China. The pre-occupation with bombing Japan cut across private 
ambitions as well as national interests: it connected the politics of airpower in interwar 
period to the final surrender of Japan in August 1945. 
 
As the historian Christopher Thorne observed in Allies of a Kind (1978) – there was a 
persistent myth before and during World War II that the United States government and 
the American people cared about China.
1223
 Soon after Pearl Harbor the AVG/Flying 
Tigers became part of the myth of Sino-American friendship: publicists and historians 
used the group as proof of Roosevelt’s prescience and desire to help China resist Japan 
even before Pearl Harbor.
1224
  Research for this study, however, suggests that 
Roosevelt’s priority was to help Britain rather than China in 1940-1941.  The diversion 
of P-40s from Britain to China, however, came close to creating an awkward diplomatic 
incident. Through indirect channels, Roosevelt allowed the British to regain control 
over the planes which they had been forced to give up. The airpower programme for 
China evolved into air support for British colonies in the Far East – in line with 
Roosevelt’s priorities and Bruce Leighton’s original idea of a guerrilla air unit.  
                                                     
1223
 Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind, The United States Britain and the war against Japan 
1941-1945 (Oxford, 1978), p.23  
1224
 Utley, War with Japan, p.136 
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For close to sixty years, most of the American historians who have commented on the 
politics of airpower in US-China relations have insisted that the American road to China 
was lined with good intentions. Sino-American interaction, however, was characterised 
more by mutual misunderstanding than mutual interest because their economic and 
political  circumstances were too different for either to make a clear commitment to the 
other. Furthermore as long as the Roosevelt Administration was at peace it could not 
understand the exigencies of war which China and Britain suffered. What brought the  
United States and China together was their common hatred for Japan and a desire to 
bomb it into submission. In every other respect, America’s twisted road to China was 
lined with political self-interest over which, since Pearl Harbor, historians have paved 
layers of good intentions.  
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